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Abstract 
A crisis is a specific, unanticipated, and non-routine event that generates high levels of 
uncertainty and jeopardizes high value priorities such as life, economic well-being, or 
physical infrastructures. Some scholars observe that our computing environment has 
dramatically changed and is now defined by greater use and dependence on technology, while 
simultaneously it is hampered by technological failures and security vulnerability, which have 
perhaps led to an increase in the incidence of organisational crises. Because of the high 
occurrence of crises and the increased dependence on information systems (IS) in 
organisations, one would assume that most firms would have established measures to 
counteract these events, however the literature indicated otherwise. The purpose of this 
research was to explore and understand the factors that contribute to crisis preparedness of the 
information systems. 
 
A comprehensive review of the literature indicated that the IS field has a large volume of 
publications on information systems disaster recovery, business continuity, information 
systems risk management and information systems security but little on crisis preparedness of 
the information systems.  This study comprehensively reviewed relevant literature on the 
nature of crises, crisis preparedness and information systems. The literature review 
established groundwork necessary for the development of the research hypotheses which were 
tested during this investigation. 
 
A quantitative positivist research approach was proposed. The study utilized a web-based 
survey to collect quantifiable information on the subject matter from study participants. The 
survey instrument was developed based on seven research dimensions. From these 
dimensions descriptive questions were created which formed part of the survey instrument. 
The collected data was analysed using three different approaches: descriptive statistics, 
correlation and percentage responses. From the data, facts about crisis preparedness of the 
information systems in New Zealand organisations were revealed.     
 
In total 90 responses were received, 72 of which were eligible for data analyses.  The study 
findings indicate some degree of end-user awareness of and adherence to crisis preparedness 
of the information systems in New Zealand organisations. However, more emphasis is needed 
in the understanding of the processes that bring about successful CPIS strategies across 
varying organisation structures.  
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The academic value of this research is the review of discourse in the fields of crisis 
preparedness and Information Systems, and the application of some of the theoretical 
concepts from those fields. These were necessary to test the research hypotheses and their 
findings can be used to explain the crisis-preparedness phenomenon in future studies. The 
practical value of this research is the development of a tool that can be used by managers and 
senior executives to undertake informed decisions with regard to the status or progress of the 
crisis preparedness of the information systems initiatives in their respective organisations 
from the end-user perspective.   
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Definitions 
Availability: 
This is an attribute to which information and associated assets are accessible by authorised 
users when required (Evans, 2003). In other words, it reflects the readiness for correct service 
(Avizienis, Laprie, Randell, & Landwehr, 2004). 
 
Business Continuity Plan: 
This is a process of planning to generate a state of readiness that will facilitate an immediate 
response to a disaster affecting a business unit or the computing environment of an 
organisation (Smith & Jamieson, 2006). 
  
Confidentiality:  
This is a property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorised 
individuals, entities, or processes (Evans, 2003) or the absence of unauthorised disclosure of 
information (Avizienis et al., 2004). 
 
Disaster Recovery Plan: 
Documented procedures that establish how a company or organisation can restore its IS 
systems and services after a significant large-scale interruption (Omar, Alijani, & Mason, 
2011). 
 
Integrity:  
This is a property of a computing environment that ensures accuracy and completeness of 
information and processing methods are safeguarded (Evans, 2003). In other words, it is the 
absence of improper system alterations (Avizienis et al., 2004). 
 
Information Security: 
Information security is a recurring management process in which risks are continuously 
managed by applying appropriate safeguards to reduce the likelihood and or mitigate the 
consequences of unacceptable risks (Albani, 2011). In other words, information security 
methods are intended to assist organisations to establish a security plan to address 
vulnerability associated with unauthorised misuse of information (Watson, 2007). 
 
Information Systems Risk Management: 
This is a management process which is intended to minimize the total expected cost of loss by 
selecting and implementing an optimal combination of security measures (Rainer, Snyder, & 
Houston, 1991). This process involves identifying, controlling, and mitigating information 
system–related risks (Elky, 2006).  
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Reliability: 
This refers to the ability of the IS/IT asset to tolerate faults that may render it unusable or 
incorrect (Evans, 2003) or the continuity of correct service (Avizienis et al., 2004). 
 
Threat: 
A threat is any person, object or circumstance that has the potential for causing an IS failure 
(Watson, 2007). 
 
Vulnerability: 
Vulnerability is a property of an IS/IT asset that can lead to the compromise of one or more of 
its required attributes (e.g. confidentiality, integrity and availability) (Whitman & Mattord, 
2005). 
 
 Botnet: 
A botnet is a set of compromised computers, or bot clients, running malicious software that 
enables a “botherder” or “botmaster” to control these computers remotely (United States 
Computer Emergency Readiness Team, 2010).  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The topic of the thesis is end-user awareness of and adherence to crisis-preparedness of the 
organisation's information systems (CPIS). To start this chapter, the concept of a crisis is 
explored to clarify the way it will be used in this thesis. Next, the motivation to undertake this 
study is explained in terms of a perceived gap in existing research. The research question(s) 
and the research objectives are then presented, followed by a discussion of the practical and 
academic value of this study. Having framed the topic and the motivation of the study, a brief 
description of the research methodology is provided. Finally, the structure of the main 
chapters in the thesis is presented.  
1.1 The Concept of a Crisis  
 
A crisis is a specific, unanticipated, and non-routine event that generates high levels of 
uncertainty and jeopardizes high value priorities such as life, economic well-being, or 
physical infrastructures (Denis, 1995). Crises manifest themselves in many forms such as 
informational (e.g. theft of proprietary information), physical (e.g. industrial accident), 
psychopathic (e.g. product tampering), or natural (e.g. earthquake) (Kim, Cha, & Kim, 2008; 
Mitroff, 2004). The frequency and diversity of types of crises have been on the increase 
(Pollard & Hotho, 2006) in the past three decades. Many Information Systems (IS) crisis 
events are associated with technological failures and security issues. Recently the rise of 
crisis events has become even more likely to a result of increased online criminal activities 
(Savage, 2002; Omar et al., 2011; Symantec, 2012).  
 
Many of the crises incidents directly affect the IS because most of the operations and services 
provided by organisations are computerised and fully depend on the IS platforms to be 
effected. The importance to the organisation of having its information systems remain up and 
running is evident from the fact that critical business systems which run over the IS platforms 
are considered to be the backbone of the organisation (Chang & King, 2005). These authors 
also equate the information systems to the existence of the organisation itself. Moreover, 
crises happening today have become more complex given the interconnectivity nature of 
functional groups within and between organisations. As a result, in any given event a 
substantial number of processes, operations or activities running over the IS platforms are 
likely to be affected, both in the organisation and for external customers. This complexity has 
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led each crisis to last longer in comparison with previous years (Boin & Lagadec, 2000; Hart, 
Heyse, & Boin, 2001). 
1.2 Motivation for the Research 
 
The IS field has developed several ways to handle crises: managing disaster recovery, 
maintaining business continuity, IS risk management (ISRM), and IS security (ISS). 
Organisations need these processes in order: to prevent (Albani, 2011; Pinta, 2011), to 
minimize (Boin & Lagadec, 2000; Pinta, 2011), to control (Hough, 2005; Hu, Hart, & Cooke, 
2006) or to recover (Nelson, 2006) from crises events. These approaches assist organisations 
to establish mechanisms to handle crises events before they happen, when they are in 
progress and after the events. Many studies on disaster recovery, business continuity and IS 
risk management have their main focus on what is perceived to be 'best practice' for these 
approaches at the organisation level. Even with this knowledge, the financial burden incurred 
by organisations due to the damages caused to the information systems has been on the rise 
(Richardson, 2007). 
 
Critical business systems are essential to ensure that end-users within the organisation are 
able to carry out their daily duties, and managers will hope that a high level of work output 
from end-users guarantees optimal service delivery to the customer, for at the end of the day 
this generates revenue to the organisation. However, the same end-users are required to 
comply with a number of IS protection measures such as information security procedures and 
information security policies (Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 2007a). The processes by 
which end-users interact with the critical business systems and associated requirements to 
comply with established CPIS measures is critical because in many cases end-users are taken 
by surprise due to a lack of awareness of (Siponen, 2000), or a lack of involvement in the 
processes used to establish these measures (Savage, 2002).  
 
The ever-rising cost of undoing the damage that results from IS crises events is an 
international problem, and clearly one that can and will affect many organisations in New 
Zealand. There is no clear evidence of past research studies on end-user awareness of and 
adherence to crisis preparedness of information systems in New Zealand organisations. These 
two conditions were the main drivers that led to the undertaking of this study. Therefore, this 
study aimed at investigating the degree to which end-users are aware of and adhere to CPIS 
measures in New Zealand organisations.  
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1.2.1 Research Gap and Research Question(s) 
 
IS are essential to organisational success (Bharadwaj, 2000; Mithas, Ramasubbu, & 
Sambamurthy, 2011). These systems are used to integrate various business activities, to 
reorganize and enhance interactions with customers, and to coordinate organisations with 
their suppliers so that customer demands are dealt with more efficiently and effectively. To 
take advantage of a wide range of capabilities offered by the IS, many organisations have 
underpinned almost all activities, operations or processes over different IS platforms. End-
users, also known as IS-users, use these platforms to process, to support, to operate, to 
develop, or to manage the information systems services and applications within and outside 
the organisation (Chang & King, 2005).  
 
Despite the level of computerisation, organisations are still affected by crises events. Crises 
events are potentially capable of generating substantial negative impacts on the functioning 
of the organisation. Crises events in the context of the IS manifest themselves in diverse 
forms such as destruction of the organisational information base (Pearson & Clair, 1998), 
informational (theft of proprietary information), physical (industrial accident) (Kim, Cha, & 
Kim, 2008; Mitroff, 2004) or data loss (data corruption) (Omar et al., 2011). 
 
In order to counteract these adverse events some organisations have committed to a crisis 
management process (CMP). CMP is a process that embraces four main stages: mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery (Shaluf, 2008). These are processes that organisations 
establish in order to prevent, minimize, and control the negative impact resulting from crises 
events. From these processes different measures are deployed in order to transcend the 
ramifications resulting from the impact of crises events. Some of these measures include 
business continuity plans (BCP), disaster recovery plans (DRP), ISS, and ISRM.  
 
These measures, which are established during the mitigation phase, are meant to provide a 
sense of being ready to offset the effects of crises events in times of response and recovery. 
They are intended to have the organisation ready to react to complex situations once they are 
in progress. On the other hand, preparedness is a proactive process that plays a vital role to 
ensure that response and recovery phases are executed effectively given the crisis event (Boin 
& Lagadec, 2000; Eaglestone, Lin, Nunes, & Annansingh, 2003). The importance of crisis 
preparedness is made evident in organisational partnerships. This is because an organisation 
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that implements proactive approaches is considered as a trusted partner, which also reflects 
upon its high reputation in the eyes of other organisations (Allen, 2005). While crisis 
preparedness is vital for organisations in business partnerships, its significance is far more 
important at the organisation level. Albani (2011) notes, that “…information security policies 
and procedures are of little use unless they are understood and observed by all who are 
affected by them” (p. 96). This observation is referring to the necessary level of end-user 
involvement with CPIS within the organisation. Albani suggests that organisations should 
proactively communicate their expectations and requirements to their employees, because it 
is insufficient to publish policies and assume that end-users are aware of them, will read them 
and will adhere to them. In other words, organisations should proactively prepare IS-users to 
function moderately well even in crisis times and assist them to bring up threatening issues in 
their organisations on a day-to-day basis (Boin & Lagadec, 2000).  
 
While the three components involved in the CMP (i.e. mitigation, response and recovery) are 
well explored in the literature there remains a huge concern on the fourth component— 
preparedness. The major challenge with crisis-preparedness is about the understanding of 
preparedness measures. The lack of understanding or awareness of what actually constitutes 
crisis-preparedness of information systems has a detrimental effect on how organisations 
prepare their employees (end-users) to participate in crisis preparedness endeavours 
(Siponen, 2000; Susanto, 2003). Consequently, this has led to confusion and ultimately to 
low levels of preparedness.  
 
A study conducted by Meta Group research (2003) cited by Susanto (2003) reports that only 
20% of Global 2000 organisations have comprehensive BCPs to assist them in recovery 
operations. The major problem that causes the lack of crisis preparedness is the failure to 
prioritize measures for crisis preparedness of the information systems. Adding to this 
problem is the inability of the managers to differentiate between different measures that are 
appropriate to establish the crisis preparedness of the information systems (Susanto, 2003). 
For example, some organisations consider a business continuity plan to be synonymous with 
a disaster recovery plan, yet in essence these two plans have different purposes. 
 
The lack of crisis preparedness is more of an attitude problem (Jordan, 1999). This is because 
in many instances the responsibility for producing the so called “plans” (e.g. BCP, DRP) to 
assist in times of crisis events is usually given to a particular group of people (e.g. low level 
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personnel from the IS/IT department), hence no other staff are involved, and do not 
appreciate its importance (Cerullo & Cerullo, 2004). This may happen because the 
management perceive crisis preparedness to be irrelevant as far as information systems are 
concerned, and hence, they don’t give it the attention it requires. The attitude problem is also 
reflected in issues related to risk and security policies. For instance, in some organisations 
more emphasis is placed on the technology and ignoring other components like end-users 
awareness and training, policies or IS standards operationalisation (Wood, 1995; Botha & 
Solms, 2004).  
 
The set of scenarios highlighted above indicate that there is a problem and hence a research 
gap that needs to be addressed. Therefore in order to address this gap, this study investigates 
the following research question(s): 
 
 
1. What constitutes crisis preparedness of the information systems? 
 
2. What is the extent of end-user awareness of crisis preparedness of the information 
systems within the organisation?  
 
3. What is the extent of end-user adherence to crisis preparedness of the information 
systems in the organisation? 
 
1.2.2 Research Objectives 
 
Much of the reviewed literature relevant for this study indicated that failure to counteract 
crisis events in organisations was in part inherent in end-user understanding, end-user 
awareness of, and end-user failure to abide by established CPIS measures. What was inferred 
from these studies is the deficiency in aligning the crisis preparedness initiatives to a human 
(end-user) component. On the basis of this understanding, the main theme for this research 
was to identify and compile the key elements of the CPIS from the extant literature. This 
undertaking established a foundation to generate research items which would later be used to 
seek opinions from end-users in their actual work settings. This involved identifying the 
extent to which end-users were aware of different aspects of CPIS and to what degree they 
were actually ready to act on different measures of CPIS established within the organisation. 
Thus, this research had four main objectives.  
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1. To determine the key elements of the CPIS; 
2. To determine the extent of end-user awareness of CPIS measures in their 
organisations; 
3. To determine the extent of end-user adherence to CPIS measures established within 
the organisation; 
4. To apply two existing theories to test the research hypotheses on end-user awareness 
of and adherence to CPIS measures in New Zealand organisations. 
1.3 Value of This Research 
 
The primary value of this research to academia is the expansion of the existing discourse on 
crisis-preparedness. This was done through the application of two existing theories to create 
research hypotheses and test them. Both, the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and the 
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) are important in the study of uncertainty or adverse 
events. While the PMT is useful in investigating the cognitive processes mediating 
behavioural change, the TRA is vital in the prediction of end-user intentions and end-users’ 
behavioural change attempts. The consolidation of the theoretical frameworks and the 
application of the theories to analyse data and test the research hypotheses add knowledge to 
the field of crisis preparedness in IS.  
 
This study also offers value to the practitioners. The significance of the results from this 
study allows the practitioners to gain a better understanding of the level of end-user 
awareness of and adherence to crisis preparedness of the information systems in their 
organisations.  From this understanding organisations are able to improve or enhance user 
participation in crisis preparedness of the information systems initiatives at all levels. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
 
In order to address the research questions and the main objectives of this research it was 
important to review the relevant literature. This was fundamental to gain a deeper 
understanding of the extant literature in the subject matter. Moreover, the review of the 
literature permitted for the identification of the theoretical foundations on which to base this 
study.  
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The classification of the theoretical foundations to support this study allowed for 
identification of the research dimensions. The research dimensions permitted the generation 
of the research hypotheses and the creation of research items/statements for the survey 
instrument.  
 
A quantitative positivist research approach was adopted. The aim of this methodology was to 
collect quantitative data that could explain the CPIS phenomenon without requiring 
subjective interpretation. The data was collected by using a web-based questionnaire. The 
data was analysed using three different methods (descriptive statistics, correlation and 
percentage responses) in order to provide facts about end-user awareness of and adherence to 
CPIS measures in New Zealand organisations. 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
 
This chapter presents the introduction of the thesis. Chapter 2 presents the literature review 
by addressing the three main areas of this study, namely the nature of a crisis, crisis 
preparedness, and information systems. This chapter provides a thorough review of the 
theoretical concepts relevant to the investigation. Chapter 3 explains the research 
methodology that guided this investigation. Chapter 4 analyses the collected data and 
presents the findings. Finally, Chapter 5 provides an overview of the study, presents the study 
implications and study limitations. The chapter closes by presenting opportunities for future 
research.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Chapter Outline 
 
This chapter reviews and discusses the literature relevant to this study. The review considers 
a number of research streams in order to understand the literature on the subject. Most of 
these works are from business continuity planning, information systems risk management, 
information systems disaster recovery planning, and information systems security.  
 
This study builds on the common tradition of IS research of drawing on theories from 
disciplines such as economics, computer science, psychology and general management 
(Wade & Hulland, 2004). It is envisaged that theories and/or concepts from relevant 
disciplines will shed more light on understanding and investigating crises preparedness in the 
information systems (IS) context. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
The literature review is divided in three main sections: 1) the nature of a crisis; 2) crisis 
preparedness and; 3) information systems. Figure 2.1 is a diagrammatic representation of the 
extent of this literature review. This diagram is used as a guide to review systematically 
appropriate literature in relation to the three main research areas.   
 
From section 2.1.1 to section 2.1.5 the review explores the general understanding of crises in 
the current literature with respect to this study. From these sections, the reader is able to see 
the general perspective of crises in the context of information systems within organisations 
   
Crisis 
Preparedness 
 
Nature of a 
Crisis 
 
Information 
Systems 
Theoretical 
Foundations of the 
CPIS 
Figure 2.1: Literature Review Structure 
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but with a particular focus on New Zealand organisations.  The crisis object is defined, 
followed by the characterisation of the conditions that trigger crises in a computing 
environment. This section is completed with a discussion of various issues associated with 
crisis management process in current practices. 
 
Section 2.2 reviews and discusses the concepts of crisis preparedness. In this section the 
concept of crisis preparedness is defined in order to provide a lead to section 2.3, the 
Information Systems.   
 
Section 2.3 reviews the significance of the information systems and hence the importance of 
being crisis ready from the end-user perspective. Section 2.4 reviews the foundation concepts 
in order to identify the theoretical framework to guide this investigation.  
 
2.1.1 Overview of Crises 
 
The concept of crisis is inherent in many aspects of IS such as security, interdependencies 
that result from a highly inter-connected world, human error and climatic disturbances 
(Robert & Lajtha, 2002). As a result, there is no agreed definition of a crisis. Given the lack 
of consensus on the common definition of a crisis (Shaluf, Ahmadun & Said, 2003), scholars 
from different disciplines use the terms “crisis and disaster1” interchangeably or meaning the 
same thing (Brown, Hickling, & Frahm, 2010; Faulkner, 2001; Racherla & Hu, 2009; Sylves, 
2008). The use of the term ‘crisis’ is very much dependent on the scholar’s area of research 
and the context in which it is being used (Preble, 1997). Building upon this understanding, 
this study explores the concept of crisis preparedness from the IS context. Therefore, this 
thesis draws on the work of Denis (1995) and defines a crisis as “a specific, unanticipated and 
non-routine event that generates high levels of uncertainty and jeopardises high value 
priorities such as life, economic well-being, or physical infrastructures including availability, 
confidentiality, integrity and reliability of information systems within the organisation".    
 
In the past three decades the world has witnessed a considerable number of adverse events 
which led to the damage of IS platforms (Hu et al., 2006). The losses have been experienced 
                                                 
1
 In this study the terms: crisis, disaster, emergency and catastrophic or adverse events are considered to mean 
the same thing and may be used interchangeably. 
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by a wide range of industries. For instance, in 1990, AT&T's nationwide network went down 
due to a software failure (Kuhn, 1997). Likewise, Sun Microsystems Inc. registered reduced 
net income for the fourth quarter due to system errors which affected the introduction of a 
new company-wide computer system (Rainer, Snyder, & Carr, 1991). 
 
In 1989, the American Airline's Sabre computer reservation system inadvertently shut down 
for almost 12 hours (Rainer et al., 1991), and the event disrupted the operations of about 
14,000 travel agencies nationwide.  This was because a substantial amount of customers’ 
information (data) related to flight bookings was wiped from the airline application system. 
One study reported losses resulting from these kinds of events to the tune of US$345,000 on 
average among the 39% of organisations approached during the time of the study (D’Arcy, 
Hovav, & Galletta, 2009). Unfortunately, 50%–75% of these events are triggered from within 
the organisations (Ernst & Young, 2003). 
  
Sometimes crises happen as a consequence of human actions. These actions involve 
personnel within the organisation who deliberately perform acts of vandalism, theft 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2005) or non compliance with established rules and regulations (Jones, 
2007). For example, IS personnel responsible for the management of customer information 
such as credit card details may sell that information to a third party, which can also lead to 
identity theft. The illegitimate sale of customer information is a threat both to the 
organisation and to those outside of the organisation. Identity theft can negatively affect the 
brand and reputation of the organisation, which also can result in a loss of investor and 
consumer confidence and loyalty (Allen, 2005). 
 
The seriousness of these actions to the organisation is clearly demonstrated by the incident 
that involved a U.S credit information provider back in 2006. This provider, ChoicePoint 
Inc., was fined US$10 million for negligence after personal information of 160,000 people 
went missing (Herrmann, 2007). The failure by ChoicePoint to protect private data from the 
threat of identity theft (FTC, 2006) had rendered it financially liable in terms of insurance 
payments and restoring its reputation in that market segment (or to its stakeholders). 
 
The preceding four paragraphs demonstrate how crises can have a direct impact on the IS 
platforms and the whole computing environment of an organisation. The identified examples 
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highlight some types of crises that are potentially capable of causing large detrimental impact 
to the IS. According to Pearson and Clair (1998), some other types of crises events include: 
 
 Natural disasters that destroy the infrastructure that supports a certain product or 
service; 
 Natural disasters that destroy the organisational information base; 
 Information systems tampering— an informational event that leads to criminal 
activity or unauthorised system access; 
 Information sabotage that develops into a negative financial impact as a result of 
fraud activities or disruption of business operations; 
 Security breaches that takes down the enterprise network. 
 
The consequential impact resulting from these events is enormous (Cerullo & Cerullo, 2004). 
Unfortunately, the frequency of these events and others of a similar nature is increasing and 
they are becoming more serious day by day (Jain & Singh, 2012). For instance, the number of 
attacks to the organisational IS from the Internet has increased from 3.0 Billion in 2010 to 5.5 
Billion attacks in 2011 (Symantec, 2012). Despite the current investments in management 
methodologies and technologies such as information systems risk management, information 
security risks, business continuity plans, and disaster recovery plans to assist managers in 
addressing challenges resulting from adverse events (Jordan, 1999; Susanto, 2003; Sam, 
2004; Omar et al., 2011), problems remain for which end-users are often unprepared (Spillan 
& Hough, 2003). These problems are further complicated by the lack of understanding and/or 
awareness of the fundamental concepts of crisis preparedness, or how to be prepared given 
the wide range of potential crises that can affect the functionality of the IS platforms. 
 
2.1.2 Types of Crises in the Context of IS   
Crises events are classified differently depending on the condition in which they occur. The 
UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction suggests two main types of crisis events: 
natural and technological (UN/ISDR, 2002).  
 
Natural crises include two explicit groups, namely:  
 
1. Hydro-meteorological crises.  
 12 
 
These include floods and wave surges, storms, droughts and related calamities such as 
extreme temperatures and forest/scrub fires, and landslides. 
2. Geophysical crises.  
These are categorized into earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions. 
 
Technological crises are mostly associated with industrial accidents. These are incidents such 
as chemical spills; collapses of industrial infrastructures; explosions; fires; gas leaks; 
poisoning; and radiation. 
 
Both hydro-meteorological crises and geophysical crises are potentially capable of disrupting 
the IS platforms within the organisation (Cerullo & Cerullo, 2004; Omar et al., 2011). The 
disruption could result from flooded data centres due to storms or physical destruction of the 
IS infrastructure due to earthquakes. The IS platform could also be damaged due to 
technological crises from industrial accidents such as fires and explosions (Omar et al., 
2011).  While some technological types of crises might be rare such as fires and explosions, 
others are more common in the IS environment including power failure (Elky, 2006), 
communication line failure, and defective equipment (Jordan, 1999; Cerullo & Cerullo, 2004) 
as well as malicious threats (e.g. viruses and worms) from inside and outside the organisation 
(D’Arcy et al., 2009). 
 
Technological crises are also evident from the occurrence of cyber-terrorism— unauthorised 
access to a system, denial-of-service attack, or unauthorised use of a system (Cerullo & 
Cerullo, 2004). The likelihood of different IS platforms shutting down due to unauthorised 
access to a system, denial-of-service, unauthorised use of a system, or unauthorised changes 
to system hardware or software is on the rise. In part, this is because many organisations have 
increased their dependence on IS to facilitate their day to day operations as well as linking 
internal to external networks (Savage, 2002; Omar et al., 2011), and as such, IS platforms are 
more prone to security vulnerabilities and technological failures. These characteristics make 
the IS platforms a potential target for all sorts of attacks— for example malicious attacks and 
cyber-terrorism. The extent of damage from technological crisis events is similar to those 
generated from natural crises (Cerullo & Cerullo, 2004).  
 
 
Having explored different forms of crises and their impact on the IS platforms in the 
organisation, the next section explores the conditions that trigger different types of crises. 
 13 
 
2.1.3 Conditions that Trigger Crises in an IS Environment 
 
The categorization of crises in natural and technological types (UN/ISDR, 2002) seems to be 
insufficient. This is because crises events are likely to result from other causes beyond natural 
and technology.  For instance, the IS environment encompasses a wide range of other 
components such as individuals, organisations, or systems that collect, process, or 
disseminate information. Any of these components is a likely candidate that can initiate a 
sequence of events that can lead to a crisis. To allow for this, the concept presented by 
UN/ISDR (2002) is further developed to reflect triggers of crises in an IS environment.  They 
include human (e.g. perceptions, behaviours), organisational (e.g. management 
miscommunication, management carelessness or management misconduct), technological 
(e.g. accidents, defective equipment, systems changes and new technology) and natural (e.g. 
floods, earthquake or storms). Table 2.1 summarizes the four key triggers of crises in an IS 
environment. 
 
        Table 2.1: Key Triggers of Crisis Events 
Category Triggers Author 
 
 
Human 
Perceptions, behaviours, 
poor training, lack of motivation, evil 
intent, poor decision-making, lack of 
knowledge, operator error, 
managerial errors, human error 
Rousaki and Alcott (2006);  
Weirich and Sasse (2001) ;  
Rhee & Kim (2005); Garrett (2004); 
Parnell, Koseoglu, and Spillan (2010) 
Organisational 
Management miscommunication, 
management carelessness, takeovers 
and mergers, layoffs, management 
misconduct, policy failures, 
inadequate resource allocations 
Rosenthal and Kouzmin (1997); 
Shrivastava, Mitroff, Miller, and 
Miclani (1988); Jaques (2010) 
Technological 
Accidents, defective equipment, 
systems changes, adoption of new 
technologies, cyber-terrorism 
activities, malicious threats 
Perrow (1999);  
Cerullo and Cerullo (2004);  
Shaluf (2008); D’Arcy et al., (2009) 
Natural  Floods, storms, earthquake 
Coleman (2006); Jaques (2010); 
Shrivastava et al., (1988) 
 
 
Human  
 
There are different elements in human nature that are potentially capable of initiating crises. 
They include perceptions (Rousaki & Alcott, 2006), behaviours (Rhee & Kim, 2005) and 
poor training (Garrett, 2004) among others . The perception aspect is well described by 
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Chinese and Greek wisdom that characterises a crisis as having two sides: positive and 
negative. From this perspective the concept of a crisis is symbolised by combining the signs 
of danger and opportunity (Robert & Lajtha, 2002; Rousaki & Alcott, 2006). The ability to 
differentiate a danger from an opportunity, and vice versa, from a crisis event depends very 
much on the individual’s perception, on how the individual was brought up, or the previous 
experience with the incident at hand (Parnell, Koseoglu, & Spillan, 2010). In other words, 
differences in perceptions allow individuals to act differently when faced by new events or 
complex situations. Depending on which action is taken may result in a crisis event or the 
avoidance of it. 
 
The human element in crisis events can further be illustrated by the use of secure passwords 
to access various IS resources (Assuming the use of secure passwords as one aspect of the CPIS). 
It is known from the literature that system users behave differently when it comes to the use 
security measures. Inherent in their behaviour, some users may not feel they are vulnerable 
to relevant password security threats (Weirich & Sasse, 2001). Rhee and Kim (2005) also 
contend that because of security behaviours some computer users consider themselves less 
vulnerable to threats than their counterparts. Issues related to non-compliant behaviours of 
humans do not end with security passwords alone, but they are also evident in back-up 
procedures for end-user systems (Nelson, 2006), including organisational IS rules, routines 
and standards and virus checks (Jensen, Kjærgaard, & Svejvig, 2009).  
 
Other potential triggers of crises in the human category are characterised as human factors. 
Because of the human factors, crises may occur as a result of actions or inactions of end-users 
or individuals in that particular organisation. The causes of such incidents are attributed to the 
human factors which include (a) a lack of knowledge and poor training, (b) unsafe behaviour, 
(c) leaning to poor decision making regardless of being aware and motivated and, (d) being 
motivated to act maliciously (Garrett, 2004).  
 
Organisational  
 
Triggers of crises under the organisational category include miscommunication, carelessness, 
and misconduct. Crises may occur as a result of simultaneous interactions among variables 
which co-exist inside the organisation with those in its environment (Parnell et al., 2010; 
Shrivastava et al., 1988). Usually, environmental variables introduce preconditions for 
triggering adverse events. The most recorded form of interaction in which failures occur is 
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miscommunication in decision making among the stakeholders (Elsubbaugh et al., 2004; 
Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1997; Shrivastava et al., 1988). These types of failures build up in 
stages (Turner, 1976) through communication breakdown either at the departmental level or 
at the organisation level. The extent of communication failures are depicted in some of the 
major disastrous events like NASA’s Challenger explosion, the Three Mile Island nuclear 
accident (Shrivastava, 1994),  and the explosion of the Union Carbide Corporation pesticide 
plant in Bhopal, India, in 1984 (Roberts, 1990; Shrivastava et al., 1988; Shrivastava, 1994). 
Excessive optimism and system pressures were blamed as being the cause of the Challenger 
disaster (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988) because even though the concerned parties were aware 
of the potential technical flaws in the Challenger design they failed to communicate that 
information to the relevant bodies that could have prohibited liftoff.  
 
Management carelessness or failure is also regarded as a key trigger of crises in the IS 
environment. Despite the organisation being bound to meet a range of societal legislative 
requirements such as information security incident management system standards (ISO/IEC 
27035:2011), crisis management – guidance and good practice (PAS 200:2011), business 
continuity management (SAA/SNZ HB 221:2004), trade sector standards, and also best-
practice standards and policies that have been adopted within the organisation field (Jones, 
2007; Albani, 2011), some managers fail to establish proper procedures and structures to 
accommodate these standards. For instance, the management might be working against (i.e. 
show a lack of interest in) the laid down procedures and structures, resulting in limiting 
signal detection methods, inhibiting upward reporting and discouraging positive thoughts 
from key stakeholders (e.g. end-users) (Jaques, 2010).  
 
From a different perspective, some of the failures mentioned above originate from 
organisational factors. This is according to Elliott and Smith (2006), whose standpoint was 
built on earlier arguments made by influential scholars such as Turner (1976) and Turner & 
Pidgeon (1997). Organisational factors include “policy failures, inadequate resource 
allocations for safety, strategic pressures which allow managers to overlook hazardous 
practices and conditions, communication failures, misperceptions of the extent and nature of 
hazards, inadequate emergency plans, and cost pressures which curtail safety” (Shrivastava et 
al., 1988, p. 290). The potential for a crisis event is nurtured through faulty assumptions in 
the organisation because organisational beliefs and cultures are incorporated into day to day 
management and its operations (Turner, 1976). Included in this category are the crises 
 16 
 
resulting from takeovers and mergers, layoffs, management misconduct (Jaques, 2010), lack 
of organisational planning, and unwillingness to use appropriate resources to address a crisis 
in the making (Parnell et al., 2010). 
 
Technological 
 
Crises resulting from technical aspects originate from or through handling or operating of 
equipment as well as problems with the equipment itself. A small defect in the equipment is 
likely to escalate to a major crisis (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). Technological crises resulting 
from accidents in different systems express themselves in multiple, simultaneous, and 
interacting failures in design, equipment, procedure, and environment (Perrow, 1999). A 
vivid example of these kinds of crises is the events that led to the plant explosion in Bhopal 
in 1984 (Shaluf, 2008). The plant exploded because it had received inadequate maintenance 
and was in a rundown condition (Shrivastava et al., 1988). The explosion was the effect of 
the interaction between material things (e.g. technologies), people and institutions. To explain 
this interaction Jasanoff (1993) notes that “a factory design that had worked more or less 
safely in America had been transported to a country with a fundamentally different material 
and technological culture” (p.128). As a result, the operators had developed their own way of 
running the plant in accordance with their own cultural necessities and assumptions.  
 
The investigation of the accident indicated that constant malfunctions in valve and alarm 
systems had forced the workers to develop their own ways of dealing with the breakdowns. 
This included relying on their sense of smell as a detection system for the leaking of methyl 
isocyanate. The absence of clear procedures and regulations for operating the plant resulted 
in the operator's failure to perform critical procedures shortly before the accident took place 
(Shrivastava, 1994) and hence the incident developed into a crisis event.  
 
Natural 
 
Natural events that are potentially capable of triggering crises that can impact IS platforms 
and render them unreliable include floods, earthquake and hurricanes (Cerullo & Cerullo, 
2004) among others. The impacts resulting from these events manifest themselves in diverse 
forms, such as crippling the IT infrastructure, flooding the data centres or causing power 
outage (Omar et al., 2011). The federal emergency management agency (FEMA) reports that 
between 1976 and 2001 a total of 906 major crises were declared in the US alone (Cerullo & 
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Cerullo, 2004) and the frequency and magnitude of major crises is increasing.  To emphasize 
the severity of these events Schut (1990), as cited by Cerullo and Cerullo, contend that 43% 
of organisations hit by severe crises never reopen, and that another 29% fail within two years.  
2.1.4 Common IS Risks and Threats in NZ Organisations 
 
Besides losses from natural causes, such as earthquakes, fires and floods, the majority of 
adverse events to the information systems of the organisation can be traced back to either 
intentional or unintentional unsafe behaviour of end-users or individuals. The New Zealand 
Computer Crime and Security Survey showed that over 70% of participating organisations 
experienced some sort of security incident in the 2009 calendar year (Quinn, 2010). Many of 
these security incidents are directly linked to human actions or human behaviours. The 
survey involved respondents from utility, manufacturing /production, financial, 
telecommunications, transport, high technology, medical, wholesale, retail, tertiary education, 
legal, national and local government agencies, entertainment/media, construction, and 
commercial/trade services. Some of the incident types that are likely to generate negative 
consequences to the information systems of the organisation include laptop/mobile hardware 
theft, virus contamination, malware infection, unauthorised insider access, unauthorised 
external access, and USB contamination. Some types of incidents were not addressed during 
the 2010 survey, but seem to be significant in relation to IS risks and threats internationally. 
According to the recent Symantec Internet Security Threat Report (2012), these other 
incident types include threats against mobile devices, spam and social media threats. 
2.1.4.1 Laptop/Mobile Hardware Theft 
 
Theft or loss of a laptop, a computer or other medium on which data is stored or transmitted, 
such as a USB drive or a back-up gadget is considered to be the most common cause of data 
violation (Quinn, 2010; Tetmeyer & Saiedian, 2010). According to Quinn these losses cost 
the surveyed organisations NZ$250,000 during the 2009 calendar year.  Across the globe 
laptops and mobile hardware theft account for 34.3% of all security breaches to the IS within 
the organisations. This equates to approximately 18.5 million identities being exposed to 
online criminals in 2011 (Symantec, 2012). The two reports indicate that the factors 
contributing the most to these losses are; (1) organisations being unaware that their mobile 
devices suffered security incidents and (2) a lack of security tools or procedures to safeguard 
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these devices that are fast joining the enterprise network (i.e. they appear to be preferred by 
employees to traditional desktop computers) (Albani, 2011).  
2.1.4.2 Virus Contamination 
 
A virus is defined as a small computer programme that reproduces itself on an infected 
computer and multiplies like a disease from one computer to another through e-mail, USB 
drives, file-sharing networks and Web sites (Goldsborough, 2007; Siponen & Oinas-
Kukkonen, 2007). Viruses are second in importance to laptop/mobile hardware theft, costing 
about NZ$0.25m to participating organisations at the time of Quinn's study (2010).Virus 
attacks manifest themselves in a wide range of destructive incidents. These include loss of 
data, data inconsistency, or data corruption (Goldsborough, 2007). One recorded incident of a 
viral attack is the SQL Slammer (a worm) that hit Microsoft SQL Servers in the early hours 
of January 25, 2003. This worm took advantage of a bug found in the SQL Server that had 
been made public several months earlier (Aytes & Conolly, 2003). Despite this vulnerability 
being known to IS staff from many organisations they failed to apply a required patch to their 
respective systems until after the worm event. According to the report released by Symantec 
(2012), future attacks can be avoided if organisations and all involved stakeholders update 
security virus and intrusion prevention definitions on regular basis. This also includes 
conducting training and awareness programmes to key stakeholders in the organisation— the 
end-users (Siponen, 2000). 
2.1.4.3 Malware Infection 
 
“Malware” is a portmanteau word from malicious software (Australian Communications & 
Media Authority, 2008). Malware infection allows someone with an evil intent to gain full 
access to the compromised host, leading to the exfiltration of sensitive information or the 
installation of utilities that facilitate remote control of the host (Provos, McNamee, 
Mavrommatis, Wang, & Modadugu, 2007). Malware exists in diverse forms such as Trojan, 
Adware and Spyware (Australian Communications & Media Authority, 2008).  Trojan 
software contains or installs a malicious programme with a harmful impact on a host 
computer. Adware automatically displays advertising material to the user resulting in a 
nuisance user experience. Spyware is malicious software secretly installed on host computers 
that collects information about users without their knowledge. Spyware software operates by 
monitoring the user's computing experience. Spyware can collect almost any type of data, 
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including user information like user logins, bank or credit account information, and Internet 
browsing habits (Sipior & Ward, 2008). 
 
Quinn (2010), reports that malware infection is the third largest IS threat, experienced by 
22% of the respondent organisations. This percentage is consistent with data published by 
Symantec (2012), which indicates that between October 2010 and the end of the year 2011 
about 35.8% of organisational websites had at least one vulnerability and 25.3% had at least 
one critical vulnerability resulting from malware infection. In part this is encouraged by the 
integration of IS to the Internet which facilitates a number of business processes to be 
conducted online. As such computer users have become the target of an underground 
economy that infects hosts with malware or adware for financial gain (Provos et al., 2007). 
 
Malware infections have become more common and trickier to detect and remove, as their 
perpetrators make use of many existing sophisticated techniques. For instance, Conficker had 
nothing new but was difficult to discover and erase because it was created by combining 
many advanced malware techniques (Markoff, 2009; Porras, 2009) . On the other hand, web-
based malware infection is made possible to a large extent by the existing facilities to setup 
and deploy websites (Provos et al., 2007). Provos et al., observe that keeping the required 
software (IS platforms) up to date with patches is a challenging task since it requires human 
intervention that involves human behaviour with regard to crisis preparedness measures of 
the information systems. 
2.1.4.4 Unauthorised Insider Access 
 
One of the complicating aspects with improper insider access is that the referred incidents 
will not always relate to something that is unauthorised (Magklaras & Furnell, 2001; Furnell 
& Phyo, 2007). This is because the individual concerned has legitimate access to IS resources 
of the target organisation. In other words, this person does not need to bypass the access 
control mechanisms of the IS infrastructure for example by stealing passwords. In the context 
of this study, unauthorised insider access is the act of abusing granted privileges to cause 
harm (Theoharidou, Kokolakis, Karyda, & Kiountouzis, 2005), thus violating the established 
measures for the crisis preparedness of the information systems of the organisation. 
 
Abuses of the information systems of the organisation are acts performed for a variety of 
reasons. For instance, a legitimate end user who attempts to access sensitive data (i.e. data 
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theft), take revenge against an organisation (personal differences) due to his/her impending 
redundancy, other malicious motives, or deliberately ignoring established measures for the 
crisis preparedness of the information systems (i.e. being negligent) (Furnell & Phyo, 2007; 
Richardson, 2008). 
 
According to D’Arcy et al., (2009) unauthorised insider access of information systems 
resources represents a significant threat to organisations. This point of view is consistent with 
the finding from the New Zealand Computer Crime and Security Survey (2010) that reports 
that security policy non-compliance and inadequate protection from internal users are the 
second and third largest perceived issues, backing up the 2007 findings that the insider threat 
poses the greatest risk to organisational security.  
 
Insiders are very often the source of major and costly security incidents, and a considerable 
proportion of what is commonly categorised as online crime (or cybercrime) can be attributed 
to them. Undeniably, their place within the organisation often puts them in an ideal position 
to access a system illegitimately if they are inclined to do so (Theoharidou et al., 2005; 
Furnell & Phyo, 2007). 
2.1.4.5 Unauthorised External Access — Denial of Service Attacks 
 
Denial of service (DOS) attacks have recently become a weapon to promote political 
ideology such as promoting expressive politics, free speech, and human rights by a number of 
social groups like Anonymous. A DOS attack is an attempt to make a machine or network 
resource unavailable to its intended users (Computer Emergency Response Team, 2001). 
The DOS attack is implemented by clogging up the memory of the targeted system so that it 
cannot be accessed by its users, or it causes the target system to crash, reboot, or otherwise 
deny services to legitimate users (Kumar & Gomez, 2010; Jain & Singh, 2012). The 
architects of DOS attacks usually target sites or services hosted on high-profile Web servers 
such as government websites, credit card payment gateways, and banks (see some examples 
below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the US Computer Emergency Response Team (2001), not all service outages, 
even those that result from malicious activity, are necessarily denial-of-service attacks. Other 
types of attack may include a denial of service as a component, but the denial of service may 
be part of a larger attack. The authors further contend that illegitimate use of resources may 
also result in a denial of service. This happens when an unauthorised user uses the 
organisation's anonymous ftp area
2
 as a place to store illegal copies of commercial software, 
which results in consuming disk space and generating network traffic.  
 
Denial of Service attacks will have a greater impact as more services and business processes 
are moved over to the Internet platform. According to the New Zealand Computer Crime and 
Security Survey (2010) external threats (virus/malware/worms…) account for 46% of all IS 
threats and risks. DOS attacks can cause loss of business and credibility. However this can be 
avoided if the following vulnerabilities in the organisation IS platforms are sorted out (Evans, 
2003; Albani, 2011): 
 
                                                 
2
 Anonymous ftp area is method for downloading public files using the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). It is called 
anonymous because the person downloading the files can not be identified. 
Internal Affairs website down; no evidence of DOS attack so far 
February 2011 
 
The Internal Affairs Department website is down, and while there has been speculation it 
may be due to a denial-of-service attack from the hacker group Anonymous, Internal 
Affairs spokesman Tony Wallace says there is no evidence so far to suggest that's the 
case. 
Source: http://computerworld.co.nz/news.nsf/news/internal-affairs-website-down-anonymous-
blamed 
 
 
Walmart, Amazon.com hit with denial of service attack  
Thursday, December 24, 2009 
 
Holiday shoppers who were hoping to purchase last minute gifts at some of the top e-
commerce retailers in the country were greeted with a surprise Wednesday evening as a 
denial of service attack slowed down sites such as Amazon.com, Walmart.com, Expedia 
and others. 
Source: 
http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/blog/techflash/2009/12/walmart_amazoncom_hit_with_denial_o
f_service_atack.html 
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 Apply an appropriate firewall to the IS infrastructure;  
 Provide adequate network management; 
 Apply patches to different versions of the software used in developing various IS 
applications that can stop the exploitation of any security weakness; 
 Keep up to date all measures for the crisis preparedness of the information systems to 
allow known weaknesses to be corrected in a timely manner. This includes running 
training and awareness programmes to key stakeholders.   
2.1.4.6 USB Devices 
 
In the past decade Universal Serial Bus (USB) devices became commonly used as new forms 
of portable storage media with great storage capacities, high data transfer speeds, and are 
typically removable and rewritable (Rich, 2007; Tetmeyer & Saiedian, 2010). These kinds of 
devices include memory cards (Compact- Flash, Secure Digital or Memory Stick), removable 
USB flash drives, and iPods among others. The USB devices may also be referred to as 
transient storage devices (TSDs).  
 
The small physical size of the USB coupled with functionalities such as the ability to store 
and auto-run applications straight from the devices has allowed for criminal acts like identity 
theft, data breaches and electronic fraud to be carried out easily by insiders (Al-Zarouni, 
2006; Vijayan, 2006). Given this possibility USB devices have become a major IS threat and 
risk factor to organisations (Quinn, 2010; Tetmeyer & Saiedian, 2010). However, Yee (2004) 
suggests that, for a device to be effective and easy to use there should be a trade off between 
security and usability. “This underlying principle is applicable to security issues for transient 
storage devices. If devices are solely focused on security, usability will suffer.” (Tetmeyer & 
Saiedian, 2010, p. 46) 
 
The extent of the IS threats and risks from USB devices is made clear in the New Zealand 
Computer Crime and Security survey (2010) showing that USB devices are the main vectors 
for virus and malware infection, including being among the main vectors for data loss 
incidents. Some of the common incidents causing these states of affairs include: USB via 3
rd
 
party network segment, USB via antivirus laptop, USB PowerPoint by overseas visitor, USB 
by security guard and loss or theft of a USB device. The survey also indicates that over 50% 
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of respondent organisations had no existing protection against USB incidents. Around 17% 
completely disabled USB capability and only 6% had file copy protection.  
 
The literature indicates that USB based attacks are closely linked to human factors in relation 
to IS security or crisis preparedness of the information systems for this matter (Al-Zarouni, 
2006). Clear understanding of the human factors involved may establish potential IS threats 
and risks TSDs pose to organisations. As such raising awareness and training of IS-users 
about these threats may play a big role in reducing USB based attacks. 
2.1.4.7 Threats against Mobile Devices 
 
The number of employees bringing their own mobile devices such as smart-phones, tablets or 
laptops to work is on the rise (Symantec, 2012). While threats against mobile devices were 
not explored in the New Zealand Computer Crime and Security Survey (2010), the global 
trends to ‘bring your own device’ presents a major challenge to the crisis preparedness of 
information systems in many organisations. This is because of the difficulty in monitoring 
and controlling every device brought to the enterprise network. The risk here is that a device 
owned by an employee could have been or might be used for non-work activity that can 
potentially expose it to malware infections. 
 
Many of the mobile devices can be used in the same way as desktop computers. The complex 
design and enhanced functionality of these devices present additional vulnerabilities as their 
security can be compromised when accessing public internet hot spots or home networks. 
These vulnerabilities, put together with the growing market share, make mobile technology 
an attractive, viable, and rewarding target for those interested in exploiting it (United States 
Computer Emergency Readiness Team, 2010).  This is because mobile devices are likely to 
contain vast amounts of sensitive information belonging to both the organisation and the 
device owner. Whenever mobile devices are compromised the outcome is likely to be severe 
for the individuals and to the organisations alike. That is why these kinds of devices present a 
serious IS threat and risk to the crisis preparedness of the information systems within the 
organisation.   
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2.1.4.8 Spam  
 
Spam is defined as an unsolicited e-mail which is sent with intent to lure the recipient to buy 
something or which provides a disproportionately high benefit to the receiver (Goldsborough, 
2007; Australian Communications & Media Authority, 2008). Spammers may also use 
information that is current and interesting to the reader such as political unrest (e.g. the Egypt 
uprising), the deaths of public figures (e.g. Muammar Gadhafi, Steve Jobs and Amy 
Winehouse) and natural disasters (e.g. the Japanese tsunami). These are the kinds of topics 
that newspapers cover and for the same reasons they attract a reader's attention (Symantec, 
2012). 
 
The global trends indicate that the overall amount of spam fell considerably in the year from 
88.5% of all e-mails in 2010 to 75.1% in 2011 (Symantec, 2012). In part this was a result of 
the law enforcement action that shut down Rustock, a huge, global botnet that was 
responsible for distributing large quantities of spam. Despite the fall in e-mail spam, spam 
remains a chronic problem for many organisations and can pose a silent threat to businesses 
due to the increase in informational, managerial and operational costs to the organisations. 
These costs can range from bandwidth costs, productivity losses resulting from wasted time 
(i.e. time spent to receive, read and delete large quantities of unsolicited e-mails) and money 
spent on recovering destroyed data (New Zealand Statistics, 2010).  
 
Despite the existence of e-mail filters to reduce the quantity of spam (Goodman, Cormack, & 
Heckerman, 2007), the increasingly sophisticated techniques used by spammers mean the 
filters may not prevent users from accessing these spam e-mails. For the same reason, end-
users need to be aware of how to identify spam and how to act in case they come across 
them. 
2.1.4.9 Social Media Threats 
 
The attention of online criminals and spammers is now shifting to social media sites 
(Australian Communications & Media Authority, 2008; Symantec, 2012). The shift is 
encouraged by the increasing popularity of social networking and micro-blogging sites. The 
potential of having access to a multitude of people on social networking sites make them 
attractive targets for online criminals and spammers. 
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A social media channel (e.g. Facebook and Twitter) is perfect for social engineering as it is 
easier to trick individuals when they feel they are in safe hands surrounded by friends 
(Workman, 2008). According to Symantec (2012), over 50% of all attacks identified on 
social networking web sites were linked to malware infection on compromised Blogs/Web 
Communications web sites. It is on the social networks that the hyperlinks of the 
compromised web sites are shared to a wider audience and they are also increasingly used for 
sending out spam messages. In addition, online criminals are utilizing the power of social 
media by tricking end-users from different organisations into spreading the compromised 
links on their behalf. 
 
In order to counteract this challenge organisations are encouraging responsible use of online 
content and services. This is done by promoting and enforcing policies for responsible 
behaviour in online communities. These policies encourage end-users to behave reasonably 
in social media channels and to report those they feel are not abiding to the rules (Australian 
Communications & Media Authority, 2008).   
2.1.5 Challenges to Current Approaches to Crises Situations 
 
As discussed in chapter one, some organisations have committed to a crisis management 
process (CMP) in order to reduce the severity of potential crises events. Mansor (2004) 
presents a disaster management cycle of a crisis management process progressing through 
four phases — mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (Fig 2.2). The phases of the 
crisis management process are characterized by different goals and resources (Lettieri, 2009), 
which means different functions and activities are performed at each phase.  
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Figure 2.2: Disaster Management Cycle 
Source: Shaluf (2008) 
 
Mitigation embraces activities that do away with or reduces the probability and consequences 
of a disaster, for example, information security measures are established to alleviate the 
operational risks in order to ensure the dependability of  the information systems (Avizienis 
et al., 2004). The term 'dependability' refers to the ability of the IS platforms to deliver 
services that can justifiably be trusted. Alternatively, it is the ability to avoid service failures 
that are more frequent and more severe than is acceptable.  
 
Some of the necessary activities in this phase are to:  
 
 Identify threats and vulnerabilities that might impact the operations of the computing 
environment; 
 Protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information (Allen, 2005). 
 
The mitigation phase also includes the activities performed to establish the components of the 
business continuity plan (BCP); information systems risk management (ISRM); or 
information systems security (ISS). In the case of a BCP this can include: 
 
 Business risk and impact analysis;  
 Initial tests and training of staff in the business recovery process (Savage, 2002). 
 
Preparedness is defined differently by different authors. From the emergency management 
perspective, preparedness refers to the development of effective policies, procedures and 
capacities to plan the best ways to manage a crisis event (Hwacha, 2005). According to Unlu 
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(2010) preparedness is a process that involves technical tasks, such as the identification of 
critical resources and the development of the necessary agreements among responding actors 
(e.g. end-users). Alexander (2005) views preparedness as short-term actions taken to reduce 
the impact of an impending disaster. Thorough discussion on this concept will follow later. 
  
Response is described as an action undertaken immediately prior to, during and immediately 
after a crisis or a major emergency (Shaluf, 2008; Hwacha, 2005). Response activities are 
meant to minimize property damage and enhance the beginning of recovery from the incident 
(Shaluf, 2008).  
 
Recovery embraces activities that return infrastructural systems to minimum operating 
standards including guiding long-term efforts designed to return businesses to normal or 
improved levels after a disaster (Shaluf, 2008). Primarily, this is accomplished through prior 
strategies established during the mitigation phase, such as business continuity plans (BCPs) 
or disaster recovery plans (DRPs), and being kept current throughout the preparedness phase,  
 
This study attempts to examine to what degree end-users are aware of and adhere to a range 
of CPIS measures established within the organisation. In particular, this study focuses on four 
common approaches applied by diverse organisations to protect their critical business 
systems running over different IS platforms. They are business continuity plans, disaster 
recovery plans, information systems risk management and information systems security 
which was used as a representation of CPIS measures in chapter one. These approaches 
present different aspects of the CPIS. The number and type of approaches implemented by 
the organisation depends on the size and the business needs of that particular organisation 
(Susanto, 2003; Jones, 2007).    
 
Business Continuity Plan (BCP) 
 
A BCP is intended to avoid or mitigate risks; to reduce the impact of a crisis event; and to 
reduce the time needed to restore critical business systems to a state of “business as usual” 
(Botha & Solms, 2004; Cerullo & Cerullo, 2004). A BCP is meant to be a dynamic document 
that must evolve as different changes are introduced in the organisation’s business processes 
(Pinta, 2011). The business continuity planning process is required to address three main 
interdependent objectives; (1) to identify the major risks that can potentially shut down the 
computing environment; (2) to develop a plan to mitigate or reduce the impact of the 
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identified threats and risks; (3) train end-users and then to test the plan to ensure that it works 
(Cerullo & Cerullo, 2004). To achieve these objectives a number of activities are usually 
involved. Botha and Solms (2004) present seven phases required to generate a BCP: project 
planning, business impact analysis (BIA), business continuity strategies, continuity strategies 
implementation, continuity training, continuity testing, and continuity plan maintenance. 
Cerullo and Cerullo (2004) group these activities (phases) into three main components of the 
BCP process: (i) business impact analysis (BIA), (ii) disaster contingency recovery plan, and 
(iii) training and testing.  
 
For the purpose of explaining the business continuity planning process, this study follows the 
work of Cerullo and Cerullo (2004). The BIA systematically assesses the potential impacts 
resulting from different events or situations that may cause critical business systems to be 
unavailable (Savage, 2002; Botha & Solms, 2004). The BIA process facilitates the 
organisation to evaluate the risk of business process failures and to identify critical and 
necessary business functions including the hardware, software, systems, services, and related 
technology assets that support the organisation’s critical operations.   
 
On the other hand, a disaster contingency recovery plan explains procedures to follow when a 
crisis hits. It lists the names of team members and their specific duties, work-around 
processes to keep the organisation operational while the damaged IS platforms are being 
restored to a “business as usual” status. In general, the disaster contingency plan is a critical 
part of a BCP.  
 
In preparation for potential crises events, training and testing is needed. This is done after 
completing the BCP (Savage, 2002; Botha & Solms, 2004). Testing of the BCP and related 
training of the stakeholders are usually followed by auditing the plan at regular intervals. 
Training and testing are essential to ensure that the BCP is comprehensive to address critical 
risks (Pinta, 2011). Salvage (2002) observes that training and testing usually only involve the 
recovery team and exclude other end-users. The lack of involvement of other members of the 
organisation is due to executives’ cost concerns and their perception of business continuity 
planning as a cost but with no value in return (Cerullo & Cerullo, 2004). This is evident in 
surveys conducted to examine the status of the BCPs in organisations around the world, 
which indicate their status to be minimal. For instance, study results published in the Ernst & 
Young Global Information Security survey (2002) based on responses from 459 Chief 
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Information Officers and IT Directors from medium to large size organisations worldwide, 
indicate that only 53% of these organisations had developed a BCP.  A similar survey 
conducted by Meta Group research (2003) as cited by Susanto (2003) shows that only 20% of 
Global 2000 organisations have effective BCPs to assist them during the recovery phase of a 
crisis. 
   
Another problem with the current approaches to BCP is that most of the existing BCPs are 
incomplete and outdated and they don’t address today’s major risks and threats of business 
system interruptions (Cerullo & Cerullo, 2004). This might be caused by a lack of knowledge 
and/or understanding, lack of awareness or failure to adhere to established rules and 
regulations within the organisation itself, or from the effect of regulatory bodies in the 
organisational sector. In addition, many of these BCPs have not gone through the normal 
procedure of carrying out the business impact analysis (BIA) as well as being tested (Ernst & 
Young, 2002) before their implementation. This could mean a wide gap between what the 
organisation needs and what the plan can actually provide.  
 
Incomprehensive BCPs in many organisations are also blamed on the lack of participation of 
active participants in the recovery process (Tootle, 2007; Omar et al., 2011). These are the 
people knowledgeable or have the understanding of how to deal with crisis events, or are the 
end-users who use the systems on a day-to-day basis (Nelson, 2006). 
 
Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) 
 
In some organisations a BCP and a disaster recovery plan (DRP) are considered synonymous 
(Susanto, 2003), but others view disaster recovery planning as more tightly focused on areas 
around information systems and services (Watson, 2007; Omar et al., 2011). Nelson (2006) 
argues that organisations with a BCP usually have a DRP. These two can either be integrated 
or maintained as separate plans. In essence, the DRP is a technically oriented plan intended to 
facilitate the recovery of critical business processes so that they are restored to normal 
operation (Pinta, 2011) after a crisis. “An effective DRP should consist of nine procedural 
steps: obtaining top management commitment, establishing a planning commitment, 
performing risk and impact analysis, prioritizing recovery needs, selecting a recovery plan, 
selecting a vendor and developing agreement, developing and implementing the plan, testing 
the plan, and continually testing and evaluating the plan” (Chow & Ha, 2009, p. 250). Blatnik 
(1998), as cited by Chow and Ha, observes that a DRP implementation should consist of nine 
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Initiation Risk Analysis Risk Mitigation 
stages, namely policy enforcement, threat analysis, back-up strategies, training, testing, 
documentation, regular reviews, regular updates, and IS staff participation. While Blatnik 
indicates the necessity of IS staff participation in the DRP implementation, Blatnik, Chow 
and Ha excluded end-user participation in the process of DRP implementation. That means 
the DRP may exist in the organisation but it is not brought to the awareness of the end-users. 
The lack of awareness and no input from end-users is likely to be a source of inefficiency in 
maintaining this kind of a plan over time.  
 
Similar to the BCP, the DRP is a dynamic document that needs to be updated as new business 
processes and other new aspects of the business are introduced, and if the organisation learns 
from tests and operationalisation of plans in response to an actual crisis (Nelson, 2006). With 
the absence of end-user input the DRP is unlikely to be comprehensive enough to 
accommodate all potential risks and threats. To address this challenge, Smits and Ally (2003) 
suggest that organisations should put in place a management infrastructure that assists with 
creating a behavioural readiness for a crisis via provision of programmes that create 
awareness and understanding of how crises and interruptions can threaten the organisation’s 
operations and survival.  
 
Information Systems Risk Management (ISRM) 
 
Another important aspect of the CPIS is information systems risk management (ISRM). This 
is a process of understanding and addressing the factors that may lead to failure in the 
confidentiality, integrity or availability of critical business systems (Stoneburner, Goguen, & 
Feringa, 2002). The ISRM process embraces three main stages: initiation, risk analysis and 
risk mitigation (See figure 2.3). For the purposes of this study, only the risk mitigation stage 
is reviewed. This is because it is at this stage that end-user involvement becomes important.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: The Overall Process of Risk Management 
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According to the ISO/IEC 27001 (2005), the risk mitigation stage (Figure 2.4) consists of 
three tasks: design, implement, and monitor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The design task embraces the specification of security objectives and the deployment of 
security policies and processes appropriate for controlling risk. Existing policies and 
countermeasures are identified and reviewed in comparison to the findings from the risk 
analysis stage. In the case of any changes, additional control measures are specified and 
designed, accompanied by the timeframe over which they should be implemented. The 
implementation task involves the application of the identified control measures and 
procedures including the management of resources (i.e. people, time, funds, and operations) 
required for implementing these measures. It is during the implementation stage that security 
awareness programmes are established in order to build a healthy risk and security culture 
within the organisation. The final task of the risk mitigation stage is monitoring. This process 
follows the implementation of the identified control measures and ensures that they are 
operating effectively and as intended. The monitoring process also includes:  
 
(i) processes for the prompt detection of errors and security incidents; 
(ii) mechanisms that examine whether documented procedures are being followed; and  
(iii) reviews aimed at the evaluation of implemented controls’ efficiency. 
 
Generally, the ISRM process can be improved by addressing the social factors that influence 
the process and the outcome of the ISRM (Pfleeger, 2000; Gerber & Vonsolms, 2005). The 
main challenge with ISRM processes is the ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in the risks 
themselves and the human understanding of how to address them (Pfleeger, 2000). In 
Design Monitor 
Implement 
Figure 2.4: Risk Mitigation Stages 
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common practices, risk analysis focuses mainly on physical elements of the information 
systems such as the technology, the hardware and the infrastructure. According to Pfleeger, 
this approach is very unlikely to ensure comprehensive protection of the IS against potential 
risks and threats. In complementing this argument, Smith (2003) notes that “risk is not 
fragmented into compartments and silos, risk management should not be either”. It is rather 
recommended that the entire spectrum related to the IS environment is taken into 
consideration in order to establish a sound and effective ISRM strategy for the organisation.  
Gerber and Vonsolms (2005), suggest that this approach can be realized by transforming the 
estimation of threat and risk analysis to include the social aspects of the CPIS. In other words, 
ISRM processes can be organised so that they take into account the values, beliefs, and biases 
(Pfleeger, 2000; Gerber & Vonsolms, 2005) of those affected by the CPIS within the 
organisation. What is being referred to here is the need to evaluate IS threats and risks based 
on values, beliefs and biases of the end-users in addition to the technical approach. These 
social aspects which are influenced by factors such as history, culture, politics, law and 
religion (Gerber & Vonsolms, 2005) are likely to affect the social context of security 
controls’ application and the stakeholders’ perceptions with regard to IS threats and risks 
(Tsohou, Karyda, Kokolakis, & Kiountouzis, 2006). In many cases risk depends on a 
complex interplay of different social variables, which are influenced by human judgment. 
Again, the identification and estimation of risk is both a human and a social activity. Karyda 
et al., (2004) as cited by Tsohou (2006), observe that ISRM is affected by organisational 
elements, including social and cultural aspects.  
 
The point above is well explained by cases whereby end-users are not aware of the security 
measures put in place by their organisations (Cerullo & Cerullo, 2004; Tsohou et al., 2006). 
In such circumstances IS security measures are viewed as bottlenecks (i.e. time wasters) 
rather than a necessity (Smith & Jamieson, 2006). In order to change this attitude and allow 
for end-users to comply with established CPIS measures, some organisations have introduced 
training and awareness programmes. However, apart from awareness and training there are 
other social factors that affect end-users’ perceptions of IS threats (Tsohou et al., 2006). This 
is the reason why there is much diversity in the way end-users and other stakeholders react to 
different risks and threats. Their thoughts of IS risks and threats may result from personal 
experience, from what they have seen or heard in the mass-media (e.g. newspapers, internet, 
TV, etc.) or from what they have learnt from friends. According to Tsohou et al., (2006) other 
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social factors that influence end-users’ perceptions include their familiarity with the source of 
danger, their ability to control the situation, and the severity of the crisis event. 
 
On the other hand, end-users are unlikely to follow organisational information security 
guidelines appropriately even though they are aware of them (Siponen, 2000). This is because 
ISRM involves a number of human activities that depend on how end-users perceive risk 
with regard to IS. To explain this phenomenon, Tsohou et al., (2006), observe that people 
tend to evaluate risks differently when they rate the same risks for themselves, their family, 
and people in general. This could be the main reason of disparity between the end-users’ 
ranking of threats and those of IS security professionals. This point of view is also supported 
by Rippl (2002), who argues that individuals are embedded in a social structure that acts like 
a filter shaping their values and attitudes [with regard to IS risks].   
 
Despite the existence of several ways to minimize the negative impact of crises events, 
unfortunately the literature shows these methods have failed to produce the intended results.  
Problems mentioned in this text are not exhaustive; however they indicate that many of the 
difficulties and shortcomings revolve around lack of understanding, lack of awareness and 
failure to adhere to CPIS measures by the users of the information systems. 
2.2 Crisis Preparedness  
 
Failures in crisis preparedness of the information systems (CPIS) endeavours have been 
linked to inadequate business and risk strategies, inadequately informed decision-making 
based on insufficient information and lack of appropriate authorisation from senior 
management. The situation is often intensified by the deficiency of clearly defined risk limits, 
intentionally misleading reports, insufficient intra-organisational communication concerning 
risk vulnerability, shallow or unrealistic risk control measures, poor knowledge of the 
business environment and lack of timely decision-making (Eaglestone et al., 2003). The 
seriousness of the matter becomes even more pressing as organisations depend on a zero-
defect quality IS to facilitate their critical operations (Applegate, 1999). The survival of the 
IS platforms can be equated to the existence of the organisation itself (Susanto, 2003). This 
point of view can be rephrased to mean that “an organisation will only prevail as long as it’s 
IS platforms remain operational” during and post the crisis event.  
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The IS platforms within an organisation can be sustained throughout a crisis event by 
implementing comprehensive measures for the CPIS. However, organisations are likely to 
ignore the warning signs or triggers of an impending crisis due to over-dependence on the 
existence of protection or preventive measures (Caponigro, 2000) for IS. This dilemma is 
well explained by Pollard and Hotho (2006), asserting that plans, such as contingency 
planning, BCP or ISRM are likely to create a false sense of preparedness where in actual fact 
it does not exist.  
 
It might be worthwhile to consider similar attempts at CPIS used by the Association of peri-
Operative Registered Nurses (AORN) to check their preparedness status: “Are you prepared? 
Is crisis planning part of your orientation plan for (staff) new to your department? We prepare 
our staff to operate with high-tech equipment, but would they also know how to function in a 
low-tech situation?”(Steiert, 2007, p. 175) It is a common phenomenon in many 
organisations, after accomplishing the development of so called “plans” such as BCP, DRP or 
ISRM, to feel a sense of security. Regrettably, many such plans are placed on a bookshelf or 
shoved in a file drawer and forgotten. In fact, some organisations did prepare some of these 
plans but, during an actual crisis, came to realize that they never thought of or considered the 
plans they had prepared (Caponigro, 2000).  This study finds out the degree to which some of 
these challenges have been addressed in New Zealand organisations in order to avoid similar 
traps (issues) as highlighted in the extant literature. 
2.2.1 Understanding the Concepts of Crisis Preparedness 
 
In principle, ‘crisis preparedness’ activities involve preparing for what has not yet occurred. 
There are two similar concepts in relation to crisis preparedness: readiness and willingness. 
The comparable nature of these concepts is drawn from their usage in various research 
studies. In fact, some authors have gone further to use the terms interchangeably. In 
conceptual terms, readiness is similar to preparedness in the effectiveness literature (Banerjee 
& Gillespie, 1994). Many such studies focus on some type of accidents, errors, destabilizing 
event or uncertainty (Perrow, 1999) when referring to potential threats to IS assets. On the 
other hand, willingness embraces behavioural features of people such as attitudes and wishes. 
These behaviours can manifest themselves at any level of the undertaking—at the individual 
level, at the departmental level, or at the organisational level. 
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2.2.1.1 Readiness 
 
Gillespie and Streeter (1987, p. 156), define readiness as the “degree of readiness to deliver 
services in response to a disaster. Rousaki and Alcott (2006) broadly define crisis-readiness 
as the capability to cope with the uncertainty caused by a crisis. From a different perspective, 
Reilly (1993) suggests that crisis-readiness activities should incorporate both crisis 
prevention and crisis management components. Prevention refers to technology and people 
engaged in activities to reduce vulnerability to a crisis, whereas a crisis management 
component involves responding to a crisis. Reilly (1993) further suggests that the execution 
of crisis management requires capabilities in decision response, information flow — both 
internal and external, and implementation, as well as resource mobilization. Drawing upon 
the same understanding, Smits and Ezzat (2003) argue that leadership and team-building are 
central elements in the effective handling of a crisis and they point to the importance of a 
meaningful human infrastructure development.  
 
By and large, readiness— similar to preparedness— embraces fundamental concepts 
associated with effectiveness.  They include effective mobilization and allocation of scarce 
resources, communication among stakeholders, as well as effective dissemination of 
information to key stakeholders.  In addition, readiness involves coordination and utilization 
of key capabilities in handling crisis events.  
2.2.1.2 Willingness 
 
One of the requirements in ISO 27001:2005, “Information technology — information 
security management systems” advocates the value of implementing and operating controls to 
manage an organisation’s information security risks. In best practices, information security 
risks must be managed in the context of the organisation’s overall business risks. There are 
diverse ways in which risks and threats can be handled at the organisation level. The 
differences in approaches depend very much on the type of the organisation and its 'risk 
appetite'— the extent of its willingness to accept risk. As Jones (2007) puts it “some will 
embrace risk where they feel that it offers the opportunity for greater reward, while others are 
more conservative and will be considered risk averse”. 
 
Willingness is also embraced in issues of organisational politics. Political will is an essential 
feature for sustained efforts in risk reduction (UN/ISDR, 2002). Gaining political 
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commitment from those in authority has a positive influence on activities intended to reduce 
negative impacts of crises. Political willingness is significantly important in giving crisis-
preparedness the place it deserves. Despite the necessity of commitment from those in 
authority, other elements such as the mobilization of human, technical, material and financial 
resources  (Broadbent & Weill, 1997; Armstrong & Sambamurthy, 1999; Smaltz, 
Sambamurthy, & Agarwal, 2006) are pertinent to meet the expectations that CPIS can 
provide. 
  
Some stakeholders have the perception that crises are unexpected, unplanned, and just Acts 
of God. To them, planning and committing high costs in order to prepare for such events 
becomes less important. Thus, inadequate preparedness can relate both to unwillingness and 
inability to prepare (Kusumasari, Alam, & Siddiqui, 2010). 
 
Individual willingness can be demonstrated in situations where end-users are required to 
update different software applications on their working stations by pressing the update 
button. Since this action is voluntary it will take individual willingness to click the update 
button in order to apply the required patches to the software application. This can also happen 
the other way round, where a pop up window from malicious software is displayed on the 
screen asking end-users to click on it in order to download and install. The judgement made 
by some end-users on which action to take will very much depend on their willingness to 
protect or harm (Garrett, 2004) regardless of their understanding or awareness of the 
consequences of their actions (Tsohou et al., 2006) to the information systems in that 
particular organisation. 
2.2.2 Crisis-Preparedness Defined  
 
The term “preparedness” is defined variously in the literature. Research studies from the 
public health sector sought to establish a comprehensive definition that could articulate the 
needs and the key elements that characterise a well-prepared community (Nelson et al., 
2007). The established definition focuses on situations “whose scale, timing, or 
unpredictability threatens to overwhelm routine capabilities of the community (Nelson et al., 
2007, p. S9)”. The process of crisis-preparedness is not a steady state; it involves continuous 
improvements, including frequent testing of plans through drills and exercises, and the 
formulation and execution of corrective action plans (Shaluf, 2008). Lack of these elements 
seem to be the source of many of the challenges associated with failures in crisis 
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preparedness strategies such as business continuity planning (BCP) and information systems 
risk management (ISRM). For instance, the BCP is not a document prepared as a one-off 
event and put on the shelf (Savage, 2002; Smith & Jamieson, 2006), rather it should be 
dynamic and must involve the active involvement of the top management team, IS staff, and 
IS-users (end-users). This is necessary to ensure constant updating and testing by 
accommodating inputs from all key participants. Active participation of all end-users is 
necessary to allow for understanding, awareness of, and adherence to established CPIS 
measures within the organisation. 
 
Again, crisis-preparedness can be explained as including certain capabilities such as the 
ability to build and apply IS, the ability to recognise signals and the ability to see the big 
picture regarding crises (Leidner, Pan, & Pan, 2009). However, capacity alone does not 
ensure preparedness (Nelson et al., 2007). This standpoint resonates through Wood’s (1995) 
argument, which gives a caution on directing much attention to the technology alone when 
dealing with information security issues. The ability to build, apply and recognise signals 
requires other capacities such as good infrastructure, trained personnel, and proper planning. 
Nelson et al., suggest that crisis-preparedness must involve a coordinated and continuous 
process of planning and implementation that relies on measuring performance and taking 
corrective action. For instance, when people change jobs, in many instances it is very difficult 
to maintain the collection of knowledge to sustain safety and effective operations of critical 
business systems (Smith & Jamieson, 2006). This is because when a new employee joins an 
organisation he/she will most likely be oriented through operational processes while ignoring 
other pertinent processes such as security and recovery of business systems (Smith & 
Jamieson, 2006). This state of affairs will put all critical business processes at high risk 
regardless of their technological capacity.   
 
Moreover, crisis-preparedness can be explained based on the activities performed or ignored. 
Mitroff, Pauchant, Finney and Pearson (1989) contend that being crisis-prepared or crisis-
prone can be drawn on the activities and structures to avert or decrease the damages inherent 
in potential crises. Structures associated with crisis-preparedness are characterised by 
effective audits, prearranged actions, and policies aimed at forecasting potential crisis 
occurrences (Greening & Johnson, 1996; Shrivastava, 1993). On the other hand, crisis 
proneness is the opposite state, in which none of the above aspects exist, possibly leading to 
an unconscious or negligent vulnerability to crisis events (Pollard & Hotho, 2006).  
 38 
 
This discussion on preparedness, readiness and willingness accompanied by a few examples 
highlighting crisis-preparedness concepts, allows us to define the term “crisis-preparedness” 
of the information systems. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, crisis-preparedness of 
the information systems is defined as: 
 
A degree to which end-users are aware of the activities, policies and procedures 
such that are able to immediately address adverse circumstances that have the 
potential to develop into information systems crises. 
 
2.3. The Information Systems  
2.3.1 Introduction  
 
The preceding sections elaborated in detail the nature of a crisis and the concept of crisis 
preparedness in the context of information systems. This section briefly explains the domain 
of IS and how it relates to the other two concepts in this study. 
 
2.3.2 The Significance of the Information Systems  
 
The significance of the information systems (IS) is made evident by their applications to a 
wide array of business processes and activities within and outside the organisation. Several 
studies that exemplify the importance of IS exist in literature. Some of them demonstrate the 
role of IS in facilitating innovation and business performance (Bharadwaj, 2000). This has 
also created a belief that IS is fundamental to the organisation’s growth and survival. The 
contribution of IS towards business performance is extended further to include it as a 
positioning strategy for the organisation in a particular market segment and count as a key 
resource against its competitors (Rivard, Raymond, & Verreault, 2006). It is important to 
recognise that in a current business environment whether it is a business activity or a business 
process both are highly dependent on the organisational IS of which the complexity and 
advancement depends on the size of the organisation (Chang & King, 2005).  
 
While the potential benefits realised from being crisis prepared are evident from the literature 
(Parnell et al., 2010), drawing upon them has proved to be a challenging task for many 
organisations. Considering the high occurrence of crises and the increased dependence on IS 
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in organisations, one would assume that most firms would have established concrete 
measures to counteract these events. However, the literature indicates otherwise. There are 
many factors contributing to this state of affairs such as (1) end-user non compliance with 
many of the established regulations, policies and procedures to protect the information 
systems of the organisation (Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, & Jolton, 2005; Pahnila et al., 
2007a), (2) lack of end-user awareness of the many tools and resources available to them to 
act accordingly to a given event (Aytes & Conolly, 2003; Pinta, 2011), (3) acts of neglect, 
and (4) the thoughts that CPIS responsibilities belong to a special group of people. 
 
Confronted with this reality, this study investigates the extent to which end-users are aware 
of, and to what degree are able to put into practice different measures meant to protect the 
information systems of the organisation from potentially adverse events. The essence of 
keeping the IS up and running is emphasised by the fact that organisations that are 
unprepared for potential IS threats and risks are likely to experience huge damages (Mitroff, 
2005) if crises occur, and if they successfully transcend a crisis event it can be considered to 
be only a matter of chance (Mayer, Moss, & Dale, 2008; Smits & Ally, 2003).  
2.4. Theoretical Foundations of the CPIS 
 
A number of measures exist to address several concerns in connection to CPIS challenges. 
These efforts range from implementation of policy compliance measures, training and 
awareness programmes, and enforcement approaches such as IS usage regulations, IS 
security policies and email/Internet etiquette (Australian Communications & Media Authority, 
2008). However, two concerns have been raised on the extant awareness approaches. Some 
studies e.g. Puhakainen (2006), Aytes and Conolly (2003) and Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen 
(2007) indicate that (1) current awareness methods lack theoretical grounding, and (2) the 
absence of  empirical evidence to demonstrate their effectiveness. Despite these observations, 
awareness, training and enforcement approaches with regard to CPIS remain dominant in 
many of the IS publications. 
  
Human behaviour is a crucial subject for the CPIS effectiveness. Nonetheless, little can be 
found from the published research on why end-users so often take on unsafe computing 
practices. This also includes how their behaviour could be modified in a positive way (Aytes 
& Conolly, 2003) to align to CPIS expectations. According to Siponen (2000), many of the 
efforts directed to user training and awareness focus on instituting standards related to 
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knowledge and skills. These training resources, however, miss out on ensuring learning, as 
they do not take into account behavioural theories linked to learning and motivation 
(Siponen, 2000; Siponen, 2006). While ensuring learning for end-users remains outside the 
scope of this study, but this study employs theories related to attitude, motivation, and 
behaviour in order to understand the extent of user awareness of, and adherence to crisis 
preparedness of the information systems in New Zealand organisations. As thus, two 
theoretical frameworks are identified as providing a sound basis to lead this investigation: the 
Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT).  
2.4.1 Integration of the Theoretical Models 
 
This study integrates the Theory of Reasoned Action and Protection Motivation Theory. This 
follows a thorough review of the relevant literature on business continuity; data recovery; IS 
risk management; IS security; and general IS. Many of these studies e.g. Pahnila et al., 
(2007a), Lippert and Volkmar  (2007), Aytes and Conolly (2003) used these two theories in 
combination with other theories to investigate and/or evaluate human behaviour, prevention 
behaviour and control behaviour with respect to IS applications from different organisational 
settings.  
2.4.1.1 Theory of Reasoned Action 
 
The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Fig. 2.5), which was formulated by Ajzen and 
Fishbein (1980), has its origin in the field of social psychology. The core assumption of the 
TRA proposes that an individual’s behaviour is determined by his/her intention to perform 
the behaviour and that this intention is, in turn, affected by the views of others within his/her 
social setting. The authors further assert that behaviour is best predicted by the intention. 
Intention is the cognitive illustration of an individual’s readiness to carry out a given 
behaviour, and it is considered to be a direct precursor of the behaviour. Behaviour is the 
transition of intention into actual action. This intention is a function of the individual’s 
attitude towards the specific behaviour and his/her subjective norms (i.e. normative beliefs in 
TRA). This argument draws from the fact that the TRA model usually focuses on the 
determinants and performance of a single behaviour (Sheppard, Hartwick, & Warshaw, 
1988). Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) argue that disregarding the likelihood of selecting from 
alternative behaviours represents a serious omission in the model.  
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In a computing environment end-users are constantly faced with a choice among policies, 
regulations, procedures, commands, and actions. In such situations in which individuals are 
forced to opt among alternative behaviours their thoughts and feelings toward alternative 
behaviour are influenced (if they have any influence at all) through their effect on individuals' 
attitudes and subjective norms toward the particular behaviour of interest. As such attitudes, 
subjective norms, and intentions toward particular behaviour are fundamental in any attempt 
to deploy the TRA in assessing a given behaviour. Sheppard et al., (1988) postulate that the 
more positive such factors are, the more likely it is that individuals will perform the 
behaviour.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Theory of Reasoned Action Model 
Source: Fishbein (1980) 
 
 
Attitude 
 
Attitudes embrace the beliefs an individual acquires through direct experience, outside 
information, and self generated conclusions (Lippert & Volkmar, 2007). An attitude is an 
individual’s belief about whether the result of his/her action will be constructive or 
destructive. An individual is said to possess a positive attitude toward the behaviour only if 
he/she has affirming beliefs about the result of his/her behaviour. Attitude is considered to be 
more static and internalized (i.e. lasts from months to years) and it is mainly linked to the 
quality of actions (Siponen, 2000). In the context of this study, the satisfying of the attitude 
factor means that the consequences of carrying out the measures for the crisis preparedness of 
the information systems (CPIS) must be desirable. This results in research hypothesis 1: 
 
 
 
 
Behaviour Intention  
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(Normative 
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Research hypothesis 1(H1): 
 
End-users’ intention to comply with the measures for CPIS within the organisation is 
likely to be positively influenced by their attitude of crisis preparedness of the 
information systems.  
 
Normative beliefs 
 
Normative beliefs embrace normative expectations of peers, superiors and colleagues which 
may have a persuasive influence on an individual to either perform or not to perform a 
specific behaviour norm (Ajzen, 1991). With regard to crisis preparedness of the information 
systems (CPIS), normative beliefs may refer to different policies, regulations or standards 
that the management expect to be followed by every member of the organisation. According 
to Aydin and Rice (1991), the behaviour of individuals is an outcome of the interaction that 
goes on among the members of a given community. Thus, belonging to a certain social 
setting or being exposed to the influence of important people may have a persuasive 
influence on whether an individual either performs or does not perform a specific behaviour. 
In the context of this study, IS staff, IS managers’ or senior managers’ behaviour toward 
complying with established CPIS measures will have a persuasive effect on end-users’ 
adherence to CPIS. This allows the generation of research hypothesis 2: 
 
Research hypothesis 2(H2): 
 
Normative expectations about the crisis preparedness of the information systems are 
likely to affect end-users’ intentions to comply with the measures for CPIS within the 
organisation. 
 
Intention 
 
Two more elements are drawn from the TRA: the intention to comply and actual compliance 
with CPIS measures. Ajzen (1991), suggests that intentions capture the motivational factors 
that have an influence on individual behaviour, and they demonstrate the difficulty 
individuals are willing to accept to perform the behaviour in question. In terms of TRA, the 
stronger the intention to commit oneself to a form of behaviour, the more likely the behaviour 
will be performed. In the context of this study, the satisfying of the intention factor means 
that the stronger the intention to comply with CPIS measures, the more likely the end-users 
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will actually comply with the established measures for the CPIS. According to Rogers and 
Prentice-Dunn (1990), intentions serve as the most appropriate measure of protection 
motivation, as applies to end-user adherence to CPIS for this particular study. This is also 
reflected in previous research on technology acceptance that says intentions are good 
predictors of actual behaviour (Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003). This allows the 
generation of research hypothesis 3: 
 
Research hypothesis 3(H3): 
 
End-users’ intentions to comply with CPIS measures are likely to have a significant 
impact on actual compliance with CPIS measures. 
2.4.1.2 Protection Motivation Theory 
 
At first the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) was developed to explain the effects of fear 
appeals on health attitudes and behaviours (Rogers, 1975). The theory was revised (Maddux 
& Rogers, 1983) into an all-purpose theory of persuasive communication, with much 
attention given to cognitive processes mediating behavioural change.  A revised version of 
PMT has allowed its applicability to a diverse array of topics, including areas of interest 
beyond health-related issues (Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers, 2000). In addition to 
influencing and predicting various health behaviours, PMT has been extended to information 
systems security (Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 2007b), effects of technology on culture 
(Lippert & Volkmar, 2007) and behavioural change in earthquake preparedness (Mulilis & 
Lippa, 1990). Floyd et al., (2000), suggest that the PMT is an appropriate framework to study 
situations that involve threats for which there is an effective recommended response that can 
be carried out by the individual— end-users in the context of this study. The PMT endorses 
the idea that motivation toward protection results from a perceived threat and the need to 
avoid the potential negative outcome (Floyd et al., 2000). This is because end-users in an IS 
environment are constantly faced with a decision to weigh the costs of taking the protective 
action against the expected benefits of taking that action.  
 
The PMT (Figure 2.6) is structured along two processes that aim to mirror the cognitive 
processes that individuals use in assessing threats (i.e. a threat-appraisal process) and in 
choosing among coping alternatives (i.e. a coping-appraisal process) (Floyd et al., 2000). The 
product of these appraisal-mediating processes is the decision (or intention) to start, maintain, 
or hold back to the recommended adaptive responses. In essence, intentions indicate the 
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effectiveness of the attempted persuasion to follow the communicator’s recommendations. 
For the same reasons, dependent variables drawn from the PMT provide key measures for the 
behavioural intentions (Mulilis & Lippa, 1990) of the end-users toward crisis preparedness of 
the information systems.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Protection Motivation Theory Model 
Source: Maddux and Rogers (1983) 
  
 
Threat appraisal 
 
Threat appraisal consists of two dimensions:  perceived vulnerability and perceived severity 
(Woon, Tan, & Low, 2005). Perceived vulnerability is a conditional probability that a 
negative event will occur if no measures are taken to counter it (Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987). 
In the context of this study, the negative event encompass all sorts of IS risks and threats that 
can potentially damage or shutdown the computing environment of the organisation. This 
study draws on the concept of perceived vulnerability to refer to end-users’ perceived 
assessment of whether their organisation is vulnerable to IS risks and threats, and the 
imminence of such threats if no correct measures are carried out to offset them. The 
assumption being made here is that if end-users do not realize that they are truly confronted 
by IS risks and threats, they are unlikely to comply with the measures for the crisis 
preparedness of the information systems (CPIS). Rippetoe and Rogers (1987) refer to 
perceived severity as both psychological and physical harm the threat can cause. From the 
standpoint of this study, the perceived severity represents impending negative outcomes with 
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a root cause due to non compliance with the measures for the CPIS. Again, the assumption 
here is that if end-users do not see that they are actually confronted by IS risks and threats 
and if they do not believe that these threats can develop into negative consequences for the 
organisation, they will barely comply with the established measures for the CPIS. This leads 
to research hypothesis 4: 
 
Research hypothesis 4(H4): 
 
Threat appraisal affects end-users’ intention to comply with established measures for 
CPIS within the organisation. 
 
Coping appraisal 
 
Coping appraisal embraces three dimensions: response efficacy, self efficacy, and response 
cost (Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987; Woon et al., 2005). However, for the purpose of this study, 
response cost is considered irrelevant since all cost resulting from end-user behaviour will be 
covered by the employer. According to Pahnila et al., (2007b), response efficacy relates to 
the belief in the perceived benefits of the action. That means, performing a coping action may 
offset the potential threat. In the context of this study, this could imply that end-user 
adherence to crisis preparedness of the information systems is an effective approach to 
identify potential IS risks and threats. Self-efficacy focuses on the individual’s ability, or 
judgment of their capabilities, to cope with the task at hand or in sight (Bandura, 1977). The 
self-efficacy concept is built on the assumption that if organisations can increase employees’ 
self-efficacy, judgment about their abilities to cope well with the tasks in sight can improve 
their efficiency. In the context of this study, it all comes to the end-users’ beliefs on whether 
their actions towards established CPIS measures will actually lead to adherence to these 
measures. Maddux and Rogers (1983) contend that self-efficacy is the most dominant 
predictor of intention. This leads to the generation of research hypotheses 5 and 6: 
 
 
Research hypothesis 5(H5): 
 
Response efficacy affects end-users’ intentions to comply with established measures 
for CPIS within the organisation. 
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Research hypothesis 6(H6): 
 
Self-efficacy affects end-users’ intentions to comply with established measures for 
CPIS within the organisation. 
 
Crisis Preparedness Awareness 
 
Crisis preparedness awareness is a measure adapted for this study to measure the extent to 
which end-users’ understanding and knowledge of their roles and responsibilities, IS 
standards, organisational regulations, and processes to protect, to prevent and to manage the 
information systems threats and risks are important to the actual compliance with the 
measures for the crisis preparedness of the information systems. This measure draws upon 
various facts from IS security effectiveness. Different scholars, e.g. Aytes and Conolly 
(2003), Al-Zarouni (2006), Australian Communications and Media (2008),  and Tetmeyer 
and Saiedian (2010) assert that training and awareness are necessary antecedents to the 
effective use of countermeasures. In the context of this study, countermeasures refer to 
different aspects of crisis preparedness of the information systems within the organisation. 
This study draws on the argument that training and awareness are fundamental for the 
effectiveness of security countermeasures. This argument also suggests that end-user 
behaviour is the result of two key factors: awareness that threats exist, and training in the 
proper use of countermeasures (Aytes & Conolly, 2003). This point of view assumes that 
much of the training content will ensure that end-users are aware of organisational policies 
and procedures related to countermeasure use. It also assumes that either users will inherently 
be motivated to comply with these policies, or compliance can be mandated. This results in 
the generation of research hypothesis 7: 
 
Research hypothesis 7(H7): 
 
Crisis preparedness awareness positively influences end-users’ intentions to comply 
with established measures for CPIS within the organisations.  
 
Therefore, this study tests seven research hypotheses (see Table 2.2) in order to understand 
the extent of end user awareness of and adherence to crisis preparedness of the information 
systems in New Zealand organisations.  
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   Table 2.2: Research Hypotheses with their Respective Theoretical Foundations 
SN Research Hypotheses Theoretical 
Foundation 
Source 
1 
End-users’ intention to comply with the measures 
for CPIS within the organisation is likely to be 
positively influenced by their attitude of crisis 
preparedness of the information systems.  
 
TRA 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980); 
Sheppard et al., (1988) 
Siponen, Lippert and Volkmar 
 (2007) 
2 
Normative expectations about the crisis 
preparedness of the information systems are likely 
to affect end-users’ intentions to comply with 
measures for CPIS within the organisation. 
 
TRA 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980); 
Sheppard et al., (1988) 
Siponen, Lippert and Volkmar 
 (2007) 
3 
End-users’ intentions to comply with CPIS 
measures are likely to have a significant impact on 
actual compliance with CPIS measures. 
 
TRA 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980); 
Sheppard et al., (1988) 
Siponen, Lippert and Volkmar 
 (2007) 
4 
Threat appraisal affects end-users’ intention to 
comply with established measures for CPIS within 
the organisation. 
 
PMT 
Maddux and Rogers (1983); 
Rippetoe and Rogers (1987); 
Floyd et al., (2000); Woon et 
al., (2005) ;Lippert and 
Volkmar (2007); Pahnila et 
al., (2007b) 
5 
Response efficacy affects end-users’ intentions to 
comply with established measures for CPIS within 
the organisation. 
 
PMT 
Maddux and Rogers (1983); 
Rippetoe and Rogers (1987); 
Floyd et al., (2000); Woon et 
al., (2005) ;Lippert and 
Volkmar (2007); Pahnila et 
al., (2007b) 
6 
Self-efficacy affects end-users’ intentions to 
comply with established measures for CPIS within 
the organisation. 
 
PMT 
Maddux and Rogers (1983); 
Rippetoe and Rogers (1987); 
Floyd et al., (2000); Woon et 
al., (2005) ;Lippert and 
Volkmar (2007); Pahnila et 
al., (2007b) 
7 
Crisis preparedness awareness positively 
influences end-users’ intentions to comply with 
established measures for CPIS within the 
organisations.  
 
Adapted for 
this study 
Aytes and Conolly (2003);  
Al-Zarouni (2006); Australian 
Communications and Media 
Authority (2008); Yuan and 
Jang (2008); Tetmeyer and 
Saiedian (2010) 
Key: TRA-Theory of Reasoned Action, PMT- Protection Motivation Theory 
 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
 
The literature review had the purpose of establishing the theoretical foundations of this 
research.  Given the number of challenges associated with the CPIS, it was essential to 
review relevant literature about the nature of crises, crisis preparedness, and the information 
systems.  
 
From section 2.1.1 to section 2.1.5 the review explored the general understanding of crises 
with respect to the information systems. From these sections the reader is able to capture the 
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general perspective of crises with regard to the IS environment.  The “crisis” object is defined 
followed by a review of common IS risks and threats in New Zealand organisations.  This 
block is completed by a discussion on various challenges to current management approaches 
to crises.   
 
Section 2.2 reviewed and discussed the “preparedness” concepts. In this section crisis- 
preparedness and related concepts are presented followed by a discussion which defines the 
crisis preparedness of the information systems.  
 
Section 2.3 explored and discussed the significance of the IS in the organisational setting.  
 
Section 2.4 reviewed two theoretical foundations— the Theory of Reasoned Action and the 
Protection Motivation Theory. The review of the theoretical foundations allowed for the 
generation of the seven research hypotheses.  
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Research design provides a structure according to which the research will be conducted. This 
chapter presents the underlying assumptions that guided this study, followed by the research 
design chosen in an attempt to answer the research question(s). Methods and strategies used 
in collecting and analysing data are also presented followed by the process of validating the 
instruments. Finally, ethical considerations followed by this study are presented.    
3.2 Research Paradigm 
 
The aim of the research methodology was to produce an instrument that would explore the 
topic of the research and describe the crisis preparedness of the information systems 
phenomenon (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Myers, 1997; Creswell, 2003) in New Zealand 
organisations.  The description of the phenomenon pertained to end-user awareness of and 
adherence to crisis preparedness of the information systems. This study was conducted from 
a positivist research perspective based on the ontological assumption that reality is external 
and objective (Hirschheim, 1992). It assumes that the universe consists of objectively given, 
immutable objects and structures. These exist as empirical entities, on their own, independent 
of the observer's appreciation of them.  
 
In the context of this study, crisis preparedness of the information systems is a single 
standing reality that doesn’t depend on how different individuals view it. As an example, the 
structure, the capability and functionality of the protection mechanisms for critical business 
systems against IS threats and risks exist in the organisation. These features won’t change 
regardless of how you look at them— that is the reality. This scenario demonstrates the 
relevance of using the positivist perspective as an investigative paradigm. This is because it 
assumes that reality is objectively given. Since objectivity does not depend on individual 
standpoints it allowed the use of a survey instrument to capture end-users’ perceptions. This 
is because survey data can be collected by using quantifiable measures  and thus can be 
explained by measurable properties which are independent of the observer (Orlikowski & 
Baroudi, 1991; Ponterotto, 2005; Gregor, 2006).  
 
 50 
 
In social science research, it is assumed that methods are tied to paradigms (Landry & 
Banville, 1992; Mingers, 2003). This sentiment concurs with the argument made by 
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991), suggesting that research methods develop within a particular 
paradigm. In line with the positivist philosophy and its underlying assumption that “reality is 
objectively given and can be explained by measurable properties which are independent of 
the observer” (Ponterotto, 2005; Gregor, 2006), a quantitative method was indicated.  
3.3 Research Methodology 
 
A research methodology is a path used by the researcher in pursuit of answers to the research 
question(s) (Kumar, 2005). The path is comprised of a number of steps and procedures that a 
researcher follows. The steps and procedures of the research methodology may include the 
following: (1) the collection of quantifiable information through self-reporting of study 
participants (Polkinghorne, 2005) or quantitative methods; (2) the use of  case studies, 
interviews, and ethnographic methods— the qualitative methods (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005); 
or (3) the utilization of mixed methods (i.e. combining qualitative and quantitative 
approaches) which may run in parallel, concurrently or sequentially (Östlund, Kidd, 
Wengström, & Rowa-Dewar, 2011). The existence of a multiplicity of methods, procedures 
and models of research methodology made it necessary to choose an appropriate method that 
ensured the objectives of the study were attained (Hanson, Creswell, Plano Clark, Petska, & 
Creswell, 2005).  
 
Because crisis preparedness of the information systems is a single reality that can objectively 
be explained it was possible to use quantifiable measures to answer the research question(s). 
Therefore, for this reason and in consideration of the positivist assumptions and the 
objectives of this study, a quantitative method was adopted.  
3.3.1 Quantitative Methods 
 
Quantitative positivist research embraces a set of methods and techniques that allow the 
researcher to provide answers to the research questions (Straub, Gefen, & Boudreau, 2005). 
After first identifying the research variables, the generation of research hypotheses follows. 
The next step was the creation of items which were later used as questionnaire questions to 
seek for opinions or perceptions from end-users of the information systems in organisations. 
By using the deductive approach, the researcher was able to get a broader understanding 
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(Helms et al., 2006; Morrow, 2007) of the CPIS phenomenon in New Zealand organisations. 
This was made possible by examining through the data again and again (Ponterotto, 2005).  
 
In general, a quantitative study seeks out facts or causes of certain phenomena without 
requiring subjective interpretation. Subjectivity is avoided by minimising personal prejudice 
and bias. This was necessary to ensure that a social setting in the surveyed organisations is 
presented as it is, rather than as it is imagined by the researcher. Moreover, this study applied 
a descriptive type of quantitative research in order to accomplish the research objectives 
(Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993). A descriptive study promises statistically sound results if a 
large number of respondents agree to participate in the study. This is pertinent to generate 
findings which are generalisable to the whole population (Kaplan & Duchon, 1988; Straub et 
al., 2000). 
3.4 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
In the existing social science literature there are mostly two types of data collection methods: 
surveys and interviews. The decision on which method to use is essentially grounded on the 
theme of the study. For theory-testing methodologies, surveys and experiments are the 
leading methods in social science research. However, field interviews and in-depth case 
studies remain predominant for researchers intending to develop a theory (Alam, 2005).  
 
This study drew on the descriptive aspect of quantitative research. In order to attain 
conclusive results descriptive analysis requires a large quantity of quantitative data. This data 
was collected through an online survey made accessible to intended participants over the 
Internet. Since data analysis in this study was inspired by descriptive questions, it means the 
study ascertained facts about CPIS through theory testing (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993).  
3.4.1 Online Survey 
 
The collection of quantitative data commenced once the instrument and the measures were 
comprehensively tested for validity and reliability. By using the New Zealand Companies 
Office Register sixteen organisations were identified as potential data collection sources. 
These companies were selected from different sectors: Energy, Telecommunication, Banking, 
Information Technology, Tertiary education and service industries. According to the data 
hosted by the Companies Office Register, the number of employees from the identified 
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organisations ranged from 500 to 10,000. The large numbers of employees provided a 
potential source for large quantity of respondents to take part in the survey (Web-based 
survey) (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993; Hair et al., 1995; Boudreau et al., 2004). This was 
based on the fact that a large sample size would provide for stronger external validity and 
streamline the examination of the hypothesised relationships (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 
1993). Inadequate sample size had the potential to cause serious problems in the course of 
analysing data and hypotheses testing (Boudreau, Gefen, & Straub, 2001; Straub et al., 2005). 
 
The quantitative approach was descriptive. It encompassed an organisation-wide Web-based 
survey. The choice of a web survey was based on benefits it would offer to the researcher in 
order to make the study successful (Straub, Gefen, & Boudreau, 2005). The Web-based 
survey contained a self-administered questionnaire accessible via a standard web browser. 
The invitation to participate in the survey was sent to potential respondents via their e-mail 
addresses. In order to protect participants’ anonymity, the participating organisation(s) 
offered to help with the distribution of the survey web-link. A representative from the 
communication or the IT/IS department in those organisations distributed the survey web-link 
including a short cover letter (survey instructions) to participants’ email accounts. The 
completed questionnaires were submitted back to the researcher through the Qualtrics survey 
application, and no identifying data was present in the returned surveys.  
 
The Web-based questionnaire covered seven key areas: (a) basic demographic information, 
(b) general understanding of the subject of crisis preparedness of the information systems 
(CPIS), (c) CPIS duties and responsibilities, (d) end-user’s awareness of the fundamental 
aspects of CPIS including processes and procedures, (e) end-user’s understanding on IS 
threats and risks and their outcome, (f) end-user’s involvement in training and awareness 
programmes, and (g) end-user’s intentions and reaction to CPIS improvements and changes.  
The Web-based survey presented some major difficulties to the researcher such as low 
response rate and non-response bias (Straub, Gefen, et al., 2005). Potential problems that 
could have resulted from challenges in using the Qualtrics research suite were not 
anticipated. This is because the researcher assumed that any person using a laptop or a 
desktop computer or any mobile device to perform her/his everyday duties would have the 
necessary competencies to enable him/her to participate in the study effectively. For instance, 
he or she must have a corporate email address; he or she would be able to follow simple 
instructions in order to access the web-link containing the measurement items and he or she is 
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knowledgeable enough on the topic to give appropriate and reasonable responses (Klassen & 
Jacobs, 2001). However, some scholars emphasise the value of collecting a second data set 
by using a paper based survey to guarantee non-respondent bias (Boyer, Olson, Calantone, & 
Jackson, 2002; Klassen & Jacobs, 2001; Simsek & Veiga, 2000). This approach was deemed 
unnecessary because it was assumed all potential respondents would be capable of 
responding to the web-based survey. 
 
By and large, the survey approach reflected many of the benefits drawn from quantitative 
research. For instance, (a) the survey was useful in investigating the association between 
variables (Straub, Gefen, et al., 2005), (b) it was cheaper to administer. Moreover, (c) the cost 
per respondent was reduced dramatically and (d) less time was needed in processing the 
survey responses due to the reduced number of potential mistakes from interpretation of the 
respondent's handwriting and e-mail follow-ups (Simsek & Veiga, 2000). 
3.4.2 Instrument Validation 
 
Instrument validation required the evaluation of content validity, construct validity and 
reliability (Chang & King, 2005; Rivard et al., 2006; Straub et al., 2000). A validated 
measuring instrument provided for a consistent evaluation mechanism that allowed 
comparisons, differences or replication across end-users and groups (Baroudi & Orlikowski, 
1988; Scott, 1995; Straub, 1989). Instrument validation was necessary for a number of 
reasons: (1) it facilitated the establishment of a cumulative research tradition, (2) it provided 
for enhanced measurement of research variables, (3) it helped in improving the clarity of 
research questions, and (4) it led to more meaningful variable relationships (Baroudi & 
Orlikowski, 1988; Straub, 1989). The use of an un-validated instrument had the potential to 
cause uncertainty in interpreting research findings, and offers no protection against the effects 
of confusing variables (Straub, 1989).  
 
Content validity is a qualitative evaluation of the degree to which the measures of a construct 
actually capture its real nature. In general, content validity of an instrument is established 
through a pre-test which helps to get rid of measurement errors caused by poorly worded or 
ambiguous questions or instructions. Pre-testing of the instrument was necessary to ensure 
that all questions are appropriate and understood (Lewis, Templeton, & Byrd, 2005). Pre-
testing for the survey instrument used in this research was achieved by running a pilot test 
that involved a total of 15 end-users from different organisations (participating organisations 
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not included). These people were approached to seek their opinions about the survey 
instrument. The feedback indicated that the concept of crisis preparedness in the context of 
the Information Systems was clearly understandable to the wider audience. Nevertheless, 
some comments and suggestions were made by the participants and they were incorporated 
into the final survey tool. In other words, content validity assured for the theoretical 
meaningfulness of a concept (Bagozzi, 1980) and the logic behind the data analysis 
(Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991).  
 
Construct validity reflects the extent to which a given test is an effective measure of a 
theoretical construct (Straub et al., 2000). In simple words, the purpose of construct validity 
is to validate the theory behind the construct (Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991). However, since 
this study is not developing theory it was considered unnecessary to undergo comprehensive 
tests of construct validity (Boudreau et al., 2004). This is because in descriptive studies the 
testing of strength of relationships between constructs is not required. As indicated earlier in 
Section 3.4, this study only established facts based on the sample data and testing of the 
research hypotheses.  
 
Reliability analysed the extent to which measurements are repeatable (Straub, 1989; 
Boudreau, Gefen, & Straub, 2004). In other words, reliability reflects the extent to which the 
measurements can provide consistent measures over time and across different studies 
(Nelson, Lurie, & Wasserman, 2007). Reliability was assessed by using the Cronbach's alpha 
(α) technique (Scott, 1995). As such, validation of the instrument only considered content 
validity and the reliability tests. 
3.5 Operationalisation of CPIS Measures  
 
The developed survey tool (appendix B) measured: (a) end-user knowledge and 
understanding of different aspects of the crisis preparedness of the information systems based 
on the available information from a range of societal legislative requirements such as 
information security incident management system standards (ISO/IEC 27035:2011), crisis 
management— guidance and good practice (PAS 200:2011), business continuity 
management (SAA/SNZ HB 221:2004), trade sector standards, including the organisational 
IS regulations, policies and procedures, (b) attitude towards CPIS, (c) normative expectations 
about peers, superiors and colleagues in the work place, (d) intention to comply with CPIS 
measures, (e) perceived vulnerability to IS risks and threats, (f) perceived seriousness of 
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crisis events outcomes, (g) response efficacy to offset potential threats, (h) self efficacy to 
cope in crisis situations, and (i) awareness of different aspects of the crisis preparedness of 
the information systems. These measures reflect attitude, normative belief and intention 
constructs of the TRA including the cognitive processes construct of the PMT. The cognitive 
processes construct embraces two major processes: threat appraisal and coping appraisal.  
 
On the basis of the TRA and the PMT theoretical frameworks six variables out of seven were 
devised for this study: attitude towards CPIS, normative expectations, intention to comply, 
threat appraisal, response efficacy, and self efficacy. These variables were measured by 
scales developed and validated in prior research studies on cross-cultural dimension of 
technology use, security of wireless networks and human behaviour towards computer and 
information systems security. The seventh variable, crisis preparedness awareness was 
measured by a scale developed as part of this study. Since none of these measures were 
previously tested in the context of crisis preparedness of the information systems, the current 
study tests these measures in that context. Table 3.1 presents the research variables and their 
definitions, including the number of items per variable and the original scale source. 
 
           Table 3.1: Research Variables with their Respective Definitions 
Variable Variable Definition Number 
of items 
Source of the 
original scale 
Attitude towards 
CPIS 
The degree to which an end-user values 
different aspects of the crisis preparedness of 
the information systems 
5 
Pahnila, Siponen 
and Mahmood 
(2007b) 
Normative 
expectations 
The extent to which an end-user believes 
that peers, superiors and colleagues in the 
work place think or expect that he/she 
should either abide or not abide by CPIS 
measures  
4 
Lippert and 
Volkmar (2007) 
Intention to 
comply 
The extent to which an end-user is likely to 
perform the established measures of the 
crisis preparedness of the information 
systems  
6 
Siponen, Pahnila 
and Mahmood 
(2007) 
Threat appraisal 
The extent to which an end-user believes 
that he/she is truly confronted by IS risk 
and/or  threat and that if nothing is done 
about it, it can develop negative 
consequences  
4 
Woon et al., 
(2005) 
Response 
efficacy 
The degree to which an end-user believes 
that his/her coping action will offset a 
potential threat 
7 
Pahnila et al., 
(2007a), Pahnila 
et al., (2007b) 
Self efficacy 
The degree to which an end-user believes 
that his/her ability or judgement will enable 
him or her to cope in a crisis situation 
7 
Siponen et al., 
(2007) 
Crisis 
preparedness 
awareness 
The extent to which end-users’ knowledge 
and understanding of different aspects of 
CPIS in their organisation is fundamental for 
them to effectively execute CPIS measures. 
8 
Yuan and Jang 
(2008)  
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A brief discussion on each variable follows below. The specific text for all scale items can be 
found in appendix C. 
 
Attitude towards CPIS is defined as the degree to which an end-user values different aspects 
of the crisis preparedness of the information systems within the organisation. Attitude 
indicates an end-user’s positive or negative beliefs towards CPIS measures. Attitude towards 
CPIS was measured by the end-user’s responses to five items requesting them to indicate to 
what degree they perceived their contribution is important to the effectiveness of the CPIS 
measures.  The attitude towards CPIS variables is adapted from the scale used by Pahnila, 
Siponen and Mahmood (2007b) when they measured attitude towards IS security compliance.   
 
Normative expectations is defined as the extent to which an end-user believes that peers, 
superiors and colleagues in the work place think or expect that he/she should either abide or 
not abide by  CPIS measures. This variable was measured by asking the respondents to rate 
their behaviour as a result of the influence resulting from interactions in their work place 
community. Their responses were based on four items. The variable “normative 
expectations” has its origin in TRA (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), but it has also been used by 
Lippert and Volkmar (2007) to measure cultural effects on technology in an organisation 
setting. 
 
Intention to comply refers to the extent to which an end-user is likely to perform the actions 
as stipulated in the measures of the crisis preparedness of the information systems. This 
variable signifies end-users’ willingness to attempt to perform the behaviour in question 
(Ajzen, 1991) — compliance with CPIS. End-users’ intentions were measured by requesting 
the respondents to indicate their willingness to perform or not to perform a range of 
behaviours expected of them. This involved responding to six items on a seven-item scale. 
The intention to comply which is based on TRA (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) has also been used 
by Siponen, Pahnila and Mahmood (2007) to measure employees’ adherence to security 
policies.  
 
Threat appraisal is defined as the extent to which an end-user believes that he/she is truly 
confronted by the IS risk and/or threat and that if nothing is done about it, it can develop into 
a negative consequence. This variable was measured by asking the respondents to indicate 
their perceptions on whether their organisation is vulnerable to IS risks and threats, which 
may take place if nothing is done to offset them and if they thought there was any potential 
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harm to the organisation that could result from those events. This involved responding to four 
items of the survey instrument. Threat appraisal which is based on PMT (Maddux & Rogers, 
1983) has also been used by Woon et al., (2005) to measure home users' decisions on whether 
or not to use security features. 
 
Response efficacy measures the degree to which an end-user believes that his/her coping 
action will offset a potential threat. This variable was measured by asking respondents to rate 
their beliefs in the perceived benefits of their coping actions (Rogers, 1975)— the CPIS 
measures and their beliefs that performing the coping action will actually offset the threat. 
End-users were required to respond to seven items on a five-item scale. Similar to threat 
appraisal, response efficacy is also based on PMT (Maddux & Rogers, 1983). The variable 
has been used in several studies. For instance, Pahnila et al., (2007a) used the response 
efficacy variable to identify factors that explains employees’ adherence to information 
security policies. In addition, Pahnila et al., (2007b) used the same variable to understand 
employees’ behaviour towards IS security policy compliance.  
 
Self efficacy measures the degree to which an end-user believes that his/her ability or 
judgement will enable him or her to cope in a crisis situation. This variable attempted to 
capture the perceived capability (Woon et al., 2005) to make use of various CPIS measures. 
In other words, it tests the belief in one’s own ability to do something (Bandura, 1977), in 
this context, carrying out CPIS measures. End-users were required to respond to seven items 
on the survey instrument. Self efficacy which is based on PMT (Maddux & Rogers, 1983) 
has also been used by Siponen et al., (2007) to investigate employees’ adherence to 
information security policies. 
 
Crisis preparedness awareness measures the extent to which end-users’ knowledge and 
understanding of different aspects of CPIS in their organisation is fundamental for them to 
effectively execute CPIS measures. This variable attempted to capture the positive influence 
that can be presented by an understanding of the broader picture of crisis preparedness in 
terms of relationships between stakeholders, information sharing, activities, processes and 
procedures (Al-Zarouni, 2006; Tetmeyer & Saiedian, 2010). End-users were required to 
respond to eight items on the survey instrument. The crisis preparedness awareness variable 
draws on marketing concepts which use awareness measures to check marketing and 
advertising effectiveness (Romaniuk, Sharp, Paech, & Driesener, 2004). This is because 
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when a person becomes familiar with a brand through repeated exposure, his/her perceived 
risk tends to decline and positive affect tends to increase (Yuan & Jang, 2008). Hence, the 
wine/winery awareness variable from a wine festival model is reworded accordingly to fit 
this study. 
3.6 Ethical Considerations 
 
Approval was obtained from the School of Information Management Human Ethics 
Committee. The researcher also ensured that the requirements of the New Zealand Privacy 
Act 1993 that sets out principles for the collection, use, disclosure, security and access to 
personal information were met before starting the survey. The ethical requirements were 
presented in the information sheet (Appendix A) for the participants to consult prior to any 
engagement in the research. All data collected were kept confidential. No other person apart 
from me and my supervisor, Dr. Philip Calvert, saw the survey responses and we were not 
able to identify who they came from. All survey responses were kept in a password protected 
file on a secure server and formed the basis of my research, but only aggregated data has 
been used to write this report. The survey responses will be destroyed two years after the end 
of the project. 
3.7 Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter an outline of the design for the empirical research was provided. It starts with 
the research paradigm, the ontological approach which is realism, with a positivist 
philosophy. The methodological approach uses quantitative methods. This is followed by a 
detailed description of the quantitative methods. An indication was provided of how the 
actual data collection and analysis fitted into the research design. Finally, the ethical 
considerations that guided this study were presented. 
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Chapter 4: Data Analysis and Results 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The literature identifies diverse methods for analysing quantitative data. Predominantly, these 
methods make use of statistical tools and packages to carry out the required data analysis. For 
the purposes of effectiveness, statistical tools and techniques use numbers to represent values 
and levels of theoretical constructs and concepts. 
 
This chapter presents the data analysis and the results of the study. First, information about 
the survey respondents is provided. This is followed by the data preparation process, the 
response rate and the respondents’ demographics. Thereafter, reliability tests and descriptive 
statistics are presented followed by the correlation analyses. Finally, a concise summary of 
the chapter is provided.  
4.2 About the Survey Respondents 
 
Potential respondents came from a set of 16 organisations which operate across New 
Zealand. These were from the following sectors: Energy, Service industries, 
Telecommunication, Tertiary Education, Banking and Information Systems (or IT). 
 
Initial communication to the respondents to request their input into the study was done either 
by phone or email. The email introduced the researcher to the respondents’ organisations as 
well as the general view of the subject of the research. Both email and phone 
communications were followed by a second communication which was an email containing 
two key documents (i.e. a brief research proposal and a survey tool). These two documents 
were used by the management of the respondents’ organisations to decide whether to allow or 
to decline the study request to collect data from end-users of the information systems in those 
organisations.   
 
Among the 16 organisations that were approached to participate into the study, only 3 
organisations agreed to my study request. This was a dramatic 81% reduction from the 
original pool of 16 possible respondent organisations (See Table 4.1). Many of these 
organisations simply indicated that they were unable to participate due to demanding 
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workload and time constraints. However, they indicated that they could participate in similar 
studies in the near future.          
               
             
              Table 4.1: Organisations Statistics 
Number of organisations 
approached 
Number of organisations 
that accepted 
Number of organisations 
that declined 
16 3 13 
100% 18.75% 81.25% 
 
 
The three organisations that accepted my study request came from three different sectors. 
Organisation A is an energy company that had just gone through a year long process of 
raising staff awareness of crisis preparedness of the information systems. Organisation B is a 
service company that provides a range of communication and business solutions throughout 
New Zealand. There was no indication of any awareness activities associated with crisis 
preparedness of the information systems in recent past. Organisation C is a tertiary 
institution, providing higher education to people from all nationalities and from all walks of 
life. In this institution, awareness activities with regard to crisis preparedness of the 
information systems are usually reserved for key people that are directly involved into crisis 
preparedness strategies. All three organisations have more than 100 employees; hence they fit 
into Statistics New Zealand's definition of large companies.  
4.3 Data Preparations 
 
This study used a self reporting perception survey to capture information systems end-users’ 
responses to seven dimensions: Attitude towards CPIS, Normative expectations, Intention to 
comply, Threat appraisal, Response efficacy, Self efficacy, and Crisis preparedness 
awareness. Once the set duration for the data collection exercise had expired, end-users’ 
responses were checked for completeness. The data collection duration comprised of two 
consecutive three weeks sessions— i.e. six weeks in total. Checking for completeness 
ensured that the data was clean and error-free. Thereafter, data was entered into SPSS 19.0.   
 
Fundamentally, the data preparation process concentrated on the survey questions which 
were likely to produce missing data. This included questions which could have produced a 
response of (1) none of the above, (2) I don’t know, or (3) a blank space. A “None of the 
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above” response was coded 11 while “I don’t know” and “blank space” responses were coded 
9 and dot (.) respectively. 
                   
                       
                      Table 4.2: Summary of Missing Responses 
 Item— 
 List other activities that 
embraces CPIS 
Percentage 
% 
Number of responses— 
 Missing 
44 61.1% 
Number of responses 28 
 
38.9% 
Total number of 
respondents 
72 100% 
 
 
There were generally a minimal number of responses missing. However, as Table 4.2 
indicates, Item S2.2 – ‘List other activities that embraces CPIS’ – was responded to by only 
28 respondents out of 72,  which is about 39% of the total responses to that particular item. 
The fewer number of responses to this question could be because there were no other CPIS 
activities that existed in those organisations or end-users were completely unaware of crisis 
preparedness initiatives in their organisations. For other items, the completeness of data was 
facilitated by a feature in the Qualtrics application that forced the participants to respond to 
each pending question before proceeding to a subsequent question. 
 
Data preparation also involved coding multiple response items (Appendix D). These are the 
questions that required the respondents to provide more than one response. Since it is 
impossible to record these items as a single variable into the SPSS application, it was 
necessary to create as many component variables as there were items in the list. Each 
recorded response was labelled “Yes” and coded with a value of 1. And all non-recorded 
responses were discarded.  
 
18 responses were excluded from the dataset prior to the data analysis. These were 
incomplete responses that were started but never completed by their authors. They only 
contained demographic information. In total, 72 responses of the 90 web-surveys received 
were identified for data analysis procedures. 
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4.4 Response Rate  
 
In total 297 email invitations were sent out to potential participants (see Table 4.3). In 
average 10 minutes were spent by the majority of the respondents to complete the survey. 
The response rate to the survey was 30%. This is well below the 60% mark which is 
considered to be “good” for statistical accuracy (Sivo, Saunders, Chang, & Jiang, 2006). 
Despite every effort to uplift the response rate, 30 percent was the final yield.  Some of the 
efforts included running the pilot test, incorporating the suggested changes (about the design 
and the instrument questions) to improve the respondents’ experience, and sending out two 
reminders.  
 
        
      Table 4.3: Expected Responses versus Actual Responses 
 Expected response rate Actual response rate 
Survey sample size  297 297 
Response rate  60% 30% 
Participant responses  178.2 90 
 
 
Nevertheless, the 30% response rate is still considered to be reasonable for organisational 
surveys. This is because a 30% response is slightly higher than many of the reported response 
rates in published IS research studies which considered response rates in the 17%- 28% range 
to be reasonable (Jarvenpaa & Staples, 2001; Ravichandran & Rai, 2000). 
 
The Web-based survey was voluntary and the respondents were identified from a group of 
employees with help from the participating organisations. The web-based survey was 
comprised of forty closed questions and one open question.  Potential respondents were 
required to read an information sheet prior to their engagement into the study. Based on the 
information provided in the information sheet respondents were at liberty to indicate their 
willingness to participate into the study by either choosing to “agree” or to “disagree”. 
Respondents who agreed to participate into the study were required to respond to all 
questions to successfully complete the survey.  
 
There are many factors that could have contributed to the low response rate. These may 
include (1) unwillingness to respond to an unsolicited survey, (2) lack of motivation to 
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complete the survey as no incentives were promised in return, and (3) a shortage of time to 
start and ultimately complete the survey (Bryman, 2008).  
 
In future studies low responses could be overcome by requesting the top management team to 
take on the research project as their own. In this way they can promote it to their employees. 
In addition, some kinds of motivation in terms of prizes or supermarket vouchers can be 
promised in return for research assistance.  
4.5 Demographics 
 
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 present the distribution of respondents in terms of the years worked in the 
current organisation and the age group. Table 4.4 indicates that the majority of the 
respondents (53%) have worked in their current organisation between 1 to 10 years. This is 
an indication that the respondents have spent enough time with their respective organisations 
to comment on different processes, procedures and strategies with regard to CPIS.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Years with the Current Organisation 
 
From a different perspective, 56% of the respondents fall into the (31-45) age group. This 
could possibly indicate that the respondent were mature enough to provide invaluable 
information to which the degree of crisis preparedness of the information systems could be 
measured.  
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Figure 2.8: Age in Years 
 
Table 4.4 demonstrates key attributes of the respondents. From the respondents’ 
demographics it could be assumed that the sample was well distributed and that the 
respondents were reasonably qualified to participate in the study. 
                
                   
                  Table 4.4: Demographics 
Measure Items Frequency Percent 
Gender 
   
Male 51 70.8% 
Female 21 29.2% 
Age 
   
18-30 12 16.7% 
31-45 40 55.6% 
>45 20 27.8% 
Role  
[Your department] 
   
IT/IS 54 75.0% 
Other 18 25.0% 
   
EMP 
[Years with the 
current organisation] 
<1 19 26.4% 
1-10 38 52.8% 
11-20 13 18.1% 
>20 2 2.8% 
   
 
 
 
Their eligibility was based on their knowledge about the information systems and their 
familiarity with different CPIS strategies that their organisations could utilize to counteract 
crisis events that could negatively affect the information systems platforms. 
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4.6 Reliability Tests 
 
The reliability indices were calculated by SPSS 19 using Cronbach’s alpha procedure (Gray 
& Kinnear, 2011). As shown in Table 4.5, Cronbach’s α for the variables range from 0.417 to 
0.863; as such a high internal consistency cannot be claimed. Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) 
suggest that a value for Cronbach’s α greater than 0.70 indicates a satisfactory level of item 
reliability. In this particular study, only two variables (see section 3.5) were considerably 
above this threshold and one variable came close to it.  
                             
                             
                            Table 4.5: Reliability Coefficients 
Variable Cronbach’s Alpha (α) 
Attitude Toward CPIS 0.560 
Normative Expectations 0.863 
Intention to Comply 0.692 
Threat Appraisal 0.504 
Response Efficacy 0.761 
Self Efficacy 0.417 
Crisis Preparedness Awareness 0.461 
 
 
However, the minimal standard α value which is 0.7 has been met only by two constructs: 
normative expectations and response efficacy. In that sense, these alpha values: 0.417, 0.461, 
0.504 and 0.560 were considered to be moderately good. Therefore, the questionnaire tool 
used for this study provided an adequate level of reliability for hypothesised measures of the 
variables (Boudreau et al., 2004).  
 
4.7 Descriptive Statistics 
 
In order for this report to be understood by a wider audience, it was important to replace the 
SPSS variables (e.g. CPA1.1, ATTC1) with abbreviated forms of the original questions. With 
this change in place it becomes much easier for the reader to link the displayed data to the 
actual variable being studied. Table 4.6 presents different names of the study variables as 
they were used for data analysis in this study.   
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      Table 4.6: The Variables with their Respective Abbreviated Questions 
Item SPSS 
Variable 
SPSS Label Abbreviated questions 
  Demographics  
D1 Gender Gender Gender 
D2 Age Age in Years Age in Years 
D3 Role Your department Your department 
D4 Employ Years in current organisation EMP 
  Crisis Preparedness Awareness  
S2.1.1 CPA1.1 Does establishment of plans represent crisis 
preparedness? 
Establishment of CP plans 
S2.1.2 CPA1.2 Does continuous managing of risks and threats represent 
crisis preparedness? 
Continuous management of 
risks  
S2.1.3 CPA1.3 Do identification, control and mitigation of security 
measures embrace crisis preparedness efforts? 
Identification, control and 
mitigation  
S2.1.4 CPA1.4 Do plans and procedures to facilitate restoration of 
affected systems represent crisis preparedness? 
Procedures to facilitate 
restoration 
S2.1.5 CPA1.5 Do end-users sharing information about security represent 
crisis preparedness? 
Sharing security 
information 
S2.1.5 CPA3 CPIS responsibility in my organisation lies with... Responsibility lies with 
S2.1.5 CPA5.1 Unauthorised internal system access Unauthorised internal 
access 
S2.1.5 CPA5.2 Unauthorised external system access Unauthorised external 
access 
S2.1.5 CPA5.3 Unexpected system shutdown Unexpected shutdown 
S2.1.5 CPA5.4 Natural disasters (e.g. Floods, Earthquakes) Natural disasters 
S2.1.5 CPA5.5 Fire breakout Fire breakout 
S2.1.5 CPA5.6 Non-compliance with organisational information security 
policies 
Non-compliance 
S2.1.5 CPA5.7 Some of the incidents that are capable of causing 
significant damages to the IS ...-None of the above 
Deleted (Zero response) 
S2.1.5 CPA5.8 Some of the incidents that are capable of causing 
significant damages to the IS...-I don’t know 
Deleted (Zero response) 
S2.1.5 CPA6 Are you aware of any period(s) that the information 
systems of your organisation went through a crisis? 
Awareness of past crisis 
event? 
S2.1.5 CPA7 CP measures are processes that allow the organisation to 
function in times of uncertainty 
CP measures allow 
performance even in 
uncertainty 
S2.1.5 CPA8 In my organisation crisis preparedness processes and 
procedures are kept current 
CP Measures are kept 
current 
  Attitude Towards CPIS  
S3.3 ATTC1 CPIS is mainly the responsibility of all employees within 
the organisation 
Responsibility of all 
employees 
S3.4 ATTC2 CPIS is not an independent activity rather it is 
incorporated into day to day activities 
CP is incorporated into day 
to day activities 
S3.5 ATTC3 CPIS is an activity that I must perform separately to my 
daily duties 
CP performed separately to 
daily duties 
S5.6 ATTC4 Do you think the implementation of the measures for 
CPIS requires full participation of end-users? 
Participation of all users 
S3.1 ATTC5 CPIS is primarily the responsibility of a selected group of 
people 
Responsibility of a selected 
group of people 
  Normative Expectations  
S5.7 NE1 The implementation of crisis preparedness measures 
requires all teams (e.g. Information Technology/I... 
Requires all teams 
participation 
S5.8 NE2 In the implementation of the measures for CPIS, 
collaboration is not necessary 
Collaboration is not 
necessary 
S7.8 NE3 Cp training and communication provide for employees to 
know their roles in the event of a crisis 
Training provide the know 
how in crisis events 
S7.9 NE4 Cp training and communication has created a readiness 
for end-users to work together 
Training allows working 
together 
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  Intention to Comply  
S4.5 ITC1 In the occurrence of a major disastrous event such as an 
earthquake, fire breakout or flooding, what... 
What will be your first 
reaction? 
S9.1.1 ITC2 A requirement that you change your security password 
every 60 days 
Change your password 
regularly 
S9.1.2 ITC3 Your new security password must be eight characters 
long and must combine letters, symbols and figures 
Ensure strong password 
S9.1.3 ITC4 The system logs you off when you are idle for five 
minutes either  working from your office or remotely 
Strict information access 
control  
S9.2.1 ITC5 Ensure complete back up of all personal generated 
information at the end of every week 
Ensure regular back up of 
data 
S9.2.2 ITC6 Conduct a trial run to retrieve backed up information after 
every six months 
Conduct regular trial runs 
  Threat Appraisal  
S4.1 TA1 It is probable that my organisation will encounter some of 
the threats and risks common to information systems 
My organisation is likely to 
be affected 
S8.1 TA2 Failure by end users to perform correct measures will lead 
to negative consequences 
Lack of adherence lead to 
negative consequences 
S8.2 TA3 I think unexpected system shutdown as a result of non 
compliance is a serious issue for the org... 
Non compliance is a serious 
issue 
S4.4 TA4 Do you think the allowance to BRING YOUR OWN 
DEVICE to work has any detrimental effects 
Personal devices at work 
have detrimental effects 
  Self Efficacy  
S4.2 SE1 Information about potential crises have been 
communicated to all stakeholders 
Information has been 
communicated to all 
S5.5 SE2 Measures for CPIS in my organisation are developed 
enough to cope in crisis situation 
CPIS measures can cope in 
a crisis situation 
S6.2 SE3 I believe measures for the CPIS in my organisation have 
been operationalised 
CPIS measures are 
operational 
S6.4 SE4 In my organisation crisis preparedness processes and 
procedures are reviewed every 
Measures are reviewed  
S7.1 SE5 Crisis preparedness training is conducted in the following 
intervals. 
Fixed training schedules  
S7.3 SE6 Cp training is conducted when a new crisis preparedness 
measure is being implemented 
Training when there is a 
change 
S7.6 SE7 My crisis preparedness training are in-line with assigned 
duties and tested responsibilities 
Training is in-line with my 
duties 
  Response Efficacy  
S5.2 RE1 If Yes, do you believe that crisis preparedness measures 
in your organisation have improved from the... 
Improvement has been done 
S5.3 RE2 How would you rate the level of CPIS of your 
organisation as compared to others in the sector. 
Your organisation in 
comparison to others 
S5.4 RE3 CPIS measures will protect critical business processes 
from potential IS threats and risks 
Critical systems will be 
protected 
S7.2 RE4 Crisis preparedness training is conducted during the 
induction (orientation) programme 
Training during induction 
S7.4 RE5 I cannot recall any crisis preparedness training being 
conducted in my organisation 
No training at all 
S7.5 RE6 My Cp training involves crises simulation so that I know 
exactly what to do in times of crises... 
Training involves simulation  
S7.7 RE7 My Cp training include introduction to available 
resources and tools to use in the event of a crisis 
Resources and tools are 
available 
 
 
In this study, descriptive statistics calculated the mean, the range, the standard deviation, the 
minimum and the maximum values for each variable. Responses to at least four variables 
were consolidated to describe the main variable based on the collected data. Different tables 
and figures that describe the seven main variables are displayed next.  
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Attitude Towards CPIS 
 
Descriptive statistics for end-users’ attitudes toward the crisis preparedness of the 
information systems are reported in Table 4.7 and Figure 2.9.  
        
           
          Table 4.7: Descriptive Statistics - Attitude Towards CPIS 
 
 N Range Mini Maxi Mean Std. 
Deviation 
CP is the responsibility of a selected 
group of people 
70 4 1 5 3.27 1.17 
CP is the responsibility of all 
employees 
70 4 1 5 2.77 1.12 
CP is incorporated into day to day 
activities 
67 4 1 5 3.33 1.02 
CP performed separately to daily 
duties 
67 4 1 5 2.70 .99 
CP requires participation of all users 61 4 1 5 3.08 1.27 
Valid N (listwise) 61      
 
 
All five variables were measured on a five-item scale, 1-strongly disagree and 5-strongly 
agree. Hence the middle value is 3. Most of these variables have mean responses close to 3, a 
minimum of 1 and maximum of 5. The range stands at 4. All variables have a standard 
deviation greater than 1 except one (ATTC3) which has a S.D of .99. Variables with higher 
standard deviations indicated a reasonable degree of variability in the data. 
 
The high mean response of 3.27 indicates that many of the respondents believe that the 
responsibility for the crisis preparedness of the information systems belongs to a selected 
group of people (ATTC5).  This is also evident in the percentage of responses which shows 
that 55.7 percent of respondents agree that the responsibility for CPIS should be handled by a 
selected group of people.  
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Figure 2.9: Attitude Towards CPIS - Statistics 
 
Nevertheless, a high mean response of 3.33 indicates that most respondents believe that CPIS 
initiatives should be incorporated into day to day activities (ATTC2). A sizeable 55.3 percent 
of respondents agreed to this opinion and 52.3 percent disagreed to the statement that CP 
duties be performed separately to daily duties (ATTC3).   
 
Normative Expectations (NE) 
 
Descriptive statistics for end-users’ normative expectations about the crisis preparedness of 
the information systems are reported in Table 4.8 and Figure 2.10. All four variables were 
measured on a five-item scale. Hence the middle value is 3. One variable has a mean close to 
4. Two variables have mean responses close to 3 and one variable has a mean close to 2. 
Minimum values range from 1 to 2 and maximum values range from 4 to 5. Range values 
stand at 3 and 4.   
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       Table 4.8: Descriptive Statistics - Normative Expectations 
 
 N Range Mini Maxi Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Requires all teams participation 61 4 1 5 3.95 .99 
Collaboration is not necessary 61 3 1 4 1.90 .91 
Training provide the know how 
in crisis events 
53 3 2 5 3.17 .91 
Training allows working 
together 
53 3 2 5 3.17 .87 
Valid N (listwise) 53      
 
 
Most respondents agree that crisis preparedness initiatives require the participation of teams 
such as Information Technology, Business units and Human Resources (NE1). This is 
indicated by the high mean response of 3.95. No less than 74 percent of respondents agreed 
to that proposition (see Fig. 2.10).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Normative Expectations - Statistics 
 
 
The same question when asked in a reverse order produced a low mean response of 1.90. 
This indicates that end-users believe that collaboration in CPIS endeavours is necessary. This 
is also evident from a sizeable 84 percent of respondents who disagreed with the statement 
that “collaboration is not necessary” (NE2). 
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 Intention to Comply (ITC) 
 
Descriptive statistics for end-users’ intention to comply with measures for crisis preparedness 
of the information systems are reported in Table 4.9, Figures 2.11 and 2.12.  
 
   Table 4.9: Descriptive Statistics - Intention to Comply 
 
 N Range Mini Maxi Mean Std. Deviation 
What will be your first reaction? 62 2 1 3 2.66 .68 
Change your password regularly 59 6 1 7 3.61 1.70 
Ensure strong password 59 6 1 7 4.76 1.32 
Strict information access control  59 6 1 7 2.98 1.88 
Ensure regular back up of data 59 5 2 7 5.07 1.27 
Conduct regular trial runs 59 5 2 7 5.29 1.13 
Valid N (listwise) 59      
 
 
Five variables were measured on a seven-item scale, 1-very displeased and 7-very pleased. 
One variable (ITC1) was measured on a five-item scale. Three variables out of five which 
were measured on a seven-item scale have mean responses above 4, which are 4.76, 5.02 and 
5.29. Minimum values range from 1 to 2 and maximum values range from 3 to 7. Range 
values stand at 2, 5 and 6. All variables have a standard deviation greater than 1 except one 
(ITC1) which has a S.D of .68. Higher standard deviations indicate a moderate degree of 
variability in the data. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Your First Reaction during a Crisis Event 
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On the question “what will be your first reaction?” (ITC1) most respondents indicated their 
intention to comply with the set out rules and regulations. This is clear from the high mean 
response of 2.66 on a five-item scale. No less than 77 percent of respondents indicated their 
intention to comply with rules and regulations that embrace crisis preparedness of the 
information systems (see Fig. 2.11).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Intention to Comply - Statistics 
 
 
Many respondents are pleased to conduct regular trial runs to recover their data. This is 
shown by a high mean response of 5.29 (see Table 4.9) and a considerable 54 percent of 
pleased respondents. Respondents are also pleased to regularly backup their data. This is 
clear from the high mean response of 5.07 and a reasonable 47 percent of pleased 
respondents. However, a substantial percentage of respondents seem to be neutral on the 
issues of secure passwords. While 42 percent of respondents had no opinion on ensuring 
strong passwords, 34 percent lacked an opinion on changing their passwords on regular basis.  
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 Threat Appraisal (TA) 
 
Descriptive statistics for end-users’ threat appraisal with regard to crisis preparedness of the 
information systems are reported in Table 4.10 and Figure 2.13. Three variables were 
measured on a five-item scale and one variable (TA4) was measured on a scale with these 
responses: Yes, No and I don’t know.  
 
 
       Table 4.10: Descriptive Statistics -Threat Appraisal 
 
 N Range Mini Maxi Mean Std. 
Deviation 
My organisation is likely to be 
affected 
62 4 1 5 2.77 1.02 
Lack of adherence lead to negative 
consequences 
59 3 2 5 3.53 .70 
Non compliance is a serious issue 
59 3 2 5 3.44 .93 
Personal devices at work have 
detrimental effects 
59 8 1 9 2.75 2.71 
Valid N (listwise) 
59      
 
 
Two variables out of three which were measured on a five-item scale have mean responses 
above 3. Minimum values range from 1 to 2 and maximum values range from 5 to 9. Range 
values stand at 3, 4 and 8. The variables TA1 and TA4 have standard deviations greater than 
1 which shows some degree of variability in the data.   
 
Many respondents believe that a lack of adherence to established CPIS measures can lead to 
negative impacts to the information systems of the organisation. This is evident from the high 
mean response of 3.53. This observation is also in-line with the high percentage of 
respondents (61%) who agreed that a lack of adherence to CPIS measures can lead to 
damages to the information systems of the organisation. 
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Figure 2.13: Threat Appraisal - Statistics 
 
The high mean response of 3.44 for the TA3 variable reflects the perceptions of the 
respondents about the seriousness of non compliance. This means that many respondents 
perceive that CPIS non compliance is a serious matter from the organisation’s perspective. 
This finding is consistent with a sizeable 51 percent of the respondents who agreed to the 
statement that “unexpected system shutdown as a result of non compliance is a serious issue 
for the organisation”. On the contrary, 53 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement 
that their organisations are likely to encounter some of the threats and risks common to 
information systems.  
 
Moreover, on the question which asked the respondents if they thought bringing their own 
devices (BYOD) to work had any detrimental effects to the CPIS of their organisation, the 
data indicate that many respondents are of the opinion that their devices are of no threat to the 
CPIS. This is indicated by the low mean response of 2.75 (see Table 4.10).    
 
 Response Efficacy (RE) 
 
Descriptive statistics for end-users’ response efficacy with regard to crisis preparedness of 
the information systems are reported in Table 4.11 and Figure 2.14. Five variables were 
measured on a five-item scale. The dimension (RE2) which requested the respondents to rate 
the CPIS of their organisation with those in the same sector was measured on a scale with 
Below Average, Average and Above Average responses. The other dimension (RE4), asked 
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the respondents to indicate if they received any formal training on CPIS during the induction 
period. This variable was measured on a scale with Yes and No responses. 
 
 
  Table 4.11: Descriptive Statistics - Response Efficacy 
 
 N Range Mini Maxi Mean Std. Deviation 
Improvement has been done 44 3 2 5 4.00 .84 
Your orgnisation in comparison to 
others 
61 2 1 3 2.25 .70 
Critical systems will be protected 61 3 2 5 3.66 .85 
Training during induction 60 1 1 2 1.83 .38 
No training at all 60 4 1 5 2.67 1.31 
Training involves simulation  53 4 1 5 3.21 .99 
Resources and tools are available 53 3 2 5 3.23 .82 
Valid N (listwise) 39      
 
 
Four variables have mean responses above 3. Minimum values range from 1 to 2 and 
maximum values range from 2 to 5. Range values stand at 1, 2, 3, and 4. Many of the 
variables have a S.D of less than 1 except the RE5 variable which has a S.D greater than 1. 
 
The high mean response of 4.00 indicates that many respondents have a feeling that the CPIS 
of their organisations has improved from the last known incident.  This is consistent with a 
sizeable 79 percent of respondents who agreed that improvement has been made.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.14: Response Efficacy - Statistics 
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On the other hand, many respondents believe that the implementation of CPIS measures will 
protect critical systems from IS threats and risks. This is evident from a high mean response 
of 3.66 and a huge 61 percent of respondents who agreed. 
 
Nevertheless, a considerable 45% of respondents had no opinion if their CP training had 
introduced them to any resources and tools to use in the event of a crisis.    
 
 Self Efficacy (SE) 
 
Descriptive statistics for end-users’ self efficacy with regard to crisis preparedness of the 
information systems are reported in Table 4.12 and Figure 2.15. Five variables were 
measured on a five-item scale. Two dimensions (SE4) and (SE5) asked the respondents to 
indicate in terms of intervals when CPIS measures were reviewed, and after how long they 
were trained, respectively.   
 
 
Table 4.12: Descriptive Statistics - Self Efficacy 
 
 N Range Mini Maxi Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Information has been communicated 
to all 
62 4 1 5 2.68 1.00 
CPIS measures can cope in a crisis 
situation 
61 3 2 5 3.54 .94 
CPIS measures are operational 60 4 1 5 3.43 .87 
Measures are reviewed  60 5 1 6 3.23 1.90 
Fixed training schedules  60 10 1 11 6.42 4.95 
Training when there is a change 60 3 2 5 3.03 .78 
Training is inline with my duties 53 3 2 5 3.32 .78 
Valid N (listwise) 53      
 
 
Minimum values range from 1 to 2 and maximum values range from 5 to 11. Range values 
stand at 3, 4, 5, and 10. The high mean response of 6.42 was for the item which requested the 
respondents to indicate the interval between CP trainings. Many of the respondents responded 
as “none of the above”. Other options in that question included: once per year, after every 
two years, after every three years. This may indicate that there are no scheduled training 
programmes as far as CPIS is concerned, or possibly the provided categories did not match 
any of the established training schedules in those organisations. 
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Figure 2.15: Self Efficacy - Statistics 
 
This observation is also clear from the sizeable 45% and 42% of respondents who had no 
opinion on the two training dimensions: SE6 and SE7. 
 
However, 46% and 52% of respondents had a feeling that CPIS measures have been 
operationalised (SE3) and can cope in crisis situations (SE2) respectively. This finding is also 
clear from the high mean responses of 3.43 and 3.54 for the similar variables.  
 
Crisis preparedness awareness (CPA) 
 
Descriptive statistics for end-users’ crisis preparedness awareness of crisis preparedness of 
the information systems are reported in Table 4.13 and Figures 2.16 and 2.17. 
 
       Table 4.13: Descriptive Statistics - Crisis Preparedness Awareness 
 
 N Range Mini Maxi Mean Std. 
Deviation 
CPIS responsibility in my 
organisation lies with... 
70 8 1 9 3.23 1.64 
Awareness of past crisis event? 62 1 1 2 1.27 .45 
CP measures allow 
performance even in 
uncertainity 
60 3 2 5 3.88 .83 
CP Measures are kept current 60 3 2 5 3.43 .89 
Valid N (listwise) 60      
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The high mean response of 3.88 indicates that many respondents were aware that the 
existence of CPIS measures will allow the information systems of the organisation to perform 
(to a certain degree) even in complex situations. Moreover, many respondents think that CPIS 
measures in their organisations are kept current. This is indicated by the high mean response 
of 3.43. Despite these findings, many respondents still believe that the responsibility for the 
CPIS in their organisations lies with the IT or the IS department.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.16: Crisis Preparedness Awareness - Statistics 
 
 
The data on Figure 2.16 indicate that above 60% of the respondents are aware of and 
understand different processes and procedures related to the preparedness of the information 
systems within their organisation. These include (1) procedures that facilitate the restoration 
of the information systems after a crisis event, (2) identification, control and mitigation of IS 
risks and threats, (3) continuous management of risks and (4) establishment of crisis 
preparedness plans. 
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Figure 2.17: Crisis Preparedness Awareness - Statistics 
 
 
Figure 2.17 shows that above 60% of the respondents are aware of the common adverse 
events that may lead to negative consequences to the information systems of the organisation. 
These include unauthorised internal access, unauthorised external access, unexpected system 
shutdown, and non compliance, among others.  
 
4.8 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients of the Variables 
 
In order to understand the association between sets of variables, Pearson’s Correlation 
Coefficient analysis was adopted. Resulting from this analysis were the Pearson’s Coefficient 
of Correlation (r) and the values of significance (p).  
 
The analyses of the association between sets of variables including the research hypotheses 
that generated them follow next. 
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End-users’ intention to comply with the measures for CPIS within the organisation is 
likely to be positively influenced by their attitude of crisis preparedness of the information 
systems.  
 
From this hypothesis, a set of five variables was generated. These included ATTC1, ATTC2, 
ATTC3, ATTC4 and ATTC5.  
 
 
           Table 4.14: Correlations - Attitude Towards CPIS 
 
 ATTC1 ATTC2 ATTC3 ATTC4 ATTC5 
ATTC1 R 1     
Sig. (2-tailed)      
N 70     
ATTC2 R .279
*
 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) .022     
N 67 67    
ATTC3 R -.077 -.504
**
 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .535 .000    
N 67 67 67   
ATTC4 R .407
**
 .289
*
 -.153 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .024 .239   
N 61 61 61 61  
ATTC5 R -.518
**
 -.222 .183 -.338
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .071 .139 .008  
N 70 67 67 61 70 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
  
 
Table 4.14 shows four correlations with attitude towards CPIS with different significant 
levels. First, the variable ATTC2, “incorporation of crisis preparedness activities into day to 
day activities” correlates weakly (r =.279, p<.05) with the variable ATTC1, “CPIS is a 
responsibility for all employees”. This means that CPIS is likely to be effective if its 
responsibility is assumed by all employees and it is integrated into day to day activities. On 
the other hand, the variable ATTC5, “CPIS is the responsibility of a selected group of 
people” correlates moderately (r = -.518, p<.01) with the variable ATTC1, “CPIS is the 
responsibility all employees”. This means that if a selected group of people is replaced by 
end-users then end-users are likely to comply with CPIS measures. This is because CPIS now 
becomes part and parcel of their daily duties.  
 
Moreover, ATTC3 correlates modestly with ATTC2 (r = -.504, p<.01), ATTC4 correlates 
moderately with ATTC1 (r = .407, p<.01) and ATTC4 correlates weakly with ATTC2 (r = 
.289, p<.05).   
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Normative expectations about the crisis preparedness of the information systems are likely 
to affect end-users’ intentions to comply with the measures for CPIS within the 
organisation. 
 
From this hypothesis a set of four variables was generated. These included NE1, NE2, NE3 
and NE4. 
 
 
                                Table 4.15: Correlations - Normative Expectations 
 
 NE1 NE2 NE3 NE4 
NE1 R 1    
Sig. (2-tailed)     
N 61    
NE2 R -.209 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .105    
N 61 61   
NE3 R .011 -.046 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .939 .745   
N 53 53 53  
NE4 R -.033 -.145 .760
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .813 .301 .000  
N 53 53 53 53 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Test results reported in Table 4.15 exhibit one significant correlation with normative 
expectations. The variable NE4, “CP training and communication allow working together” 
correlates strongly (r = .760, p<.01) with the variable NE3, “training provide the know how 
in crisis events”. This means that crisis preparedness training and communication are likely 
to facilitate combined efforts from end-users to adhere to established measures for the CPIS.  
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End-users’ intentions to comply with CPIS measures are likely to have a significant impact 
on actual compliance with CPIS measures. 
 
From this hypothesis a set of five variables was generated. These included ITC1, ITC2, ITC3, 
ITC4 and ITC5. 
 
 
               Table 4.16: Correlations - Intention to Comply 
 
 ITC1 ITC2 ITC3 ITC4  ITC5 
ITC1 R 1     
Sig. (2-tailed)      
N 62     
ITC2 R .151 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) .254     
N 59 59    
ITC3 R .139 .489
**
 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .295 .000    
N 59 59 59   
ITC4 R -.071 .240 .319
*
 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .591 .067 .014   
N 59 59 59 59  
ITC5 R -.112 .236 .360
**
 .116 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .399 .073 .005 .382  
N 59 59 59 59 59 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Table 4.16 shows three significant correlations with intention to comply. The first indicate 
the likelihood of end-user compliance by keeping strong passwords (ITC3) and changing 
them on a regular basis (ITC2) to prevent unauthorised access to secure systems. The 
variables ITC3 and ITC2 correlate moderately with a Pearson’s coefficient of .489 (p<.01). 
Second, the variable ITC4, “strict information access” correlates weakly (r = .319, p<.05) 
with the variable ITC3, “ensuring strong passwords”. This means that end-users are likely to 
adhere to strict information access controls if they apply strong secure passwords. Thirdly, 
the variable ITC5, “regular back up of data” correlates modestly (r = .360, p<.01) with the 
variable ITC3, “ensuring strong passwords”.  This means that data recovery after a crisis 
event is likely to be effective if end-users kept backed up data under secure passwords. In 
other words the data won’t be compromised during and after a crisis event.  
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Threat appraisal affects end-users’ intention to comply with the established measures for 
CPIS within the organisation. 
 
From this hypothesis a set of four variables was generated. These included TA1, TA2, TA3 
and TA4. 
 
 
                   Table 4.17: Correlations - Threat Appraisal 
 
 TA1 TA2 TA3 TA4 
TA1 Pearson Correlation 1  .  
Sig. (2-tailed)     
N 62    
TA2 Pearson Correlation -.124 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .348    
N 59 59   
TA3 Pearson Correlation .213 .350
**
 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .106 .007   
N 59 59 59  
TA4 Pearson Correlation -.095 .035 .011 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .472 .792 .934  
N 59 59 59 59 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Table 4.17 exhibits one significant correlation with threat appraisal. The variable TA3, “Non 
compliance is a serious issue” correlates weakly (r = .350, p<.01) with the variable TA2, 
“lack of adherence will lead to negative consequences”.   
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Response efficacy affects end-users’ intentions to comply with the established measures for 
the CPIS within the organisation. 
 
From this hypothesis a set of seven variables was generated. These included RE1, RE2, RE3, 
RE4, RE5, RE6 and RE7. 
 
       Table 4.18: Correlations - Response Efficacy 
 
 RE1 RE2 RE3 RE4 RE5 RE6  RE7 
RE1 r 1       
Sig. (2-tailed)        
N 44       
RE2 r .635
**
 1      
Sig. (2-tailed) .000       
N 44 61      
RE3 r .536
**
 .535
**
 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000      
N 44 61 61     
RE4 r -.214 -.096 -.131 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) .163 .465 .318     
N 44 60 60 60    
RE5 r -.375
*
 -.367
**
 -.256
*
 .229 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .012 .004 .049 .078    
N 44 60 60 60 60   
RE6  r .382
*
 .151 .244 -.144 -.324
*
 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .016 .281 .078 .303 .018   
N 39 53 53 53 53 53  
RE7 r .454
**
 .204 .188 -.221 -.376
**
 .603
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .004 .144 .178 .112 .006 .000  
N 39 53 53 53 53 53 53 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Table 4.18 exhibits several significant correlations with response efficacy. The level of CPIS 
in the organisation (RE2) correlates moderately (r = .635, p<.01) with the CPIS 
improvements that have been made after the last known event (RE1). On the other hand, the 
variable RE7, “CP training introduced end-users to available resources and tools” correlates 
moderately (r = .603, p<.01) with the variable RE6, “CP training involves simulation of 
potential adverse events”. This may imply that end-users’ response efficacy is likely to 
enhance the identification of IS risks and threats and mitigate them effectively before they 
develop into negative consequences to the information systems.  
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Self-efficacy affects end-users’ intentions to comply with established measures for CPIS 
within the organisation. 
 
A set of seven variables was generated from this hypothesis. They included SE1, SE2, SE3, 
SE4, SE5, SE6 and SE7. 
 
 
       Table 4.19: Correlations - Self Efficacy 
 
 SE1 SE2 SE3 SE4  SE5  SE6 SE7 
SE1 R 1       
Sig. (2-tailed)        
N 62       
SE2 R .444
**
 1      
Sig. (2-tailed) .000       
N 61 61      
SE3 R .196 .455
**
 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) .134 .000      
N 60 60 60     
SE4  R -.242 -.334
**
 -.544
**
 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) .062 .009 .000     
N 60 60 60 60    
SE5  R -.256
*
 -.247 -.377
**
 .596
**
 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .048 .057 .003 .000    
N 60 60 60 60 60   
SE6 R .206 .388
**
 .178 -.120 -.166 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .115 .002 .174 .362 .205   
N 60 60 60 60 60 60  
SE7 R .344
*
 .259 .162 -.263 -.442
**
 .363
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .012 .061 .247 .057 .001 .008  
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Table 4.19 exhibits a number of significant correlations with self efficacy. The variable SE5, 
“fixed training schedules” correlates moderately (r = .596, p<.01) with the variable SE4, “CP 
measures are reviewed after certain intervals”. This means that organisations which have 
fixed training schedules with regard to CPIS are likely to review their CPIS measures at 
established intervals. In addition, the variable SE4, “CPIS measures are reviewed at certain 
intervals” correlates moderately (r = -.544, p<.01) with the variable SE3, “CPIS measures 
are operational”. This means that organisations which have integrated CPIS measures into 
their daily operations are unlikely to review CPIS measures by following fixed schedules. In 
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other words, they are likely to review their CPIS measures more often because it is integrated 
into their daily operations.   
 
Crisis preparedness awareness positively influences end-users’ intentions to comply with 
established measures for CPIS within the organisations.  
 
A set of eight variables was generated from this hypothesis. However, the following 
variables: CPA1, CPA2, CPA4, and CPA5 seemed to produce constant values in the 
calculation for the Pearson’s Coefficient Correlation. Hence, they were not included in this 
computation. The correlation analysis for this hypothesis only included the following 
variables: CPA3, CPA6, CPA7 and CPA8. 
 
 
                           Table 4.20: Correlations - Crisis Preparedness Awareness 
 
 CPA3 CPA6 CPA7 CPA8 
CPA3 R 1    
Sig. (2-tailed)     
N 70    
CPA6 R -.155 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .228    
N 62 62   
CPA7 R .116 .086 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .378 .514   
N 60 60 60  
CPA8 R .156 -.125 .301
*
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .235 .340 .020  
N 60 60 60 60 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Table 4.20 exhibits one significant correlation with crisis preparedness awareness. The 
variable CPA8, “CP measures are kept current” correlates weakly (r = .301, p<.05) with the 
variable CPA7, “CP measures allow performance even in uncertainty”. This may imply that 
if organisations keep their CPIS measures current then these measures are likely to facilitate 
the information systems platforms ability to function (at least to some degree) in crisis 
situations. In other words, end-users’ understanding and awareness of the CPIS strategies 
within their organisations are likely to influence their actual compliance (actions) with these 
measures even in times of uncertainty.  
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4.9 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter presented the data analysis and described the research findings. Information 
about the survey respondents and the process that was used to acquire them was provided. 
This included the information about the organisations that were approached and different 
communication methods that were used to request their participation in the study. The 
process of preparing the data, the response rate and the demographics were described in 
details.  
 
The demographics section was followed by the reliability tests, the descriptive statistics 
analyses and the correlation analyses.  The correlation analyses presented the Pearson’s 
Coefficient of Correlations for different sets of variables, including their values of 
significance. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter sums up key points and statements from the four chapters of this thesis. The path 
undertaken by the researcher from the identification of the research gap to the main findings 
of the study is presented. This chapter also includes the implications of the study and the 
main contributions of the research from both academic and practitioner perspectives. This is 
followed by the limitations of the study in relation to the research design, the research 
instrument and the data collection process. Finally, opportunities for future research are 
suggested. 
5.2 Overview of the Research 
5.2.1 Research Gap 
 
Despite the existence of different measures to counteract crisis events in organisations, the 
frequency and magnitude of these events remain high in the recent past (Hu et al., 2006; Jain 
& Singh, 2012). This was particularly of interest given the low figures of crisis preparedness 
on a global scale reported in diverse studies such as Susanto (2003) and Ernst and Young 
(2003). Some identified challenges with crisis-preparedness were linked to lack of 
understanding or awareness of fundamental components of crisis-preparedness of the 
information systems particularly from the end-user’s perspective (Siponen, 2000; Susanto, 
2003). Added to the list were the human behaviours such as attitudes and perceptions 
(Garrett, 2004; Rhee & Kim, 2005) in relation to different measures established by 
organisations toward crisis preparedness endeavours.   
 
For these reasons, two research questions were identified in an attempt to fill the research 
gap. They included:  
 
1) What is the extent of end-user awareness of crisis preparedness of the 
information systems within the organisation?  
 
2) What is the extent of end-user adherence to crisis preparedness of the 
information systems in the organisation? 
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5.2.2 Research Objectives and Hypotheses 
 
Research objectives are fundamental to ensuring that the underlying research question(s) are 
appropriately addressed. The review of relevant publications from IS and other reference 
disciplines suggested that the low level of crisis preparedness of the information systems in 
organisations may have a direct link to lack of end-user understanding, and a lack of both 
end-user awareness of and adherence to CPIS measures. In line with this argument and the 
identified research questions, the research objectives for this study were to: 
 
 determine the key elements of the CPIS; 
 
 determine the extent of end-user awareness of the CPIS measures in their 
organisations; 
 
 determine the extent of end-user adherence to CPIS measures established within the 
organisation; and 
 
 apply two existing theories to analyse the collected data on end-user awareness of and 
adherence to CPIS measures in New Zealand organisations. 
 
However, to answer the research questions fully it was necessary to generate and test research 
hypotheses. The research hypotheses were generated on the basis of two theoretical 
frameworks: the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and the Protection Motivation Theory 
(PMT). The choice of these two theoretical frameworks was driven by the appropriateness of 
their key assumptions to this study. For instance, the assumption that behaviour is best 
predicted by intention was relevant when examining the degree to which end-users were 
prepared to apply or not to apply established measures for CPIS in their organisations. On the 
other hand, the PMT framework was a relevant choice for this study due to its applicability in 
situations that involve threats and for which there is an expectation from peers or managers 
that end-users should act in a certain way. In other words, the PMT allowed the researcher to 
examine the belief that motivation toward protection is inherent in perceived IS threats and 
risks and the need to avoid the potential negative outcomes (please refer to chapter 4 for 
detailed analysis). 
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From the TRA and the PMT theoretical frameworks, six variables out of seven were chosen 
for this study: attitude towards CPIS, normative expectations, intention to comply, threat 
appraisal, response efficacy, and self efficacy. The seventh variable: crisis preparedness 
awareness was devised as a new scale variable for this study. 
 
From these variables seven research hypotheses were generated in an attempt to answer the 
research questions identified at the start of this study. The research hypotheses were as 
follows: 
 
 End-users’ intention to comply with the measures for CPIS within the 
organisation is likely to be positively influenced by their attitude of crisis 
preparedness of the information systems.  
 
 Normative expectations about the crisis preparedness of the information systems 
are likely to affect end-users’ intentions to comply with measures for CPIS within 
the organisation. 
 
 End-users’ intentions to comply with CPIS measures are likely to have a 
significant impact on actual compliance with CPIS measures. 
 
 Threat appraisal affects end-users’ intention to comply with established measures 
for CPIS within the organisation. 
 
 Response efficacy affects end-users’ intentions to comply with established 
measures for CPIS within the organisation. 
 
 Self-efficacy affects end-users’ intentions to comply with established measures for 
CPIS within the organisation. 
 
 Crisis preparedness awareness positively influences end-users’ intentions to 
comply with established measures for CPIS within the organisations.  
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5.2.3 Research Design 
 
In order to accomplish the research objectives and to answer the research questions, a 
quantitative positivist research method was adopted for this study. This approach was 
appropriate to generate facts about the crisis preparedness of information systems in New 
Zealand organisations without requiring subjective interpretation.  
 
Even though the three respondent organisations were tied up with busy roadmaps of 
compliance projects, still they found it beneficial to permit their employees to participate in 
the study. Nevertheless, this was a disappointment that only three organisations agreed to 
participate in the study. It could have been a greater success if more organisations had agreed 
to the study request. 
 
In consultation with a representative from each respondent organisation, it was agreed that 
potential participants should be identified from all departments across the organisation. 
Hence, study participants were identified from a cross section of employees that used 
information systems applications over their desktop computers or from their mobile devices. 
These are the people that used these kinds of systems to perform their daily duties. However, 
the researcher had no control over the participants selection process; hence it is possible that 
the sample was purposively identified (i.e. a judgemental sample). This is because the sample 
was selected based on certain criteria or some characteristics known only to the organisations 
themselves.    
 
From the three participating organisations a total number of 297 email invitations were sent 
out. The email invitation (see Appendix C.2) was followed by a second email message (see 
Appendix C.3) which contained instructions about the survey to the respondents. This email 
message also contained a web-link that gave access to an anonymous web-based survey. 
Three weeks into the study, a reminder email message (see Appendix C.4) was sent out to all 
invitees. This was necessary to encourage those who were interested to take part in the study 
to do so and those who had not completed their responses to do so before the study came to a 
close. Given the low response rate, it was necessary to send out a second reminder six weeks 
into the study. The two reminder emails gave a small boost to the response rate.  
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The collected data was analysed from three different approaches. Data analyses using 
descriptive statistics and percentage responses were necessary to ascertain facts about crisis 
preparedness of the information systems in New Zealand organisations. Correlation analyses 
were performed on the collected data in order to understand the relationships between 
different sets of variables. 
5.3 Study Implications  
 
The most important implication for both academia and practice is the understanding that 
greater emphasis should be given to the processes that bring about the CPIS strategies across 
varying organisation structures. 
 
Attitude towards CPIS, referring to the degree to which end-users perceive the importance of 
their contribution to the effectiveness of the CPIS measures, will be manifested in their 
intention to comply with the measures for CPIS. This finding suggests the importance of 
establishing processes that will see the responsibility for the CPIS being distributed across the 
entire community of the organisation. This is because many of the respondents were of the 
opinion that responsibilities for the crisis preparedness of their systems belong only to the 
Information Technology or the Information Systems departments. This was unexpected, 
especially from end-users that have gone through deliberate training associated with CPIS 
measures. The findings also suggest that IS practitioners should emphasise to their colleagues 
that many of the crisis incidents originate from within. Hence, it is the task of every 
employee to be vigilant on likely IS threats and risks so as to achieve effective crisis 
preparedness of the information systems.  
 
Study results show that normative expectations have a significant effect on end-users’ 
intentions to comply with the measures for CPIS within the organisation. This finding 
stresses the significance of providing knowledge to all employees about countermeasures to 
crisis events. If employees have not been exposed to the facts and skills for handling crisis 
events, they will find it difficult to know what is expected of them. One respondent notes 
that, “we have recently (since the Christchurch earthquake) established a framework to assist 
users to determine their … requirements.” This observation suggests that if end-users are 
brought to the same level of understanding, it would be easier for them to comply with the 
measures for CPIS because that is what her/his peers, colleagues and managers expect of 
them.  
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Intentions to comply, signifying end-users’ willingness to attempt to perform a given 
behaviour, will lead them to actual compliance with CPIS measures.  This finding suggests 
that organisations should provide informative sessions to end-users about different CPIS 
strategies in their organisations. This will enlighten the end-users on why they should adhere 
to CPIS measures. While educating all employees within the organisation may seem 
expensive, the study results indicate that end-users will comply with CPIS measures if they 
perceive the importance of those measures to the IS platforms.    
 
Study findings indicate that threat appraisal has a significant impact on end-users’ intention 
to comply with established measures for CPIS within the organisation. In other words, 
perceived vulnerability and perceived severity about non compliance with CPIS will be 
manifested in end-users’ intentions to adhere to established measures for CPIS. From the IS 
practitioners view, a few points are worth mentioning here. First, all employees should be 
made aware of IS threats and risks that can potentially affect the IS platforms of the 
organisation. As the results indicate, many respondents were unaware of this critical 
information. More precisely, it has not been communicated to them. Second, all employees 
should be made to understand that IS threats and risks are real. This is because study results 
show that many respondents didn’t accept the idea that their organisations can encounter 
some of the IS risks and threats common to IS. Third, awareness programmes should be 
conducted for the purposes of educating end-users about the severity and seriousness posed 
by crisis events to the organisation’s wellbeing. Employees need to know that the financial 
implications and the lost integrity of the organisation’s systems resulting from adverse events 
are enormous while the threat to information systems is relentlessly rising.   
 
Response-efficacy, signifying end-users’ beliefs in the perceived benefits of the coping action 
will improve their intentions to comply with CPIS measures within their organisations. This 
finding underlines the perceived relevance of the CPIS strategies. If end-users don’t perceive 
CPIS measures as important and adequate enough to offset impending threats, they will not 
adhere to those measures. This finding suggests to the IS practitioners that it is essential to 
enlighten end-users through awareness programmes such as workshops and event simulations 
about the capabilities and the functionalities of the crisis event countermeasures. Several 
respondents’ also note the importance of conducting sessions like: mock system restores, 
backup retrieval, and testing CPIS procedures. In doing so, end-users will be aware of 
different resources and tools to use given the crisis event.   
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Research results show that end-users’ self efficacy has a significant impact on their intentions 
to comply with established measures for CPIS within the organisation. The findings from this 
study indicate that IS practitioners should ensure that end-users are given the assurance that 
they are capable of carrying out CPIS measures. This can be done by providing information 
on any reviewed CPIS strategies such as what has been changed and how the end-user fits 
into the new way of doing things. In this way the spur and the confidence of end-users to 
apply CPIS measures in their daily duties will be uplifted. In other words, the review of CPIS 
measures should go hand in hand with training and awareness programmes for the end-users.  
 
Crisis preparedness awareness refers to the degree to which end-users’ knowledge and 
understanding of different aspects of CPIS in their organisation will lead to end-users’ 
intentions to comply with established measures for CPIS within their organisation. To the IS 
practitioners this implies that end-users should be to the fore with regard to CPIS measures. 
Key areas that IS practitioners should consider in order to ensure that end-users are at the 
centre of organisational efforts as far as CPIS measures are concerned include (1) forging 
relationships between stakeholders, (2) sharing information about risks and threats they come 
across on a daily basis, (3) being severe on unsafe activities or practices, (4) being aware of 
the processes and procedures to follow in the event of a crisis.  
 
The general study implications as outlined in this section are further complemented by 
research contributions for both academics and practitioners. These contributions are 
presented next. 
5.4 Contributions of this Research  
 
The contributions made by this research to the existing body of knowledge can be viewed 
from two perspectives. First are the contributions that in this text are referred to as “academic 
contributions” and the other contributions are those which are termed as “practitioner 
contributions”. Selected examples about these two types of contributions are elaborated in 
more detail in the next two sections. 
5.4.1 Academic Value of the Research 
 
The primary value of this research to academia is the expansion of the existing discourse on 
crisis-preparedness. This was accomplished by the application of existing theories (i.e. TRA 
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and PMT) to analyse the collected data. The consolidation of these theoretical frameworks 
and their application to analyse the quantitative data added knowledge to the field of crisis-
preparedness in IS.  
 
Secondly, this is the first study in New Zealand that has empirically examined the crisis 
preparedness of information systems in organisational settings. This was accomplished by 
capturing end-user perceptions on forty one (41) items which were later used to test the 
research hypotheses.  
 
A third contribution of this study is the development of a questionnaire tool which integrates 
a cluster of statements describing facets of seven different dimensions of CPIS. At the 
analysis stage each dimension became one of the seven variables: attitude towards CPIS, 
normative expectations, intention to comply, threat appraisal, response efficacy, self efficacy 
and crisis preparedness awareness. Six of these variables have been used in combination 
with other variables in existing measures or instruments. However, the crisis preparedness 
awareness dimension and hence the variables were newly created, including the 
amalgamation of the seven variables to create measures for CPIS.  
 
A fourth contribution is the testing of the seven variables in the context of the crisis 
preparedness of the information systems. This is because none of these variables had 
previously been tested in this context. 
 
A fifth contribution is that this study used participants from the actual working environment 
as opposed to other studies that use students as participants (Sivo et al., 2006).  This is 
because some studies use student participants in order to increase the external validity of their 
instruments.  Sivo et al., argue that the representativeness of the sample is pertinent to ensure 
for external validity in a given study. In other words, study findings based on a sample drawn 
from the actual population are more applicable in IS research regardless of a smaller sample 
size. Therefore, the findings from this study can be generalised to a wider population because 
the respondents gave their opinions based on the actual systems, actual structures and actual 
organisational processes and procedures with regards to CPIS.  
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5.4.2 Practitioner Value of the Research 
 
This study also offers value to the practitioner community. The significance of the results 
from this study allow the practitioner community to gain a better understanding of the level 
of end-user awareness of and adherence to crisis preparedness of the information systems in 
their organisations.  From this understanding, organisations are able to improve or enhance 
user participation in crisis preparedness of the information systems at all levels. 
 
A second contribution to IS practitioners is the availability of a valid and reliable tool with 
which organisations can assess the crisis preparedness of their information systems against a 
wide range of IS threats and risks. Previously, organisations could assess their vulnerability 
to potential IS threats and risks by applying up to four different strategies. These include 
business continuity plans, disaster recovery plans, information systems security and 
information systems risk management. However, the tool created for this project is very 
important to organisations because now they can assess the status or progress of their crisis 
preparedness initiatives in just one step.   
 
The third contribution is that the findings from this study can act as a catalyst to implement 
enhanced CPIS measures for organisations that have not implemented such measures yet. 
5.5 Limitations of the Study 
 
Despite the benefits drawn from the research findings, the researcher would like to 
acknowledge some limitations associated with this study. Study limitations are grouped in 
three different categories: the research design, the research instrument and the data collection 
process. The next three sections discuss each limitation category in more detail.  
5.5.1 Limitations of the Research Design 
 
Despite the number of benefits offered by a web-based survey such as cost reduction and 
processing time, the downside is that a web-based survey may suffer coverage limitations 
(Sivo et al., 2006). This is because the survey web-link was meant to be completed by 
participants with access to the Internet on their workstation computers or mobile devices. 
However, potential participants might have been left out because they had restricted access to 
Internet on their workstation computers. This is because in some organisations employees are 
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only allowed to access the Internet during the lunch break. It is likely that in that half hour 
lunch break the survey had to compete for attention with other favourite sites like Facebook 
and Twitter. 
 
Again, this study took place at a time when the negative consequences from some major 
crisis events in New Zealand such as Pike River Mine and Christchurch earthquake were still 
fresh in the minds of managers and executives. The timing of the study perhaps was not right 
as managers in some organisations might have had a feeling that their unpreparedness would 
be exposed.  
 
The data was predominantly collected from the two large New Zealand cities: Wellington and 
Auckland. An interesting follow-up study would be to collect data from a random sample of 
organisations from different cities across New Zealand. 
 
5.5.2 Limitations of the Research Instrument 
 
The positivist research paradigm adopted for this study is known to pose some limitations 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985) in presenting a complete picture of information systems phenomena 
(Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). This is because the positivist research approach has a 
tendency to discount the historical context of phenomena on human actions. While the survey 
instrument used for this study attempted to capture both end-user awareness of and adherence 
to CPIS, but did not explore how social contexts, marked by time, locale, organisation 
politics, and organisation culture may have influenced end-users responses (Orlikowski & 
Baroudi, 1991). The social contexts were not considered in the data capturing process as they 
were outside the scope of this study. 
 
Both internal and external validity of the research instrument cannot be claimed as this study 
is descriptive. The two major concerns were only to ensure quality and credibility of the 
study and that the study findings can be generalised to a wider population. 
 
The reliability coefficients scales for the five variables: attitude towards CPIS, intention to 
comply, threat appraisal, self efficacy and crisis preparedness awareness were below the 
normal standard alpha of 0.7. Further refinement of these scales can be of benefit for future 
studies.  
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5.5.3 Limitation of the Data Collection Process 
 
The numbers of employees allowed to participate into the study were restricted by the 
respondent organisations.  
 
Since the respondent organisations had a control on who could participate into the study, it is 
likely the sample is not random. This may limit the generalisability of the findings. In 
addition, the sample size remains relatively low. A larger sample size could have provided 
more accurate statistical evidence. 
 
Prior research studies on user awareness and adherence had investigated business continuity, 
disaster recovery, systems risk management, and information security as separate domains. 
However, this study examined these domains as a single entity of crisis preparedness of the 
information systems (CPIS). Moreover, the researcher also assumed the same combination of 
these domains (i.e. BCP, DRP, ISS and ISRM) to exist across all respondent organisations.   
 
5.6 Future Research 
 
This study presents other opportunities for further research. Although the variables utilized in 
this study were drawn from TRA and PMT, the analysis does not attempt to change the 
current configuration of each of these theoretical frameworks. This study only tested the 
association among the variables through the use of the Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients. 
Future studies can be designed around producing a model and test for causality among the 
variables.  
 
Again, further quantitative research, using a somewhat similar survey instrument, could be 
carried out to validate and confirm the results acquired in this study. That can be done after 
incorporating some of the recommendations/suggestions provided by respondents in this 
current study. Another alternative is to broaden the scope of the study by including more 
countries, organisation cultures, and the institutionalisation of CPIS strategies to validate and 
extend the findings of the present study. 
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This study integrates different aspects of the TRA with PMT to generate seven research 
hypotheses for the study. Future studies may substitute the TRA with the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), which extends TRA. The Theory of Planned Behaviour brings in a 
perceived behavioural control component to TRA. This component is in-line with the concept 
that “successful performance of the intended behaviour is contingent on the person’s control 
over the many factors that may prevent it”(Ajzen, 2005, p. 110), and it thus embraces 
practical constraints that may be present.  
 
5.7 Chapter Summary 
 
This is the chapter that brings us to a close of the thesis. A concise summary of the research 
process was first provided. This summarised the important aspects leading up to the core 
findings of the study. The research gap, the research objectives and hypotheses and the 
research design were all outlined. This was followed by a discussion on the study 
implications and the research contributions from both academia and practice perspectives.  
 
The limitations of the study were then discussed. These were categorised into three groups: 
limitations pertaining to the study design, limitations pertaining to the research instrument 
and the data collection process. Finally, opportunities for future research were suggested.  
 
 100 
 
References 
 
Ajzen, I, & Fishbein, M. (1980). Understanding attitudes and predicting social behaviour. 
Englewood Cliffs:Prentice-Hall. 
Ajzen, Icek. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 50(2), 179–211. 
Ajzen, Icek. (2005). Attitudes, Personality and Behavior 2e. McGraw-Hill International. 
Alam, I. (2005). Fieldwork and data collection in qualitative marketing research. Qualitative 
Market Research: An International Journal, 8, 97–112. 
doi:10.1108/13522750510575462 
Albani, J. (2011). Information Security Guideline - NSW Government DFS. Retrieved 
December 29, 2011, from http://services.nsw.gov.au/inside-dfs/information-
communications-technology/publications/information-security-guideline 
Alexander, D. (2005). Towards the development of a standard in emergency planning. 
Journal of Contingencies & Crisis Management, 14, 158–175. 
doi:doi:10.1108/09653560510595164 
Allen, J. (2005). Governing for Enterprise Security. Retrieved December 1, 2011, from 
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/library/abstracts/reports/05tn023.cfm 
Al-Zarouni, M. (2006). The Reality of Risks from Consented use of USB Devices. Australian 
Information Security Management Conference. Retrieved from 
http://ro.ecu.edu.au/ism/70 
Applegate, L. M. (1999). Corporate Information Systems Management: Text and Cases (5th 
ed.). Boston: Irwin/McGraw-Hill. 
Armstrong, C. P., & Sambamurthy, V. (1999). Information Technology Assimilation in 
Firms: The Influence of Senior Leadership and it Infrastructures. Information Systems 
Research, 10, 304–327. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/isre.10.4.304 
Australian Communications & Media Authority. (2008). Developments in internet filtering 
technologies and other measures for promoting online safety. Report. Retrieved 
August 1, 2012, from http://www.egov.vic.gov.au/focus-on-countries/australia/trends-
and-issues-australia/telecommunications-australia/developments-in-internet-filtering-
technologies-and-other-measures-for-promoting-online-safety-2nd-report-in-pdf-
format-3176kb-.html 
Avizienis, A., Laprie, J.-C., Randell, B., & Landwehr, C. (2004). Basic Concepts and 
Taxonomy of Dependable and Secure Computing. IEEE Transactions. Dependable 
and Secure Computing, 1(1), 11–33. doi:10.1109/TDSC.2004.2 
Aydin, C. E., & Rice, R. E. (1991). Social worlds, individual differences, and 
implementation: Predicting attitudes toward a medical information system. 
Information and Management, 20(2), 119–136. doi:10.1016/0378-7206(91)90049-8 
Aytes, K., & Conolly, T. (2003). A Research Model for Investigating Human Behavior 
Related to Computer Security. AMCIS 2003 Proceedings. Retrieved from 
http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2003/260 
Bagozzi, R. (1980). Causal Models in Marketing. The Journal of Marketing, 44(4), 126–128. 
doi:10.2307/1251239 
Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. 
Psychological Review, 84(2), 191–215. 
Banerjee, M. M., & Gillespie, D. F. (1994). Linking Disaster Preparedness and 
Organizational Response Effectiveness. Journal of Community Practice, 1(3), 129. 
doi:10.1300/J125v01n03_09 
 101 
 
Baroudi, J. J., & Orlikowski, W. J. (1988). A Short Form Measure of User Information 
Satisfaction: A Psychometric Evaluation and Notes on Use. SSRN eLibrary. Retrieved 
from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1289738 
Bharadwaj, A. (2000). A Resource-Based Perspective on Information Technology Capability 
and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation. MIS Quarterly, 24(1), 169. 
doi:10.2307/3250983 
Boin, A., & Lagadec, P. (2000). Preparing for the Future: Critical Challenges in Crisis 
Management. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 8(4), 185–191. 
doi:10.1111/1468-5973.00138 
Botha, J., & Solms, R. V. (2004). A cyclic approach to business continuity planning. 
Information Management & Computer Security, 12(4), 328–337. 
doi:10.1108/09685220410553541 
Boudreau, M.-C., Gefen, D., & Straub, D. (2004). Validation Guidelines for IS Positivist 
Research. Communications of the Association for Information Systems, 13(1). 
Retrieved from http://aisel.aisnet.org/cais/vol13/iss1/24 
Boudreau, M.-C., Gefen, D., & Straub, D. W. (2001). Validation in Information Systems 
Research: A State-of-the-Art Assessment. MIS Quarterly, 25(1), 1–16. 
doi:10.2307/3250956 
Boyer, K. K., Olson, J. R., Calantone, R. J., & Jackson, E. C. (2002). Print versus electronic 
surveys: A comparison of two data collection methodologies. Journal of Operations 
Management, 20(4), 357–373. doi:16/S0272-6963(02)00004-9 
Broadbent, M., & Weill, P. (1997). Management by Maxim: How Business and IT Managers 
Can Create IT Infrastructures. http://purl.org/dc/dcmitype/Text. Retrieved May 15, 
2011, from http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2509669 
Brown, L. M., Hickling, E. J., & Frahm, K. (2010). Emergencies, Disasters, and Catastrophic 
Events: The Role of Rehabilitation Nurses in Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. 
Rehabilitation Nursing, 35(6), 236. 
Bryman, A. (2008). Social Research Methods (3rd ed.). OUP Oxford. 
Caponigro, J. R. (2000). The Crisis Counselor: A Step-By-Step Guide to Managing a 
Business Crisis (First Edition.). McGraw-Hill Companies. 
Cerullo, V., & Cerullo, M. J. (2004). Business Continuity Planning: A Comprehensive 
Approach. Information Systems Management, 21(3), 70. 
Chang, J. C.-J., & King, W. R. (2005). Measuring the Performance of Information Systems: 
A Functional Scorecard. Journal of Management Information Systems, 22(1), 85–115. 
Chow, W. S., & Ha, W. O. (2009). Determinants of the Critical Success Factor of Disaster 
Recovery Planning for Information Systems. Information Management & Computer 
Security, 17(3), 248–275. doi:10.1108/09685220910978103 
Coleman, L. (2006). Frequency of Man-Made Disasters in the 20th Century. Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management, 14(1), 3–11. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
5973.2006.00476.x 
Computer Emergency Response Team. (2001). Denial of Service. Retrieved August 4, 2012, 
from http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/denial_of_service.html#1 
Creswell, J. W. (2003). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods 
approaches (2nd ED.). Sage Publications. 
D’Arcy, J., Hovav, A., & Galletta, D. (2009). User Awareness of Security Countermeasures 
and Its Impact on Information Systems Misuse: A Deterrence Approach. Information 
Systems Research, 20(1), 79–98,155,157. 
Denis, H. (1995). Scientists and disaster management. Disaster Prevention and Management, 
4(2), 14–19. doi:10.1108/09653569510082650 
 102 
 
Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2005). Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of 
Qualitative Research. In The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research (3rd ed.). 
Thousand Oaks  Calif.: SAGE. 
Eaglestone, B., Lin, A., Nunes, M. B., & Annansingh, F. (2003). Intention and Effect of IS 
Solutions: Does Risk Management Stifle Creativity? Journal of Information Science, 
29(4), 269–278. doi:10.1177/01655515030294004 
Elky, S. (2006). An introduction to Information System Risk Management. Retrieved 
December 1, 2011, from 
http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/auditing/introduction-information-
system-risk-management_1204 
Elliott, D., & Smith, D. (2006). Cultural Readjustment After Crisis: Regulation and Learning 
from Crisis Within the UK Soccer Industry. Journal of Management Studies, 43(2), 
289–317. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2006.00591.x 
Elsubbaugh, S., Fildes, R., & Rose, M. B. (2004). Preparation for Crisis Management: A 
Proposed Model and Empirical Evidence. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management, 12(3), 112–127. doi:10.1111/j.0966-0879.2004.00441.x 
Ernst & Young. (2002). Global Information Security Survey 2002. Retrieved November 30, 
2011, from http://www.passwordresearch.com/stats/study18.html 
Ernst & Young. (2003). Global Information Security Survey 2003. Retrieved July 21, 2012, 
from http://www.itsmportal.com/news/global-information-security-survey-2003 
Evans, N. (2003). Information Security Guideline for NSW Government Agencies. Retrieved 
December 29, 2011, from 
www.albany.edu/acc/courses/ia/inf766/nswinfosecriskmanagementpt11997.pdf 
Faulkner, B. (2001). Towards a framework for tourism disaster management. Tourism 
Management, 22(2), 135–147. doi:10.1016/S0261-5177(00)00048-0 
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior: An introduction to 
theory and research. Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. 
Floyd, D. L., Prentice-Dunn, S., & Rogers, R. W. (2000). A Meta-Analysis of Research on 
Protection Motivation Theory. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30(2), 407–429. 
doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.2000.tb02323.x 
FTC. (2006). Choicepoint Settles Data Security Breach Charges; to Pay $10 Million in Civil 
Penalties, $5 Million for Consumer Redress. Retrieved November 27, 2011, from 
http://164.62.13.221/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.shtm 
Furnell, S., & Phyo, A. H. (2007). Considering the Problem of Insider IT Misuse. 
Australasian Journal of Information Systems, 10(2). doi:10.3127/ajis.v10i2.160 
Garrett, C. (2004). Developing a Security-Awareness Culture - Improving Security Decision 
Making. Retrieved November 29, 2011, from 
http://www.eisf.eu/resources/item.asp?d=4832 
Gerber, & Vonsolms, R. (2005). Management of risk in the information age. Computers 
Security, 24(1), 16–30. doi:10.1016/j.cose.2004.11.002 
Gillespie, D. F., & Streeter, C. (1987). Conceptualizing and measuring disaster preparedness. 
International journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 5(2), 155–176. 
Goldsborough, R. (2007). How Serious a Threat Are Computer Viruses? Tech Directions, 
67(1), 14. doi:Article 
Goodman, J., Cormack, G. V., & Heckerman, D. (2007). Spam and the ongoing battle for the 
inbox. Communications of the ACM, 50(2), 24–33. doi:10.1145/1216016.1216017 
Gray, C. D., & Kinnear, P. R. (2011). IBM SPSS Statistics 19 Made Simple. Psychology 
Press. 
Greening, D., & Johnson, R. (1996). Do Managers and Strategies Matter? A Study In Crisis. 
Journal of Management Studies, 33(1), 25–51. 
 103 
 
Gregor, S. (2006). The Nature of Theory in Information Systems. Management Information 
Systems Quarterly, 30(3). Retrieved from http://aisel.aisnet.org/misq/vol30/iss3/5 
Guba, E., & Lincoln, Y. (1994). Major paradigms and perspectives. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. 
Lincoln (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research (Eds., pp. 105–117). 
SAGE. 
Hair, J. F., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L., & Black, W. C. (1995). Multivariate Data 
Analysis: With Readings. Prentice Hall. 
Hanson, W. E., Creswell, J. W., Plano Clark, V. L., Petska, K. S., & Creswell, J. D. (2005). 
Mixed Methods Research Designs in Counseling Psychology. Journal of Counseling 
Psychology, 52(2), 224–235. doi:37/0022-0167.52.2.224 
Hart, P., Heyse, L., & Boin, A. (2001). New Trends in Crisis Management Practice and Crisis 
Management Research: Setting the Agenda. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management, 9(4), 181–188. doi:10.1111/1468-5973.00168 
Helms, J. E., Henze, K. T., Sass, T. L., & Mifsud, V. A. (2006). Treating Cronbach’s Alpha 
Reliability Coefficients as Data in Counseling Research. The Counseling 
Psychologist, 34(5), 630 –660. doi:10.1177/0011000006288308 
Herrmann, D. S. (2007). Complete Guide to Security and Privacy Metrics: Measuring 
Regulatory Compliance, Operational Resilience, and ROI (1st ed.). Auerbach 
Publications. 
Hinkin, T. R. (1998). A Brief Tutorial on the Development of Measures for Use in Survey 
Questionnaires. Organizational Research Methods, 1(1), 104–121. 
doi:10.1177/109442819800100106 
Hirschheim, R. (1992). Information Systems Epistemology: An Historical Perspective. 
Retrieved June 29, 2011, from 
http://areadocenti.eco.unicas.it/virili/TerracinaRW/Kit/HirschheimISEpistemology.pd
f 
Hough, M. (2005). Crisis Planning: Increasing effectiveness, decreasing discomfort. Journal 
of Business and Economics research, 3(4). 
Hu, Q., Hart, P., & Cooke, D. (2006). The Role of External Influences on Organizational 
Information Security Practices: An Institutional Perspective, 6(C), 127a. 
doi:10.1109/HICSS.2006.481 
Hwacha, V. (2005). Canada’S Experience In Developing A National Disaster Mitigation 
Strategy: A Deliberative Dialogue Approach. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies 
for Global Change, 10(3), 507–523. 
International Organization for Standardization. (2005). ISO/IEC 27001: Information 
technology - Security techniques - Information security management systems - 
Requirements. Text. Retrieved February 17, 2012, from 
http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=42103 
Jain, A., & Singh, A. K. (2012). Distributed Denial of Service Attacks - Classification and 
Implications. Journal of Information and Operations Management, 3(1), 136–140. 
Jaques, T. (2010). Embedding issue management as a strategic element of crisis prevention. 
Disaster Prevention and Management, 19(4), 469–482. 
doi:10.1108/09653561011070385 
Jarvenpaa, S. L., & Staples, D. S. (2001). Exploring perceptions of organizational ownership 
of information and expertise. Journal of Management Information Systems, 18(1), 
151–183. 
Jasanoff, S. (1993). Crisis Management: Bridging the Two Cultures of Risk Analysis1,2. (A. 
Boin, Ed.)Sage Publications, II(2), 123–129. doi:10.1111/j.1539-
6924.1993.tb01057.x 
Jensen, T. B., Kjærgaard, A., & Svejvig, P. (2009). Using institutional theory with 
sensemaking theory: A case study of information system implementation in 
 104 
 
healthcare. Journal of Information Technology, 24(4), 343–353. 
doi:10.1057/jit.2009.11 
Jones, A. (2007). A Framework for the Management of Information Security Risks. BT 
Technology Journal, 25(1), 30–36. doi:10.1007/s10550-007-0005-9 
Jordan, E. (1999). IT contingency planning: management roles. Information Management & 
Computer Security, 7(5), 232. 
Kaplan, B., & Duchon, D. (1988). Combining qualitative and quantitative methods 
information systems research: A case study. Management Information Systems 
Quarterly, 12(4), 571–586. doi:10.2307/249133 
Kim, Y., Cha, H., & Kim, J. R. (2008). Developing a Crisis Management Index: Applications 
in South Korea. Journal of Public Relations Research, 20(3), 328. 
doi:10.1080/10627260801962962 
Klassen, R. D., & Jacobs, J. (2001). Experimental comparison of Web, electronic and mail 
survey technologies in operations management. Journal of Operations Management, 
19(6), 713–728. doi:16/S0272-6963(01)00071-7 
Kuhn, D. R. (1997). Sources of failure in the public switched telephone network. Computer, 
30(4), 31–36. doi:10.1109/2.585151 
Kumar, S., & Gomez, O. (2010). Denial of Service Due to Direct and Indirect ARP Storm 
Attacks in LAN Environment. Journal of Information Security, 1(2), 88–94. 
Kusumasari, B., Alam, Q., & Siddiqui, K. (2010). Resource capability for local government 
in managing disaster. Disaster Prevention and Management, 19(4), 438. 
Landry, M., & Banville, C. (1992). A disciplined methodological pluralism for MIS research. 
Accounting, Management and Information Technologies, 2(2), 77–97. doi:16/0959-
8022(92)90002-A 
Leidner, D. E., Pan, G., & Pan, S. L. (2009). The role of IT in crisis response: Lessons from 
the SARS and Asian Tsunami disasters. The Journal of Strategic Information 
Systems, 18(2), 80–99. doi:doi: DOI: 10.1016/j.jsis.2009.05.001 
Lettieri, E., Masella, C., & Radaelli, G. (2009). Disaster management: Findings from a 
systematic review. Disaster Prevention and Management, 18(2), 117. 
Lewis, B. R., Templeton, G. F., & Byrd, T. A. (2005). A methodology for construct 
development in MIS research. European Journal of Information Systems, 14(4), 388–
400. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ejis.3000552 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. SAGE. 
Lippert, S. K., & Volkmar, J. A. (2007). Cultural aspects on technology performance and 
utilization: A comparison of U.S. and Canadian users. Journal of Global Information 
Management, 15(2), 56+. 
Maddux, J. E., & Rogers, R. W. (1983). Protection motivation and self-efficacy: A revised 
theory of fear appeals and attitude change. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 19(5), 469–479. doi:10.1016/0022-1031(83)90023-9 
Magklaras, G. ., & Furnell, S. . (2001). Insider Threat Prediction Tool: Evaluating the 
probability of IT misuse. Computers & Security, 21(1), 62–73. doi:10.1016/S0167-
4048(02)00109-8 
Mansor, S., Shariah, M. A., Billa, L., Setiawan, I., & Jabar, F. (2004). Spatial technology for 
natural risk management. Disaster Prevention and Management: An International 
Journal, 13(5), 364–373. 
Markoff, J. (2009). Defying Experts, Rogue Computer Code Still Lurks. The New York 
Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/technology/27compute.html 
Mayer, B. W., Moss, J., & Dale, K. (2008). Disaster and Preparedness: Lessons from 
Hurricane Rita. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 16(1), 14–23. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-5973.2008.00531.x 
 105 
 
Mingers, J. (2003). The paucity of multimethod research: A review of the information 
systems literature. Information Systems Journal, 13(3), 233–249. doi:10.1046/j.1365-
2575.2003.00143.x 
Mithas, S., Ramasubbu, N., & Sambamurthy, V. (2011). How Information Management 
Capability Influences Firm Performance. MIS Quarterly, 35(1), 237. 
Mitroff, I. (2005). Why Some Companies Emerge Stronger and Better from a Crisis: 7 
Essential Lessons for Surviving Disaster (1st ed.). AMACOM. 
Mitroff, I. I. (2004). Think like a sociopath, act like a saint. Journal of Business Strategy, 
25(5), 42–53. doi:10.1108/02756660410558933 
Mitroff, I., Pauchant, T., Finney, M., & Pearson, C. (1989). Do (some) organizations cause 
their own crises? The cultural profiles of crisis-prone vs. crisis-prepared 
organizations. Organization & Environment, 3(4), 269 –283. 
doi:10.1177/108602668900300401 
Morrow, S. L. (2007). Qualitative Research in Counseling Psychology. The Counseling 
Psychologist, 35(2), 209 –235. doi:10.1177/0011000006286990 
Mulilis, J.-P., & Lippa, R. (1990). Behavioral Change in Earthquake Preparedness Due to 
Negative Threat Appeals: A Test of Protection Motivation Theory. Journal of Applied 
Social Psychology, 20(8), 619–638. doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.1990.tb00429.x 
Myers, M. (1997). Qualitative Research in Information Systems. Management Information 
Systems Quarterly, 21(2). Retrieved from http://aisel.aisnet.org/misq/vol21/iss2/6 
Nelson, C., Lurie, N., & Wasserman, J. (2007). Assessing Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness: Concepts, Tools, and Challenges. Annual Review of Public Health, 
28(1), 1–18. doi:10.1146/annurev.publhealth.28.021406.144054 
Nelson, C., Lurie, N., Wasserman, J., & Zakowski, S. (2007). Conceptualizing and defining 
public health emergency preparedness. American Journal of Public Health, 97 Suppl 
1, S9–11. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2007.114496 
Nelson, K. (2006). Examining Factors Associated with IT Disaster Preparedness. In 
Proceedings of the 39th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 
2006. HICSS  ’06 (Vol. 8, p. 205b– 205b). Presented at the Proceedings of the 39th 
Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2006. HICSS  ’06, 
IEEE. doi:10.1109/HICSS.2006.166 
New Zealand Statistics. (2010). Experienced ICT attack that resulted in loss. Retrieved 
August 3, 2012, from http://www.stats.govt.nz/~/media/Statistics/browse-
categories/business/bus-growth-innovation/bus-operations-survey/BOS-april10-all-
tables.xls 
Nunnally, J. C., & Bernstein, I. H. (1994). Psychometric theory. McGraw-Hill. 
Omar, A., Alijani, D., & Mason, R. (2011). Information Technology Disaster Recovery Plan: 
Case Study. Academy of Strategic Management Journal, 10(2), 127. 
Orlikowski, W. J., & Baroudi, J. J. (1991). Studying Information Technology in 
Organizations: Research Approaches and Assumptions. Information Systems 
Research, 2(1), 1 –28. doi:10.1287/isre.2.1.1 
Östlund, U., Kidd, L., Wengström, Y., & Rowa-Dewar, N. (2011). Combining qualitative and 
quantitative research within mixed method research designs: A methodological 
review. International Journal of Nursing Studies, 48(3), 369–383. 
doi:16/j.ijnurstu.2010.10.005 
Pahnila, S., Siponen, M., & Mahmood, A. (2007a). Which Factors Explain Employees’ 
Adherence to Information Security Policies? An Empirical Study. PACIS 2007 
Proceedings. Retrieved from http://aisel.aisnet.org/pacis2007/73 
Pahnila, S., Siponen, M., & Mahmood, A. (2007b). Employees’ Behavior towards IS Security 
Policy Compliance. In Proceedings of the 40th Annual Hawaii International 
 106 
 
Conference on System Sciences (p. 156b–). Washington, DC, USA: IEEE Computer 
Society. doi:10.1109/HICSS.2007.206 
Parnell, J. A., Koseoglu, M. A., & Spillan, J. E. (2010). Crisis Readiness in Turkey and the 
United States. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 18(2), 108–116. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-5973.2010.00603.x 
Pearson, C. M., & Clair, J. A. (1998). Reframing Crisis Management. The Academy of 
Management Review, 23(1), 59–76. 
Pearson, C., & Mitroff, I. (1993). From Crisis Prone to Crisis Prepared: A Framework for 
Crisis Management. The Executive, 7(1), 48–59. 
Pedhazur, E. J., & Schmelkin, L. P. (1991). Measurement, design, and analysis: an 
integrated approach. Routledge. 
Perrow, C. (1999). Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (Updated.). 
Princeton University Press. 
Pfleeger, S. L. (2000). Risky business: What we have yet to learn about risk management. 
Journal of Systems and Software, 265–273. 
Pinsonneault, A., & Kraemer, K. L. (1993). Survey research methodology in management 
information systems: An assessment. Journal of Management Information Systems, 
10(2), 75. 
Pinta, J. (2011). Disaster Recovery Planning as Part of Business Continuity Management. 
AGRIS On-line Papers in Economics and Informatics, 3(4), 55–61. 
Polkinghorne, D. E. (2005). Language and Meaning: Data Collection in Qualitative Research. 
Journal of Counseling Psychology, 52(2), 137–145. doi:10.1037/0022-0167.52.2.137 
Pollard, D., & Hotho, S. (2006). Crises, scenarios and the strategic management process. 
Management Decision, 44(6), 721–736. doi:10.1108/00251740610673297 
Ponterotto, J. G. (2005). Qualitative Research in Counseling Psychology: A Primer on 
Research Paradigms and Philosophy of Science. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 
52(2), 126–136. doi:10.1037/0022-0167.52.2.126 
Porras, P. (2009). Inside Risks: Reflections on Conficker. Association for Computing 
Machinery. Communications of the ACM, 52(10). Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/pqcentral/docview/237057144/1385E98F03EFF3DF37/1?
accountid=14782 
Preble, J. F. (1997). Integrating the Crisis Management Perspective into the Strategic 
Management Process. Journal of Management Studies, 34(5), 769–791. 
doi:10.1111/1467-6486.00071 
Provos, N., McNamee, D., Mavrommatis, P., Wang, K., & Modadugu, N. (2007). The ghost 
in the browser analysis of web-based malware. In Proceedings of the First 
Conference on First Workshop on Hot Topics in Understanding Botnets (pp. 4–4). 
Berkeley, CA, USA: USENIX Association. Retrieved from 
http://dl.acm.org.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/citation.cfm?id=1323128.1323132 
Puhakainen, P. (2006). A design theory for information security awareness. Oulu, Finland. 
Retrieved from http://herkules.oulu.fi/isbn9514281144/ 
Quinn, S. (2010). New Zealand Computer Crime & Security Survey. New Zealand Computer 
Crime and Security Survey. Security. Retrieved July 31, 2012, from 
http://internetnz.net.nz/our-work/security/2010-new-zealand-computer-crime-
security-survey 
Racherla, P., & Hu, C. (2009). A Framework for Knowledge-Based Crisis Management in 
the Hospitality and Tourism Industry. Cornell Hospitality Quarterly, 50(4), 561 –577. 
doi:10.1177/1938965509341633 
Rainer, R. K., Snyder, C. A., & Houston H. Carr. (1991). Risk Analysis for Information 
Technology. Journal of Management Information Systems, 8(1), 129–147. 
 107 
 
Ravichandran, T., & Rai, A. (2000). Quality Management in Systems Development: An 
Organizational System Perspective. MIS Quarterly, 24(3), 381. doi:10.2307/3250967 
Reilly, A. H. (1993). Preparing for the worst: The process of effective crisis management. 
Organization & Environment, 7(2), 115 –143. doi:10.1177/108602669300700204 
Rhee, H., & Kim, C. (2005). I Am Fine but You Are Not : Optimistic Bias and Illusion of 
Control on Information Security. Information Systems Journal. 
Rich, D. (2007). Authentication in Transient Storage Device Attachments. Computer, 40(4), 
102 –104. doi:10.1109/MC.2007.116 
Richardson, R. (2007). Computer Crime and Security Survey. Retrieved from 
http://www.newmedia.org/articles/2007-csifbi-computer-crime-and-security-
survey.html 
Richardson, R. (2008). CSI Computer Crime & Security Survey. Retrieved from 
http://www.cse.msstate.edu/~cse6243/readings/CSIsurvey2008.pdf 
Rippetoe, P. A., & Rogers, R. W. (1987). Effects of components of protection-motivation 
theory on adaptive and maladaptive coping with a health threat. Journal of personality 
and social psychology, 52(3), 596–604. 
Rippl, S. (2002). Cultural theory and risk perception: A proposal for a better measurement. 
Journal of Risk Research, 5(2), 147–165. doi:10.1080/13669870110042598 
Rivard, S., Raymond, L., & Verreault, D. (2006). Resource-based view and competitive 
strategy: An integrated model of the contribution of information technology to firm 
performance. The Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 15(1), 29–50. doi:doi: 
DOI: 10.1016/j.jsis.2005.06.003 
Robert, B., & Lajtha, C. (2002). A New Approach to Crisis Management. Retrieved October 
11, 2010, from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-5973.00195/abstract 
Roberts, K. H. (1990). Some Characteristics of One Type of High Reliability Organization. 
Organisation Science, 1(2), 160–176. doi:10.1287/orsc.1.2.160 
Rogers, R. W. (1975). A Protection Motivation Theory of Fear Appeals and Attitude Change. 
The Journal of Psychology, 91(1), 93–114. doi:10.1080/00223980.1975.9915803 
Romaniuk, J., Sharp, B., Paech, S., & Driesener, C. (2004). Brand and Advertising 
Awareness: A Replication and Extension of a Known Empirical Generalization, 
12(3). Retrieved from 
http://wwwdocs.fce.unsw.edu.au/marketing/amj_12_3_romaniuk_et_al.pdf 
Rosenthal, U., & Kouzmin, A. (1997). Crises and Crisis Management: Toward 
Comprehensive Government Decision Making. Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory: J-PART, 7(2), 277–304. 
Rousaki, B., & Alcott, P. (2006). Exploring the crisis readiness perceptions of hotel managers 
in the UK. Tourism and Hospitality Research, 7(1), 27–38. 
doi:10.1057/palgrave.thr.6050030 
Sam, L. (2004). The Impact of IT Investment in RSA e-Commerce SME Organisations. 
Electr Jour of Infor Syst Eval, 7(1), 49–59. 
Savage, M. (2002). Business continuity planning. Work Study, 51(5), 254–261. 
doi:10.1108/00438020210437277 
Scott, J. E. (1995). The measurement of information systems effectiveness: Evaluating a 
measuring instrument. ACM SIGMIS Database, 26(1), 43–61. 
doi:10.1145/206476.206484 
Shaluf, I., Ahmadun, F., & Said, A. M. (2003). A review of disaster and crisis. Disaster 
Prevention and Management, 12(1), 24–32. doi:10.1108/09653560310463829 
Shaluf, M. (2008). Technological disaster stages and management. Disaster Prevention and 
Management, 17(1), 114. 
 108 
 
Sheppard, B. H., Jon Hartwick, & Warshaw, P. R. (1988). The Theory of Reasoned Action: 
A Meta-Analysis of Past Research with Recommendations for Modifications and 
Future Research. Journal of Consumer Research, 15(3), 325–343. 
Shrivastava, P. (1993). Crisis theory/practice: Towards a sustainable future. Organization & 
Environment, 7(1), 23 –42. doi:10.1177/108602669300700103 
Shrivastava, P. (1994). Technological and organizational roots of industrial crises: Lessons 
from Exxon Valdez and Bhopal. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 
45(3), 237–253. doi:10.1016/0040-1625(94)90048-5 
Shrivastava, P., Mitroff, I., Miller, D., & Miclani, A. (1988). Understanding Industrial Crises. 
Journal of Management Studies, 25(4), 285–303. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
6486.1988.tb00038.x 
Simsek, Z., & Veiga, J. F. (2000). The Electronic Survey Technique: An Integration and 
Assessment. Organizational Research Methods, 3(1), 93 –115. 
doi:10.1177/109442810031004 
Sipior, J. C., & Ward, B. T. (2008). User perceptions of software with embedded spyware. 
Journal of Enterprise Information Management, 21(1), 13–23. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17410390810842228 
Siponen, M. (2006). Information security standards focus on the existence of process, not its 
content. Communications of the ACM, 49(8), 97–100. doi:10.1145/1145287.1145316 
Siponen, M., Pahnila, S., & Mahmood, A. (2007). Employees’ Adherence to Information 
Security Policies: An Empirical Study. In H. Venter, M. Eloff, L. Labuschagne, J. 
Eloff, & R. Solms (Eds.), New Approaches for Security, Privacy and Trust in 
Complex Environments (Vol. 232, pp. 133–144). Boston, MA: Springer US. 
Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-0-387-72367-
9_12?LI=true 
Siponen, M. T. (2000). A conceptual foundation for organizational information security 
awareness. Information Management & Computer Security, 8(1), 31–41. 
doi:10.1108/09685220010371394 
Siponen, M. T., & Oinas-Kukkonen, H. (2007). A review of information security issues and 
respective research contributions. SIGMIS Database, 38(1), 60–80. 
doi:10.1145/1216218.1216224 
Sivo, S. A., Saunders, C., Chang, Q., & Jiang, J. J. (2006). How Low Should You Go? Low 
Response Rates and the Validity of Inference in IS Questionnaire Research. Journal 
of the Association for Information Systems, 7(6). Retrieved from 
http://aisel.aisnet.org/jais/vol7/iss6/17 
Smaltz, D., Sambamurthy, V., & Agarwal, R. (2006). The Antecedents of CIO Role 
Effectiveness in Organizations: An Empirical Study in the Healthcare Sector. IEEE 
Transactions on Engineering Management, 53(2), 207. 
Smith, D. (2003). Major organisations take to managing risk - Computer Business Review 
Africa. Retrieved September 10, 2012, from 
http://cbr.co.za/news.aspx?pklnewsid=9626 
Smith, S., & Jamieson, R. (2006). Determining Key Factors in E-government Information 
Systems Security. Information Systems Management, 23(2), 23. 
Smits, S. J., & Ally, N. E. (2003). “Thinking the Unthinkable” — Leadership’s Role in 
Creating Behavioral Readiness for Crisis Management. Competitiveness Review: An 
International Business Journal incorporating Journal of Global Competitiveness, 
13(1), 1–23. doi:10.1108/eb046448 
Stanton, J., Stam, K., Mastrangelo, P., & Jolton, J. (2005). Analysis of end user security 
behaviors. Computers & Security, 24(2), 124–133. 
 109 
 
Starbuck, W. H., & Milliken, F. J. (1988). Challenger: Fine‐tuning the Odds Until Something 
Breaks. Journal of Management Studies, 25(4), 319–340. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
6486.1988.tb00040.x 
Steiert, M. J. W. (2007). Disaster preparedness. AORN Journal, 86(2), 175–176. 
doi:10.1016/j.aorn.2007.07.013 
Stoneburner, G., Goguen, A., & Feringa, A. (2002). Computer Security: Risk Management 
Guide for Infomation Technology Systems. National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, U.S Department of Commerce. Retrieved from 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-30/sp800-30.pdf 
Straub, D., Boudreau, M., & Gefen, D. (2000). Structural Equation Modeling and Regression: 
Guidelines for Research Practice. Communications of the Association for Information 
Systems, 4(1). Retrieved from http://aisel.aisnet.org/cais/vol4/iss1/7 
Straub, D., Gefen, D., & Boudreau, M.-C. (2005). Research in Information Systems: A 
handbook for research supervisors and their students. (D. Avison & J. Pries-Heje, 
Eds.). Amsterdam: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Straub, D. W. (1989). Validating Instruments in MIS Research. MIS Quarterly, 13(2), 147–
169. doi:10.2307/248922 
Susanto, L. (2003). Business Continuity / Disaster Recovery Planning. Retrieved November 
28, 2011, from http://www.susanto.id.au/papers/bcdrp10102003.asp 
Sylves, R. (2008). Public Managers, Volunteer Organizations, and Disasters. Public 
Manager, 37(4), 76. 
Symantec. (2012). Internet Security Threat Report. Enterprise Security Response. Retrieved 
July 31, 2012, from http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/ 
Tetmeyer, A., & Saiedian, H. (2010). Security Threats and Mitigating Risk for USB Devices. 
IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, 29(4), 44–49. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/10.1109/MTS.2010.939228 
Theoharidou, M., Kokolakis, S., Karyda, M., & Kiountouzis, E. (2005). The insider threat to 
information systems and the effectiveness of ISO17799. Computers & Security, 24(6), 
472–484. doi:10.1016/j.cose.2005.05.002 
Tootle, D. M. (2007). Disaster Recovery in Rural Communities: A Case From Louisiana. In 
Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Rural Sociological Society. Seelbach 
Hilton Hotel, Louisville, Kentucky. Retrieved from 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p124535_index.html 
Tsohou, A., Karyda, M., Kokolakis, S., & Kiountouzis, E. (2006). Formulating Information 
Systems Risk Management Strategies Through Cultural Theory. Information 
Management & Computer Security, 14(3), 198–217. 
doi:10.1108/09685220610670378 
Turner, B. A. (1976). The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 21(3), 378–397. doi:10.2307/2391850 
Turner, B., & Pidgeon, N. (1997). Man-Made Disasters, Second Edition (2nd ed.). 
Butterworth-Heinemann. 
UN/ISDR. (2002). Living with risk: A global review of disaster reduction initiatives. Geneva. 
Retrieved from www.adrc.asia/publications/LWR/LWR_pdf/index.pdf 
United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team. (2010). Cyber Threats to Mobile 
Devices (No. Technical Information Paper-TIP-10-105-01). Retrieved from 
http://www.us-cert.gov/reading_room/TIP10-105-01.pdf 
Unlu, A., Kapucu, N., & Sahin, B. (2010). Disaster and crisis management in Turkey: A need 
for a unified crisis management system. Disaster Prevention and Management, 19(2), 
155. 
Venkatesh, V., Morris, M. G., Davis, G. B., & Davis, F. D. (2003). User Acceptance of 
Information Technology: Toward a Unified View. MIS Quarterly, 27(3), 425–478. 
 110 
 
Vijayan, J. (2006). IT Risks Rise On USB Drives. Computerworld, 40(40), 1–56. 
Wade, M., & Hulland, J. (2004). Review: The Resource-Based View and Information 
Systems Research: Review, Extension, and Suggestions for Future Research. MIS 
Quarterly, 28(1), 107–142. 
Watson, R. (2007). Information Systems. University of Georgia: Global Text Project. 
Retrieved from http://globaltext.terry.uga.edu/userfiles/Information Systems.pdf 
Weirich, D., & Sasse, M. A. (2001). Persuasive password security. In CHI  ’01 Extended 
Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems (pp. 139–140). New York, NY, 
USA: ACM. doi:10.1145/634067.634152 
Whitman, M., & Mattord, H. (2005). Principles of information security (2nd ed.). Boston  
Mass.: Thomson Course Technology. 
Wood, C. C. (1995). The Charles Cresson Wood file. Information Management & Computer 
Security, 3(4), 23–26. doi:10.1108/09685229510097278 
Woon, I., Tan, G.-W., & Low, R. (2005). A Protection Motivation Theory Approach to 
Home Wireless Security. ICIS 2005 Proceedings. Retrieved from 
http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2005/31 
Workman, M. (2008). A test of interventions for security threats from social engineering. 
Information Management & Computer Security, 16(5), 463–483. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09685220810920549 
Yee, K.-P. (2004). Aligning security and usability. IEEE Security Privacy, 2(5), 48 –55. 
doi:10.1109/MSP.2004.64 
Yuan, J., & Jang, S. (2008). The Effects of Quality and Satisfaction on Awareness and 
Behavioral Intentions: Exploring the Role of a Wine Festival. Retrieved February 5, 
2012, from 
http://search.proquest.com.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/pqcentral/docview/217431427/134B0B
2711E7232DCDC/1?accountid=14782 
 
 
 
 
 
 111 
 
Appendices 
 112 
 
Appendix A- Information Sheet 
 
   
User Awareness of and Adherence to Crisis Preparedness of the Information Systems in 
New Zealand Organisations 
 
 
Name of the researcher: Dennis Ishumi 
 
Institution: School of Information Management, Victoria University of Wellington. 
 
I am a Master of Commerce and Administration student in Information Systems at Victoria 
University of Wellington. As part of this degree I am undertaking a research project leading 
to a thesis. This research project has the potential to help organisations improve or 
enhance user awareness of, and adherence to, crisis preparedness of their Information 
Systems against potentially adverse circumstances. In the context of this research project, 
crisis preparedness of the information systems means a wide range of activities including 
management and prevention of potential information systems threats and risks within the 
organisation. 
  
Thank you for taking part in this study. The web survey will take approximately 15 minutes 
to complete. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and your responses 
will remain anonymous. Your responses cannot be matched to your identity and will be 
released only as aggregates grouped with other employees’ responses. 
  
However, you may choose to enter your contact details if you would like to receive a 
summary of the report findings. This information will not be linked to your survey 
responses in order to ensure anonymity. All responses will be kept in a password protected 
file on a secure server, and will be deleted permanently once the findings have been 
communicated to interested individuals. 
  
You may withdraw prior to submitting your responses without consequences of any sort. To 
leave the study simply select a disagree button below. Once you have submitted your 
responses it is no longer possible to withdraw your data because your responses are 
entered into a non-identifiable data file. All material collected will be kept confidential. No 
other person apart from me and my supervisor, Dr Philip Calvert, will see the survey 
responses and we will not be able to identify who they came from. Survey responses will 
form the basis of my research but only aggregated data will be used in the written report. 
The thesis will be submitted for marking to the School of Information Management and 
deposited in the University Library. It is intended that one or more articles will be 
submitted for publication in scholarly journals. The survey responses will be destroyed two 
years after the end of the project. 
  
If you have any questions or would like to receive further information about the project, 
please contact me at dennis.ishumi@vuw.ac.nz or my supervisor, Dr Philip Calvert, at 
philip.calvert@vuw.ac.nz, or at the School of Information Management, Victoria University 
of Wellington, P O Box 600, Wellington 6140, Phone 04 463 6629. 
 
 
 
Dennis Ishumi                         Signed: 
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Appendix B- Survey Instrument  
 
User Awareness of and Adherence to Crisis Preparedness of the Information Systems 
in New Zealand Organisations 
 
K1     I have read and understood the above information sheet and am willing to participate in this study.  
 I agree 
 I disagree 
If “I disagree” Is Selected, Skip To End of Survey 
D1 Gender: Please indicate what describes you best.  
 Male 
 Female 
D2 Age (Years): 
 18-30 
 31-45 
 46 or above 
D3 Do you work in an information technology (IT) or information systems (IS) department? 
 Yes 
 No 
D4 Please indicate the number of years worked in the organisation. 
 < 1 Year 
 1-10 Years 
 11-20 Years 
 > 21 Years 
Crisis preparedness means a wide range of activities including management and prevention of potential 
information systems threats and risks within the organisation.  
 
On the basis of this statement please answer the following questions below. 
S2.1 Which of these statements do you think represent activities associated with crisis preparedness of the 
information systems. Please check all that apply. 
 
 Establishment of plans that will facilitate immediate response to events affecting the information 
systems of the organisation 
 Continuously managing risks by applying appropriate protection to reduce information systems 
vulnerability to potential attacks 
 Selecting and implementing a combination of security measures through the identification, control, and 
mitigation of information systems related risks 
 Putting in place procedures that can facilitate an organisation to restore its information systems and 
services after a significant large-scale interruption 
 End-users sharing information about security, such as exchanging passwords on a regular basis 
 
S2.2 Please list down any activity or activities apart from those listed above that are being practiced in your 
organisation with regard to crisis preparedness of the information systems. 
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S3.1 Crisis preparedness of the information systems is primarily the responsibility of a selected group of people. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
S3.2 The primary responsibility for the crisis preparedness of the information systems in my organisation lies 
with the… 
 Management team 
 Board of Directors 
 Information Technology (IT) or Information Systems (IS) department 
 Business function units 
 IT/IS vendor or supplier 
 I don’t know 
 Other: Please indicate ____________________ 
S3.3 Crisis preparedness of information systems is mainly the responsibility of all employees within the 
organisation. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
S3.4 Crisis preparedness of information systems is not an independent activity, rather it is incorporated into my 
day to day activities. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
S3.5 Crisis preparedness of the information systems is an activity that I must perform separately to my daily 
duties. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
S4.1 I am aware of all major potential crises that can negatively impact the information systems of this 
organisation. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
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S4.2 Information about potential crises that can hit the information systems of this organisation has been clearly 
communicated to all stakeholders. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
S4.3 Some of the incidents listed below are potentially capable of causing significant damages to the 
information and information systems services that can lead to major crises events to an organisation . Please 
check all that apply to your organisation. 
 Unauthorised internal system access 
 Unauthorised external system access 
 Unexpected system shutdown 
 Natural disasters (e.g. Floods, Earthquakes) 
 Fire breakout 
 Non-compliance with organisational information security policies 
 None of the above 
 I don’t know 
S4.4 It is probable that my organisation will encounter some of the threats and risks common to information 
systems platforms. 
 Yes 
 No 
 I don't know 
S4.5 In the occurrence of a major disastrous event such as an earthquake, fire breakout or flooding, what will be 
your first reaction? Please check the best answer. 
 
 Run for my safety 
 Stop and think the best way to contain the situation 
 Follow the laid down procedures to avoid further damages or death 
 Do nothing 
 I don’t know 
 
S5.1 Are you aware of any period(s) that the information systems of your organisation went through a crisis? 
 Yes 
 No 
If you selected “Yes” please respond to S5.2, if “No”, move on to S5.3  
 
S5.2 If Yes, do you believe that crisis preparedness measures in your organisation have improved from the 
previous event?  
 
o Strongly Disagree 
o Disagree 
o Neither Agree nor Disagree 
o Agree 
o Strongly Agree  
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S5.3 How would you rate the level of crisis preparedness of your organisation with regard to potential IS threats 
and risks as compared to other organisations in the same sector? 
 Below Average 
 Average 
 Above Average 
S5.4 Crisis preparedness measures in my organisation will protect critical business processes from potential IS 
threats and risks. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
S5.5 Measures for crisis preparedness of the information systems in my organisation are developed enough for 
the organisation to cope in crises situations. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
S5.6 Do you think the implementation of the measures for crisis preparedness of the information 
systems   requires full participation of all end-users within your organisation? 
 Definitely yes 
 Probably yes 
 Maybe 
 Probably not 
 Definitely not 
S5.7 The implementation of crisis preparedness measures requires all teams (e.g. Information 
Technology/Information Systems, Business units or Human Resources) and individuals to cooperate fully with 
each other. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
S5.8 In the implementation of the measures for crisis preparedness of the information systems, collaboration 
between teams is not necessary. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
S6.1 Crisis preparedness measures in my organisation are processes that allow organisational information 
systems platforms to continue operating in times of uncertainty with minimum interruptions. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
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 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
S6.2 I believe measures for the crisis preparedness of the information systems in my organisation have been 
operationalised. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
S6.3 In my organisation crisis preparedness processes and procedures are kept current. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
S6.4 In my organisation crisis preparedness processes and procedures are reviewed every… 
 6 months 
 12 months 
 24 months 
 36 months 
 Only when there is an incident 
 Only when it is necessary 
S7.1 Crisis preparedness training is conducted in the following intervals. Select only one - 
 Once per year 
 After every two years 
 After every three years 
 None of the above 
S7.2 Crisis preparedness training is conducted during the induction (orientation) programme. 
 Yes 
 No 
S7.3 Crisis preparedness training is conducted when a new crisis preparedness measure is being implemented in 
the organisation. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
S7.4 I cannot recall any crisis preparedness training being conducted in my organisation. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
If “Strongly Agree” Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Block S7 
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S7.5 My crisis preparedness training involves crises simulation so that I know exactly what to do in times of 
crises. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
S7.6 My crisis preparedness training is in line with assigned duties and tested responsibilities. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
S7.7 My crisis preparedness training includes an introduction to available resources and tools to use in the event 
of a crisis. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
S7.8 Crisis preparedness training and communication in my organisation provide for employees to know 
precisely their role(s) in the event of a crisis. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
S7.9 Crisis preparedness training and communication has created a readiness for end-users to work together in 
crisis situations. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
S8.1 Failure by end-users to perform correct measures to counteract potential crises events will lead to negative 
consequences to the information systems of the organisation. 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
S8.2 I think unexpected system shutdown as a result of non compliance with the measures of the crisis 
preparedness of the information systems is a serious issue for the organisation. 
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 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
S9.1 Information security is one approach used by organisations to secure or protect critical business systems 
from unauthorised access that can lead to information systems threats and risks. If these new changes are 
introduced to replace the current setup, how would you react to them? 
 Very 
Displeased 
Displeased Somewhat 
Displeased 
Neutral Somewhat 
Pleased 
Pleased Very 
Pleased 
A requirement that you change 
your security password every 60 
days 
              
Your new security password must 
be eight characters long and must 
combine letters, symbols and 
figures 
              
The system logs you off when you 
are idle for five minutes either  
working from your office or 
remotely 
              
 
S9.2 The back up of information can prove useful in a post crisis situation especially the information generated 
at the individual level. If these are new crisis preparedness measures, how would you react to them? 
 Very 
Displeased 
Displeased Somewhat 
Displeased 
Neutral Somewhat 
Pleased 
Pleased Very 
Pleased 
Ensure complete back up of 
personally generated 
information at the end of 
every week 
              
Conduct a trial run to 
retrieve backed up 
information after every six 
months 
              
 
T1 ** Thank you so much for taking the time to complete this survey ** 
Your responses will allow participating organisations to gain a better understanding of the level of end-user 
awareness of and adherence to crisis preparedness of the information systems in their organisations and how that 
can be improved or enhanced based on the findings from this research project. If you have 
suggestions/recommendations that may improve this study in the near future, please write them down in the box 
provided below. 
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Appendix C- Research Items 
Variable   Item Wording (Attitude Towards CPIS)  
ATTC1 
S3.3 Crisis preparedness of the information systems is mainly the 
responsibility of all employees within the organisation 
ATTC2 
S3.4 Crisis preparedness of the information systems is not an 
independent activity rather it is incorporated into my day to day activities 
ATTC3 
S3.5 Crisis preparedness of the information systems is an activity that I 
must perform separately to my daily duties 
ATTC4 
S5.6 Do you think the implementation of the measures for crisis 
preparedness of the information systems requires full participation of all 
end-users within your organisation? 
ATTC5 
S3.1 Crisis preparedness of the information systems is primarily the 
responsibility of a selected group of people 
 
 
 
  
Variable   Item Wording (Normative Expectations) 
NE1 
S5.7 The implementation of crisis preparedness measures requires all teams 
(e.g. Information Technology/Information Systems, Business units or Human 
Resources) and individuals to cooperate fully with each other 
NE2 
S5.8 In the implementation of the measures for crisis preparedness of the 
information systems, collaboration between teams is not necessary 
NE3 
S7.8   Crisis preparedness training and communication in my organisation 
provide for employees to know precisely their role(s) in the event of a crisis 
NE4 
S7.9 Crisis preparedness training and communication has created a readiness 
for end-users to work together in crisis situations? 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable   Item Wording (Intention to Comply) 
ITC1 
S4.5 In the occurrence of a major disastrous event such as an earthquake, fire 
breakout or flooding, what will be your first reaction?  
ITC2 A requirement that you change your security password every 60 days 
ITC3 
Your new security password must be eight characters long and must combine 
letters, symbols and figures 
ITC4 
The system logs you off when you are idle for five minutes either working 
from your office or remotely 
ITC5 
Ensure complete back up of all personal generated information at the end of 
every week 
ITC6 Conduct a trial run to retrieve backed up information after every six months 
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Variable   Item Wording (Threat Appraisal) 
TA1 
S4.4 It is probable that my organisation will encounter some of the threats 
and risks common to information systems platforms 
TA2 
S8.1 Failure by end users to perform correct measures to counteract potential 
crises events will lead to negative consequences to the information systems 
of the organisation 
TA3 
S8.2 I think unexpected system shutdown as a result of non compliance with 
the measures of the crisis preparedness of the information systems is a 
serious issue for the organisation 
TA4 
S8.3 Do you think the allowance to BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE (e.g. iPad, 
notebook) to work has any detrimental effects to the crisis preparedness of 
the information systems of your organisation? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable   Item Wording (Response Efficacy) 
RE1 
S5.2 If Yes, do you believe that crisis preparedness measures in your 
organisation have improved from the previous event? 
RE2 
S5.3 How would you rate the level of crisis preparedness of your organisation 
with regard to potential information systems threats and risks as compared to 
other organisations in the same sector? 
RE3 
S5.4 Crisis preparedness measures in my organisation will protect critical 
business processes from potential information systems threats and risks 
RE4 
S7.2   Crisis preparedness training is conducted during the induction 
(orientation) programme 
RE5 
S7.4 I cannot recall any crisis preparedness training being conducted in my 
organisation 
RE6 
S7.5 My crisis preparedness training involves crises simulation so that I know 
exactly what to do in times of crises 
RE7 
S7.7 My crisis preparedness training include introduction to available 
resources and tools to use in the event of a crisis 
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Variable   Item Wording (Self Efficacy) 
SE1 
S4.2 Information about potential crises that can hit the information systems 
of this organisation has been clearly communicated to all stakeholders 
SE2 
S5.5 Measures for crisis preparedness of the information systems in my 
organisation are developed enough for the organisation to cope in crises 
situations 
SE3 
S6.2 I believe measures for the crisis preparedness of the information systems  
in my organisation have been operationalised 
SE4 
S6.4 In my organisation crisis preparedness processes and procedures are 
reviewed every… 
SE5 
S7.1   Crisis preparedness training is conducted in the following intervals. 
Select only one     
SE6 
S7.3 Crisis preparedness training is conducted when a new crisis 
preparedness measure is being implemented in the organisation 
SE7 
S7.6 My crisis preparedness training are in-line with assigned duties and 
tested responsibilities 
 
 
  
Variable   Item Wording (Crisis Preparedness Awareness) 
CPA1 
S2.1   Which of these statements do you think represent activities associated 
with crisis preparedness of the information systems. Please check all that 
apply. 
CPA2 
S2.2 Please list down any activity or activities apart from those listed above 
that are being practiced in your organisation with regard to crisis 
preparedness of the information systems 
CPA3 
S3.2 The primary responsibility for the crisis preparedness of the information 
systems in my organisation lies with the… 
CPA4 
S4.1 I am aware of all major potential crises that can negatively impact the 
information systems of this organisation 
CPA5 
S4.3 Some of the incidents listed below are potentially capable of causing 
significant damages to the information and information systems services that 
can lead to major crises events to an organisation . Please check all that apply 
to your organisation. 
CPA6 
S5.1 Are you aware of any period(s) that the information systems of your 
organisation went through a crisis? 
CPA7 
S6.1 Crisis preparedness measures in my organisation are processes that 
allow   organisational information systems platforms to continue operating in 
times of uncertainty with minimum interruptions 
CPA8 
S6.3 In my organisation crisis preparedness processes and procedures are 
kept current 
 
 123 
 
Appendix D- Multiple Response Items 
 
Variable 
Item Wording (Crisis Preparedness Awareness) 
  Activities that represent Crisis preparedness of the information systems 
CPA1.1 Does establishment of plans represent crisis preparedness? 
CPA1.2 Does continuous managing of risks and threats represent crisis preparedness? 
CPA1.3 
Do identification, control and mitigation of security measures embrace crisis 
preparedness efforts? 
CPA1.4 
Do plans and procedures to facilitate restoration of affected systems 
represent crisis preparedness? 
CPA1.5 
Do end-users sharing information about security represent crisis 
preparedness? 
 
 
 
 
  
Var. Item Wording (Crisis Preparedness Awareness) 
  
Incidents that can lead significant damages to the information systems of 
the organisation 
CPA5.1 Unauthorised internal system access 
CPA5.2 Unauthorised external system access 
CPA5.3 Unexpected system shutdown 
CPA5.4 Natural disasters (e.g. Floods, Earthquakes) 
CPA5.5 Fire breakout 
CPA5.6 Non-compliance with organisational information security policies 
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Appendix C- Other Documentation 
C.1 Human Ethics approval application form 
 
SIM HUMAN ETHICS COMMITTEE 
Application for Approval of Research Projects 
Please email applications to your supervisor, who will then email it to a SIM HEC member 
for a preliminary review. 
Note: The Human Ethics Committee attempts to have all applications approved within 6 working days, but a 
longer period may be necessary if applications require substantial revision.   
 
1 NATURE OF PROPOSED RESEARCH: 
 
 (a) Student Research  
 
 (b) If Student Research            Degree MCA   Course Code INFO 591 
 
(c) Project Title:  
 
User Awareness of and Adherence to Crisis Preparedness of the Information Systems in New 
Zealand Organisations  
 
2 INVESTIGATORS: 
 
 (a) Principal Investigator 
 
 Name:  Dennis Buberwa Ishumi 
 
 E-mail address: dennis.ishumi@vuw.ac.nz 
 
 School/Dept/Group: School of Information Management 
 
 (b) Other Researchers   
                      
 Name   Position 
 
 ………………………………………………………               …………..   
 ……………………………………………………………..      ……………. 
 
 (c) Supervisor (in the case of student research projects) 
 
 Dr. Philip Calvert   Supervisor 
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3 DURATION OF RESEARCH 
 
 (a) Proposed starting date for data collection – Soon after HEC approval is granted. 
  (Note: that NO part of the research requiring ethical approval may commence 
prior to approval being given) 
 (b)Proposed date of completion of project as a whole March 2013 
4 PROPOSED SOURCE/S OF FUNDING AND OTHER ETHICAL  
 CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 (a) Sources of funding for the project 
Please indicate any ethical issues or conflicts of interest that may arise because of sources of funding e.g. 
restrictions on publication of results 
 
Conflict of interest is unanticipated as there is no any external funding 
involved. 
 
 (b) Is any professional code of ethics to be followed      N  
  
 (c) Is ethical approval required from any other body      N  
  
 
5 DETAILS OF PROJECT 
 
 Briefly Outline: 
 
 (a) The objectives of the project/research include: 
 
i. To determine the extent of end-user awareness within the 
organisation of the crisis preparedness of the information systems;  
 
ii. To determine the extent of end-user adherence to the crisis 
preparedness of the information systems.  
 
 (b) Method of data collection 
 
This study will make use of a survey instrument to be distributed to the 
respondents through their email addresses. The email content will include the 
survey link and the information to access it. The survey process uses Qualtrics 
software and will be strictly anonymous. It is anticipated that it will take 
approximately 15 minutes to complete the survey.   It is proposed to distribute 
the survey to the respondents soon after HEC approval is granted and three 
weeks later a follow up email will be sent as a reminder. 
 
 (c) The benefits and scientific value of the project 
 
The primary value of this research to academia will be the expansion of the 
existing discourses on crisis-preparedness. This will be done by the application of 
existing theory to analyse the collected data. The consolidation of the theoretical 
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frameworks and the application of the theory to analyse data will add knowledge 
to the field of crisis preparedness in IS.  
 
This study also offers value to the participating organisations. The significance of 
the results from this study will allow these organisations to gain a better 
understanding of the level of end-user awareness of and adherence to crisis 
preparedness of the information systems in their organisations.  From this 
understanding organisations will be able to improve or enhance user 
participation in crisis preparedness of the information systems at all levels. 
  
 (d) Characteristics of the participants 
 
 The selected participants must be people employed by the organisation 
and perform their duties using  workstation computers or laptops 
connected to the enterprise network 
 They must have minimum knowledge in Information Systems and 
services offered over its platform 
 They must have an official email address that will be used to access the 
web survey. 
 
 (e) Method of recruitment 
  
Two or three organisations will be approached to see if they are willing to 
support the research.  When an organisation agrees, an IS manager will be asked 
to arrange for the distribution of the email message containing the link to the 
survey to all staff who fit the profile in 5 (d). 
 
Participants in the study will be recruited from organisational employees who 
have access to (or use) information and information systems services from their 
workstation computers or laptops connected to the enterprise network. In other 
words, this is a group of people who use organisational information systems to 
carry out their daily duties. 
  
 (f) Payments that are to be made/expenses to be reimbursed to participants 
 
  None 
 
 (g) Other assistance (e.g. meals, transport) that is to be given to participants 
 
   None 
 
(h) Any special hazards and/or inconvenience (including deception) that participants will 
encounter 
 
  None 
 
 (i) State whether consent is for: (Please indicate as many as it applies) 
 
  (i) the collection of data    Y    
  (ii) attribution of opinions or information N    
  (iii) release of data to others   N 
 127 
 
  (iv)  use for a conference report or a publication Y    
  (v) use for some particular purpose (specify) N    
 
 Attach a copy of any questionnaire or interview schedule to the application 
 
(j) How is informed consent to be obtained (see paragraphs 4.31(g), 5.2, 5.5 and 5.61 of the Guidelines) 
 
  (i) the research is strictly anonymous, an information sheet is supplied and 
informed consent is implied by voluntary participation in filling out a 
questionnaire for example (include a copy of the information sheet) Y  
  (ii) the research is not anonymous but is confidential and informed consent will 
be obtained through a signed consent form (include a copy of the consent 
form and information sheet) N  
  (iii) the research is neither anonymous nor confidential and informed consent will 
be obtained through a signed consent form (include a copy of the consent 
form and information sheet) N 
  (iv) informed consent will be obtained by some other method (please specify and 
provide details) N  
    
…………………………………………………………………………………………………..
. 
 
With the exception of anonymous research as in (i), if it is proposed that written consent will 
not be obtained, please explain why 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………..
. 
 
 (k)If the research will not be conducted on a strictly anonymous basis state how 
issues of confidentiality of participants are to be ensured if this is intended. (See 
paragraph 4.3.1(e) of the Guidelines). (e.g. who will listen to tapes, see questionnaires 
or have access to data). Please ensure that you distinguish clearly between 
anonymity and confidentiality.  Indicate which of these are applicable. 
 
  (i) access to the research data will be restricted to the investigator N  
  (ii) access to the research data will be restricted to the investigator and their 
supervisor (student research) Y    
  (iii) all opinions and data will be reported in aggregated form in such a way that 
individual persons or organisations are not identifiable Y  
  (iv) Other (please specify) 
 
 (l) Procedure for the storage of, access to and disposal of data, both during and at the 
conclusion of the research. (see section 7 of the guidelines). Indicate which are 
applicable: 
 
(i) all written material (questionnaires, interview notes, etc) will be kept in a 
locked file and access is restricted to the investigator Y     
  (ii) all electronic information will be kept in a password-protected file and access 
will be restricted to the investigator Y      
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  (iii) all questionnaires, interview notes and similar materials will be destroyed: 
   (a) at the conclusion of the research N  
  or (b) Two years after the conclusion of the research Y      
  (iv) any audio or video recordings will be returned to participants and/or 
electronically wiped N       
  (v) other procedures (please specify): 
   
 ………………………………………………………………………………... 
 
 If data and material are not to be destroyed please indicate why and the procedures 
envisaged for ongoing storage and security 
 
 ……………………………………………………………………………... 
 
 (m) Feedback procedures (See section 8 of the Guidelines). You should indicate whether 
feedback will be provided to participants and in what form.  If feedback will not 
be given, indicate the reasons why. 
 
At the end of the study a 2 – 3 page summary version of the research 
report will be sent to participants using a mailing list which will be 
created as a secondary component of the survey. The Qualtrics software 
application allows participants who are interested in receiving a copy of 
the report findings of this study to be directed to a different web link in 
order to maintain anonymity during this study. This web link is 
configured so that respondents can provide their contact details without 
being linked to their survey responses. A full final report will be written 
based on the overall results from the study. One copy of the final report 
will be submitted to the management of the participating organisations 
for them to consider any recommendations /suggestions made by the 
researcher.  
  
 
 (n) Reporting and publication of results.  Please indicate which of the following are 
appropriate.  The proposed form of publications should be indicated on the 
information sheet and/or consent form. 
 
  (i) publication in academic or professional journals Y     
  (ii) dissemination at academic or professional conferences Y     
  (iii) deposit of the research paper or thesis in the University Library (student 
research) Y     
  (iv)   a case study used for teaching purposes N 
  (v) other (please specify) 
 
 ……………………………………………………………………………... 
 
Signature of investigators as listed on page 1 (including supervisors) and Chair of SIM 
HEC. 
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 NB: All investigators and the Chair of SIM HEC must sign the form, then send 
it to the SIM HEC administrator for filing once the electronic application has 
been approved. 
 
 
 Dennis Buberwa Ishumi    Date………………………... 
 
 Supervisor: 
 
 Dr. Philip Calvert      Date………………………... 
 
 Chair of SIM HEC: 
 
     ………………………………….                Date ……………………….. 
  
                                                    
   
APPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN ETHICS APPROVAL 
CHECKLIST   
Have you read the Human Ethics Committee Policy? 
Have you read the Faculty of Commerce and Administration’s HEC Guide? 
Is ethical approval required for your project? 
Have you established whether informed consent needs to be obtained for your project? 
In the case of student projects, have you consulted your supervisor about any human ethics 
implications of your research? 
Have you included an information sheet for participants which explains the nature and purpose of 
your research, the proposed use of the material collected, who will have access to it, whether the data 
will be kept confidential to you, how anonymity or confidentiality is to be guaranteed? 
 Have you included a written consent form? 
If not, have you explained on the application form why you do not need to get written consent? 
 Are you asking participants to give consent to: 
collect data from them 
 attribute information to them 
 release that information to others 
use the data for particular purposes 
Have you indicated clearly to participants on the information sheet and/or consent form how they 
will be able to get feedback on the research from you (e.g. they may tick a box on the consent form 
indicating that they would like to be sent a summary), and how the data will be stored or disposed of at 
the conclusion of the research? 
Have you included a copy of any questionnaire or interview checklist you propose using? 
 
POINTERS TO AVOID HAVING APPLICATIONS RETURNED BEFORE HEC 
REVIEW 
 The approval process is speeded up by not requiring the hard copy of your 
application form with the signatures on it at the initial review process.  The complete 
application (HEC application form, info sheet, consent form, covering letter, 
questionnaire etc.) is to be emailed as an attachment in one file to your supervisor 
who will email it to an SIM HEC member for a preliminary review.  
 Do not insert a date into item 3 a. 
 Delete the “Y” or “N” option that is not required.  DO NOT remove any other text from 
the application form. 
 BOLD your answers if you wish but do not alter the font anywhere else in the form. 
  
 
C.2 First Contact Email Template 
 
 
 
Dear Colleague, 
 
We are writing in advance to let you know that a few days from now you will receive in your 
email inbox a request to fill out a web survey for an important research study. This study is 
being conducted in collaboration with the School of Information Management at the Victoria 
University of Wellington. 
 
This email is to let you know that you been chosen to participate in our study. The research 
study is designed to capture the degree to which people (end users) within the organisation are 
aware of and adhere to different measures of the crisis preparedness of the information 
systems. 
 
Your participation in our study is highly appreciated. We thank you in advance for your time 
and consideration of this email. 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Dennis Ishumi 
School of Information Management 
 
  
 
C.3 Second Contact Email Template 
 
 
Dear Respondent,  
  
We'd like to invite you to take part in today’s study about Crisis preparedness of the 
information systems in New Zealand Organisations.  
 
It should take approximately 10 minutes depending on your answers to complete this survey. 
We hope you find it interesting!  
 
So that your views can be included we need you to finish the survey in the next three weeks. 
This survey will close when the three weeks lapse.  
 
Your answers, your organisation and your identity are completely anonymous. Your views 
will be grouped with those of others so that individual people and their answers cannot be 
identified. All collected information will be kept in a password protected file on a secure 
server accessible only to me and my supervisor. 
 
To start, just click on the link below. If you need to, you can stop the survey at any time on 
the way through and return to the same point at a later date (i.e. you can do it in small bits).  
 
Please click here to take a survey.  
 
Thanks, in advance, for your time and your views!  
 
Dennis Ishumi 
School of Information Management 
  
 
C.4 Email Reminder Template 
 
 
Dear Respondent,  
 
About three weeks ago I sent a web-based survey to you that asked about your perception on 
Crisis preparedness of the information systems in New Zealand Organisations. Our 
records show that some of you have responded to our request by completing the survey, some 
are in progress and others have not started yet.  
 
The point of views of people who have already responded have communicated a wide variety 
of ways in which they believe their organisation is prepared and how they see their role in the 
whole process of crisis preparedness of the information systems. We think the results are 
going to be very useful to all participating organisations and to the wider community of 
private and public organisations. 
 
We are writing again because of the importance that your response has for helping to get 
credible results. Although we sent invitations to many other employees at Meridian Energy, it 
is only by hearing from nearly everyone in the sample that we can be sure that the results are 
truly representative. You have three more weeks to take the survey. 
 
We hope that you will access the web-based survey and fill it out as soon as you can or you 
can do it now: Please click here to take a survey.  But if for any reason you prefer not 
to participate in the study just ignore this reminder.   
 
Thanks again for your time and your views! 
 
 
Dennis Ishumi 
dennis.ishumi@vuw.ac.nz 
  
 
C.5 The Data Collection Process 
 
To Whom It May Concern, 
This document gives you detailed explanation of the data collection process if your 
organisation agrees to participate into the study. All of the work will be done by me with a 
little assistance from the IT staff particularly on broadcasting the email message. 
I promise this study will not be disruptive in any way to either IT staff or other employees.   
The survey is designed to ensure that the respondents will use approximate 10 minutes or less 
of their time to fill out the questionnaire.  We would also hope that (organisation name) will 
benefit from the results of the survey, giving you something back in return for the staff time 
given to us. 
 
The process will go as follows:  
1. An email template below will be sent to IT staff (or communication people) so that the 
same can be broadcasted to (organisation name) employees. This will be the first task IT staff 
will be helping us with. 
 
First Contact Email 
Dear Colleague, 
 
We are writing in advance to let you know that a few days from now you will receive in your 
email inbox a request to fill out a web survey for an important research study. This study is 
being conducted in collaboration with the School of Information Management at the Victoria 
University of Wellington. 
 
This email is to let you know that you been chosen to participate in our study. The research 
study is designed to capture the degree to which people (end users) within the organisation are 
aware of and adhere to different measures of the crisis preparedness of the information 
systems. 
 
Your participation in our study is highly appreciated. We thank you in advance for your time 
and consideration of this email. 
Sincerely, 
 
Dennis Ishumi 
School of Information Management 
 
2. A second email template (see below) containing the survey link will also be sent to IT staff 
so that the same can be broadcasted to (organisation name) employees. This will be the 
second task we are asking a support from IT staff.  
 
An email containing the survey link (this will be sent two days later after the first one) 
Dear Respondent,  
 
We'd like to invite you to take part in today’s study about Crisis preparedness of the 
information systems in New Zealand Organisations.  
 
  
 
It should take approximately 10 minutes depending on your answers to complete this survey. 
We hope you find it interesting!  
 
So that your views can be included we need you to finish the survey in the next three weeks. 
This survey will close when the three weeks lapse.  
 
Your answers are completely anonymous. Your views will be grouped with those of others so 
that individual people and their answers cannot be identified.  
 
To start, just click on the link below. If you need to, you can stop the survey at any time on 
the way through and return to the same point at a later date.  
 
Please click here to take a survey.  
 
Thanks, in advance, for your time and your views!  
 
Dennis Ishumi  
 
If you would like to contact us about this survey, simply email us at 
dennis.ishumi@vuw.ac.nz   
------------------------------------------ 
 
3. Once the employees fill out the questionnaire, their responses will automatically be sent to 
a designated server on our side. This means no one at (organisation name) will be responsible 
for managing the filled out questionnaires.  
 
4. After three weeks I may ask IT staff to send out an email reminder to those who received 
the first invitation to ensure that they use this opportunity to participate if they have not done 
so. 
 
 5. A few months later a draft copy of the final report will be sent to Communication 
department to review the company narration.  
 
6. At the end of the study a copy of the final report will be submitted to (organisation name). 
The report will contain the study finding, suggestions and recommendations which may be 
used for improvements or enhancements of user participation in crisis preparedness of the 
information systems at (organisation name).  
 
 
